

PERSPECTIVES IN ŚAIVISM


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V. RAMAKRISHNAN

A GOLDEN JUBILEE PUBLICATION
The Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for
Advanced Study in Philosophy
UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS





A Golden Jubilee Publication

GENERAL EDITOR :

Dr. V. A. DEVA SENAPATHI

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PERSPECTIVES IN ŚAIVISM

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


சுவாமிநாதர்
— திருச்சிற்றம்பலம் —

PERSPECTIVES IN SAIVISM

Tanjore Nataraja Pillai Olaganathan..
4.X.1978.

BY
V. RAMAKRISHNAN



THE Dr. S. RADHAKRISHNAN INSTITUTE
FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

1978



University of Madras, Madras, 1978.

Price Rs. 12/-

Printed in India
at Rathnam Press, Madras-600 001.

FOREWORD

The Department of Philosophy was started in the University of Madras in September 1927. In August 1964 it was raised to the status of a Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy by the University Grants Commission. From 1976 it has come to be known as the Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy.

Since its inception in 1927, this Department has kept in view two major objectives: (1) the study of Indian systems of thought and (2) the study of other systems of thought. Last year the Department arranged a course of special lectures in furtherance of these objectives.

Dr V. Ramakrishnan of the Department of Philosophy, University of Sri Lanka, has had the privilege of studying with outstanding Professors like Professor K. N. Jayatilleke in Sri Lanka and Professor Ninian Smart in England. These opportunities have enabled him to see his Saivism from new angles. He has endeavoured to see Saivism along side of Buddhism and Linguistic Analysis, not against them—to look across, not look cross! We trust his lead will inspire other students of Saivism to develop such new perspectives. The Institute is thankful to him for his pioneering efforts and wishes him many years of service to the cause of Philosophy and Religion.

As part of the Golden Jubilee Celebrations, the special lectures delivered at this Institute are brought out as Golden Jubilee Publications. The Institute is grateful to Dr V. Ramakrishnan for permission to publish his lectures under the title Perspectives in Saivism in its Golden Jubilee Series.

The Institute wishes to thank the Government of Tamil Nadu, Dr Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, the Vice-Chancellor, and the other authorities of the University of Madras for the financial aid given for these publications. The Institute is appreciative of the interest evinced by the University Grants Commission in upgrading the parent Department into a Centre for Advanced Study in philosophy, financing it for ten years and for its subsequent and sustained interest in the progress of the Institute.

The Institute is grateful to the late Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri for laying the foundations of the Department on sound lines and to Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan, former Director of the Institute for building up the Department over a period of three and a half decades by his devoted services.

The General Editor wishes to thank his colleague, Mr. P. Balasubramanian, for going through the proofs and the Rathnam Press for the prompt and neat execution of the work.

Madras
February, 22, 1978. }

V. A. DEVASENAPATHI

P R E F A C E

Saiva Siddhanta and Buddhism are heir to a common religious and philosophical tradition and thus there is a great deal in common between the two systems. It is true there are marked differences and this could be traced to the differences in the values emphasised. One views the human environment as a divine creation and life on earth is seen as an opportunity for spiritual advancement, while the other seeks peace and calm. Both are prescribed as solutions to the problem of human alienation, which to the more sensitive beings become totally unbearable. The source of the problem is traced to the life of surrender to the inclinations. Both systems therefore see in renunciation a guarantee of bliss.

In seeking to attain their respective goals different sets of practices had been evolved, which over the years has lent the two traditions a cultural distinctness of their own. Physical contiguity of the two traditions has often led to polemical situations and scholars were not found wanting who would rub in the differences—and this for non-religious reasons. The time has now come for the pendulum to swing the other way and our task therefore is to describe the scheme of doctrines one along side the other.

disputa-
controversial

The Dr S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy gave me an opportunity to undertake this task. On the initiative of Professor V. A. Devasenapathi, I was invited to deliver a course of lectures, as part of the programme for the Golden Jubilee year, I am indeed grateful for this kind gesture.

It must be stated that the preliminary work was done while a research student at The University of Lancaster. The skilled guidance of Professor Ninian Smart was indeed a great advantage. Dr W. Sirinanda and Mr H. N. G. Macleed, who were my contemporaries then, spared a great deal of their time to help me steer my research programme through. Several of my colleagues at the University of Sri Lanka—in particular Mr S. Murugavel and Mr S. V. Kasinathan, gave me invaluable assistance. Yet I do not feel happy in rushing into print. Perhaps there is a danger in waiting. It may not see print at all. Hence the appeal to the readers. I would welcome any helpful criticism that may prove useful in pursuing my researches in this field. I would also welcome other researchers to examine the two systems with a view to bringing out similarities and differences.

V. RAMAKRISHNAN.


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ABBREVIATIONS

- D. A. I. P. N. Smart; *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy.*
- B. L. Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic.*
- S. B. *Śivajñāna Boddam.*
- S. S. P. *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār: Parapakkam.*
- S. S. S. *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār: Supakkam.*
- E. B. I. K. Jayatillake, K. N., *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge.*
- H. I. P. S. N. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy.*
- T. K. S. S. V. Ponnaiyah, *Theory of Knowledge of Saiva Siddhanta.*
- M. *Manimekalai.*
- Mn. *Majjima Nikāya.*
- B. T. I. E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India.*
- Y. I. F. M. Eliade, *Yoga Immortality and Freedom.*
- P. T. S. Pali Text Society.

T.N. Gnananathan.



ON RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

(Some Comments on Śaiva-Lokāyata Polemics)

The verifiability theory of meaning as defined and applied in the analysis of religious statements had raised two significant questions:—1. whether such statements were at all susceptible to empirical tests, and 2. if they are not empirically testable, whether they can be construed as factual assertions that can be assessed as true or false.

The above standpoint as canvassed by Logical Empiricists had focussed its attention on statements affecting the existence of God. If God is a supernatural being not governed by any laws or regularities to be discovered, then, it would be impossible to make any statements (even false ones) about such a being. So went the argument. It concluded that a theory, which prevents us from recognising the existence of such an entity, if it did exist, would be an unreasonable theory.

This verificationist challenge as raised in academic circles in the West arose out of circumstances peculiar to an Anglo-Saxon environment. Scientific truths and the methodology of arriving at them became the model of testing the meaningfulness or otherwise of religious statements. If so, why then raise it in the Indian context, it may be asked. And this for two reasons: 1. Why raise a spectre that has not haunted us? It is true that the Logical Empiricist school has not any of its blood cousins in our midst—the only nearest to it being the late K. N. Jayatilleke.¹ 2. Besides, the verificationist challenge was directed at the Christian religion, which has a distinct set of dogmas and practices. The Śaiva religion (its dogmas and practices) on the other hand belongs to a totally different metaphysical background. True enough. But the cult of science and technology claims to replace the role of religion in our society. Not only are subtle challenges

to the meaningfulness of religious claims made overtly, but the impact of the implications of such a standpoint is being felt in the realm of law and education as well. Even if it be Christianity alone that has remained the target of attack by the verificationist school, it is nevertheless an attack on the spiritual realm. To that extent affinity is claimed. This is more in the nature of the background to the discussion, lest I be charged of pontification. The main aim is in the nature of an academic exercise—to examine the nature of religious claims made by Śaiva mystics and theologians as expressed in language.

This study seeks as its base of operation the Śaiva polemics with the Lokāyata as found in the *parapakkam* portion of *Śivā-jñāna Siddhiyār*. The author, Arulnandi Śivāchāriyar, here attempts a short statement of the Lokāyata position *vis-a-vis* the Śaiva and in turn presents a refutation from the Śaiva point of view. It is not merely a probe into the cognitive element. It develops into a confrontation of two conflicting life styles that emerge as prescriptions. Hence the polemical nature of the exercise. But what should interest us is the implications of the Śaiva-Lokāyata debate to the current discussion on problems of language. The type of arguments adopted in refutation is essentially metaphysical and the source of the differences is mainly epistemological. Yet one can draw implications that could be preliminary to a study of Śaiva religious language.

The Lokāyata begins with a statement of the bases of knowledge that he upholds and that which he rejects. This is almost a ritual exercise in system-building among Indian philosophers. Sense perception alone constitutes the only valid base of knowledge. This rules out other sources.

Empirical observation or sense perception is defined in terms of sensing material objects external to the knowing subject that could be described in terms of qualities. The six modes of perception as elaborated by the commentator include doubt and error and also what could be called immediate inference. Thus within the range defined, considerable rigour seems to obtain. The Lokāyata then proceeds to construct a system that could

explain all phenomena on the basis of what is claimed as his primitive findings—the material elements and their combination in different proportions. To combine and disintegrate is in their nature.² The human frame and consciousness together with its environment, and all experiences (of pleasure and pain) become subsumable under this materialist principle. Qualitative changes are said to emerge from quantitative changes. The intervention of non-materialist agencies is thus treated as redundant. Nor is one allowed to read design in all change.

Emphasis on sense perception reveals the Lokayata's interest in drawing implications for morality and a way of life to be prescribed. It is not merely a method. It gets transformed into a creed. But it is the measure of the true statement that should interest us. And this remains as that which is verifiable in terms of empirical observation.

Perhaps the most crucial and also controversial stand is the value ascribed to a life of pleasure. It is treated as derivative from the theory of knowledge upheld. After having stated their findings with regard to what is the case, they also seem to assume that it ought to be the case. The zest with which it is extolled is a revelation. They appear to have an insight into what is of intrinsic worth. What is real is that which exists and is available for sense perception. But that which exists is also that which is good. Thus what exists also takes the form of the ideal. The descriptive task becomes co-extensive with the evaluative task. What begins by being answers to questions of fact concerns itself with values as well. It becomes an attempt to direct conduct by presenting what should be done. 'Pleasure' gains dimensions accessible to the senses.³ Subjectively, it has the quality of gratification and the natural tendencies in the struggle for survival (murder, theiving, drunkenness, lust and dishonesty) are extolled as virtues. These could only be spurned by cowards.⁴ All worthwhile endeavour is indulgence in a life of pleasure. True freedom therefore consists in a total surrender to the inclinations and the liberated or free man is one who continuously indulges in it.⁵

The ideal therefore emerges from the natural^o and it is this prescription that provokes polemics.

If the prescriptive element is eliminated, a close resemblance could be discerned between the standpoint of the Lokāyata and the modern verificationist school. According to the verifiability theory of meaning, one could be said to be making a factual assertion only if it is possible to conceive of some way in which what he is saying can be shown to be true or false by empirical observation. As far as method is concerned, the Lokāyata too is concerned with questions of fact regarding the world around us and their behaviour. Their answers are descriptive and reveal a preparedness to vindicate the truth of their assertions in terms of test for evidence. Their generalised statements concerning unobservable entities resemble the modern scientific hypothesis in that they are indirectly testable. But the Lokāyata's position differs from that of modern science in that the former's position could be characterised by cocksureness devoid of the tentative approach of the latter.

Armed with what could be referred to as the verifiability theory of meaning in terms of sense perception⁷ the Lokāyata turns his attention on what is asserted by the Śaiva. The existence of God and Soul and the operation of *karma* or the moral law—crucial dogmas in the Śaiva scheme, are rejected not as meaningless but as decidedly false. Here, their commitment to a self-contained materialist account, compels them to adopt a position qualitatively distinct from that of their modern counterparts. But in refuting the Śaiva position as false, the Lokāyata seem to credit Śaiva assertions as meaningful—a position, the modern verificationists would refuse to adopt. As such, scope exists to interpret the verificationist principle in some extended way that could make religious statements both meaningful and true. (Western philosophers with commitments to the Christian religion do not refer to an 'extended interpretation' of the verifiability criteria. Rather they would resort to an 'alternate interpretation' of religious language. Two issues are involved that could explain their position:—

1. These philosophers would rather accept scientific propositions

as meaningful and true and accommodate religious propositions by grafting them on to scientific propositions, than show that they are antithetic to one another. The latter would make at least one of them false. Even the verificationist would argue that the utterances of theists not being genuine propositions at all, cannot stand in any logical relation to the propositions of science and hence conclude that the one does not exclude the other.

2. Being committed to the meaningfulness of scientific propositions that are expressed in ordinary language, religious predicates are found to be mere 'odd' uses of ordinary terms.)

A detailed examination of the Lokāyata position may point towards a possibility of extended interpretation of the verificationist principle that could cover the whole range of human experience. Perhaps Arulnandi had similar intentions when he begins the *parapakkam* with a statement of the Lokāyata position. Even if the contest be an imaginary one, the logic of religious language demands that analysis begins with an examination of the Lokāyata stand point. A similar structure is also discernible in other Indian polemical treatises—eg. *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.

The key assertions made by the Śaiva Siddhāntin that provokes contemptuous deriding are as follows:—

1. *Karma*:—"The operation of *karma* or the moral law accounts for all modes of existence." The above generalised statement contains, if not entails, the following detailed statements:—

- (a) All actions are productive of consequences that rebound on the agent himself.⁹
- (b) The effects of human actions need not be experienced contiguously in space and time in the analogy of the fertilisers.⁹ One could thus imaginatively comprehend the macrocosmic conception of time presupposed—and this includes rebirth, and the survival of the impact of human actions in subtle form for their fruition as effects on a later occasion.¹⁰
- (c) The variegated modes of existence, their numerically varying sensory equipment, the different classes of

objects of sensory knowledge¹¹ and the variegated modes of thought and experience,¹² are the outcome of *karma*.¹³

(d) All experiences of pleasure and pain are the outcome of *karma*.¹⁴

2. *Soul*:—There is an experiencing subject independent of the material body.^{15 16} It is capable of the conceit of egoism.¹⁷

3. *God*:—God exists.¹⁸

(This presupposes God's existence.)

He creates the world :

As the Lord, He creates the world so that souls may experience the fruits of their actions.¹⁹

He is omniscient.

He is full of love.

He dispenses justice i.e. allocates the fruits of *karma*.²⁰

The Lokāyata cites an analogy to dismiss the Śaiva assertions about God, Soul and *Karma*, which is itself of a curious kind. They refer to the 'Barren Woman's Son', 'Standing on a hare's horn' and 'to pick flowers off the sky'.²¹ It is a complex of propositions juxtaposed to assume the form of a factual assertion. Their absurdity is so apparent that it is cited more to ridicule the Śaiva dogmas, belief in which is deemed an aimless pursuit. Aruṇandi's rendering of the Lokāyata position in verse is so terse that one is unable to see the different steps in the argument. However the different propositions taken individually constitute the stock examples cited by Indian philosophers to refer to the non-existent. They are non-existent and hence inconceivable. It is inconceivable not in the sense of being beyond thought and description where the term inconceivable is used as an intensifier to refer to the glorious nature of the object referred to and which is beyond thought. Here, they are inconceivable because they cannot be conceived of at all because they are non-existent. They are dismissed as falsehoods because of their prescriptive claims.

Before one proceeds to an examination of the inherent difficulties in the Lokāyata position, it is good to recount the argumentation developed by the modern verificationist school. This will enable us to compare and contrast the standpoint of both schools so that the problems of religious language from the Śaiva standpoint could emerge with some degree of clarity. Besides Aruṇandi's reply in refutation is not helpful for such an approach. At the most it could be judged inadequate. The refutation is more concerned with pointing out contradictions on the basis of the Lokāyata's stated bases of knowledge. The bulk of the argument is in the realm of natural theology concerned with establishing the truths of their assertions (eg. God exists and He has such and such attributes). This is lower order activity and does not come within the activity of doing philosophy in the modern sense of the term.

Modern philosophy confronted with obscurities in statements about God and concerned with questions of justifiability, significance and value interests itself in examining the grounds of religious statements. The pioneers of the verificationist movement focussed attention on the predicates of religious and theological statements. These were viewed as an extended and therefore 'odd' application of what would normally be used to identify empirically observable objects. Religious and theological language, it was argued, cannot be taught from scratch. But it was seen that terms cannot have the same meaning in both cases. Gradually their attention was shifted to the problem of verifiability of religious and theological statements that claim to be factual assertions. The context in which it is uttered becomes relevant—to gain an inkling into the sense that is sought to be conveyed. Yet it was dogmatically held that their truth or falsity was not to be affirmed or denied in terms of sense experience. Such tests were ruled out on principle and these statements, it was claimed, had no status as factual propositions. A. J. Ayer,²² the classic exponent of this view states that 'the existence of a being having attributes which define the God of non-animistic religion' can neither be proved 'demonstratively' nor proved as 'ever probable'. God's existence to have logical certainty, has to be deducible only from *a priori*

propositions. But *a priori* propositions are certain merely because they are nothing more than tautologies. Only tautologies are validly deducible from a set of tautologies. It follows therefore that God's existence cannot be demonstratively proved at all. On the otherhand if God's existence were to be probable, then the proposition that He exists has to be an empirical hypothesis. In that case it would be possible to deduce from it and other empirical hypotheses, certain experiential propositions not deducible from those other hypotheses alone. But in fact this is not possible. This refers to contingencies in the natural world and human society in the model of indirectly testable scientific hypotheses. God talk refers to a transcendent being which might be known through certain empirical manifestations. But he cannot be defined in terms of these manifestations, and as such, these become metaphysical terms. 'God exists' therefore becomes a metaphysical statement that cannot be either true or false. Applying the same criterion, any sentence that claims to describe the nature of a transcendent God cannot possess any literal significance—i.e. we cannot apply ordinary language concepts. The notion of a God endowed with non-empirical or super-natural attributes cannot be an intelligible notion at all. And this points to the next question, whether they are factual assertions at all. If God is super-natural,—i.e. not governed by any laws or regularities that could be discovered, then it would be impossible to make any statements (even false ones) about such a being. And a theory that prevents us from recognising the existence of such an entity (if it did exist) would be an unreasonable theory—so it is concluded. God talk therefore becomes non-sensical.

The non-intelligibility of the notion of a 'person' endowed with super-empirical attributes is traced to the availability of a word—'God', which is used as if it named this 'person'. But unless the sentence in which it occurs expresses propositions which are empirically verifiable, it cannot be said to symbolise anything. The usage of the word 'God' is here intended to refer to a transcendent object. The mere existence of a noun, it is stated, fosters the illusion of a real or possible object corresponding to it. And Ayer concludes thus, 'It is only when we enquire what

God's attributes are that we discover that "God" in this usage is not a genuine name. And the Lokāyata's conclusions are in no way different. If God had no form—i.e. an object not accessible to the senses and therefore non-material, he would be as non-existent as empty space—a non-entity.²³ If he had form—i.e. material he would be devoid of God-status and remain like any other object.²⁴ If he were compounded of both it cannot be like a stone in mid-air. On all counts it becomes a vacuous notion. The Lokāyata, unlike the modern verificationists, are not willing to concede that it is non-intelligible and meaningless because transcendent and unverifiable. They hold that it is meaningful but non-existent and therefore false. The same holds good with regard to the soul.²⁵ So goes the challenge. A. J. Ayer holds, that 'To say that men do not ever die, or that the state of death is merely a state of prolonged insensitivity, is indeed to express a significant proposition, though all the available evidence goes to show that it is false. But to say that there is something imperceptible inside a man, which is his soul or his real-self, and that it goes on living after he is dead, is to make a metaphysical assertion which has no more factual content than the assertion that there is a transcendent God'. Here again the noun 'Soul' has no entity corresponding to it. The Lokāyata seems to be adopting a similar criticism of this conception of the meaning of words—namely that the meaning of a word is an object. This view they shared with the *Sautrāntika Buddhists*. (The word for 'meaning' and 'object' in Indian thought is the same—'*artha*' and the orthodox conception is that word and object are 'closely allied'. That they have eternally fixed and natural meanings arises from faith in revelation as a basis of knowledge and this the Lokāyata rejects outright.)

The Lokāyata and the Logical Empiricists seem to agree in denying objectivity to claims pertaining to the existence of God, Soul etc. The same holds good with regard to appeal to religious experience. Even if the devout refers to an encounter with a super-natural being and claims that descriptions of religious experience provide the necessary verifying statements of the objectivity of this being, we find it being reduced to nothing more than

mental states. The only thing verifiable about it is that certain psychological phenomena occur in the human mind. The feeling of certitude is to be distinguished from the certainty of states of affairs external to the mind. And this, the Lokāyata refers to as delusion.²⁰ 'God-encountering' experience can only deliver the certainty that an experience took place.

Want of objectivity to the Logical Empiricists would amount to the merely non-sensical (i.e. not verifiable in terms of sense—experience). Not so to the Lokāyata. He would reject it as false. It is here that both part company. The former would give a restricted meaning to metaphysics—as system building based on speculation. (In contrast, Rene Guenon says in his study of 'HINDU DOCTRINES' that 'metaphysics' is essentially 'the knowledge of the Universal', and by its very nature defies definition.) They would even contest the conclusions of the atheists as 'non-sensical' because it is not a significant proposition that could be significantly denied. In fact, Ayer contends that propositions about God, Soul etc., while not being valid are also not invalid either. Since nothing is said about this world, it cannot be deemed false or dismissed on insufficient grounds. What they contend with is its claims to be genuine propositions. It could be that the Logical Empiricists view religion from a Christian background. But on the whole their argument seems superficial. They would rather take a segment and comment on it, rather than take it as a whole and reject it as the Lokāyata does.

Another variant of the verification principle that is of relevance in a critique of Śaiva religious language is the principle of Falsification. This is brought out in the context of a believer not allowing anything to count against his belief. Unlike the scientist he is not willing to modify his stand in the face of conflicting evidence. (e.g. Śaiva Conception of Suffering) Comparing God to a physician-surgeon compound, Aruṇandi says: அண்ணவும் இன்பத்துன்பம் அருந்தியே வினை அறுப்பவன். Objections are as A. G. N. Flew states 'explained away' as a test of faith. Citing the parable of the gardener of John Wisdom, Flew concludes with the question, how does the elusive gardener differ from an imaginary

gardener, or even from no gardener at all.²⁷ But one could indulge in this language and yet state that the Śaivas hold that religious statements have factual meaning and that they are falsifiable. For instance "Submission to the Lord guarantees bliss" is claimed to be verifiable in experience by living according to Śaiva principles.²⁸ It is to be realised in this life itself.²⁹

Aruṇandi's refutation in reply appears to possess a strategy of its own. There is no evidence that the Lokāyata as a school were serious contenders in his times. Besides he conducts his broadside against other schools by beginning with the Lokāyata, which fits into the scheme of general and special treatment of religious truths, from the Śaiva point of view. He begins with a point of view which is the remotest and the strategy adopted is aimed at expounding the means of confirming the truths upheld by the Śaivas. Hence the emphasis on epistemology and logic and the description of the nature of Śaiva categories in the general phase and the educational techniques are confined to receiving and reflection. The complete four-fold technique of receiving, reflecting, understanding or clarification and meditation is confined to the special treatment phase. The latter includes *Sādhanaīyal* and *Payaniyal*.³⁰ The debate with the Lokayatas is confined to the discursive level. Being avowedly addressed to the *Vainayikas* (and not to the *Sāmusiddhas* or the *uttamas* nor to the *Prākṛtas* or *adhamas*) it could also be viewed as the educational method adopted by Aruṇandi—a method comparable to that adopted by Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. There are limits beyond which discursive thinking is by no means helpful. And that is the realm of 'The Holy'.

Rudolf Otto refers to 'Holiness' or 'The Holy' 'a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion.'³¹ 'While it is complex' he states, 'it contains a quite specific element or "moment" which sets it apart from "the rational"... and which remains inexpressible or ineffable—the sense that it completely eludes apprehension in terms of concepts.'³² Insights into this realm defy description. Statements about them have evaluative overtones.³³ Rudolf Otto characterises this as 'a unique

original feeling response' (the numinous)—as 'the primary and elementary datum'⁸⁴ he says that 'while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined as language tends to superimpose extraneous elements on the given. It can only be suggested so that one may feel it for himself. (Hence what is referred as the 'suggestive power' of the scriptures). As everything that comes "of the spirit" it must be awakened. The Tamil term 'Unaruthal' உணரூதல் (உணர்ந்து உயிதற்பொருட்டு) quite appropriately brings out the purpose of such an endeavour.

The encounter with the numinous has been reported by the spiritually—gifted. Hence the reliance on the authority of the saints and seers, who seem to read sense and confirm the contents of the scriptures. The spiritually—gifted are not mere intellectual geniuses. Enlightenment transforms character and hence their power over their fellow-men. The religious proposition is not just yet another proposition purported to report facts about the world. Rather religious statements must be viewed as authoritative statements or utterances of such powerful personalities. They need not necessarily be confined to what is informative of the world. A religious statement or utterance could also be a command, exhortation or exclamation. *Bhakti* literature is full of it. The religious proposition thus becomes meaningful and gains the certainty that A. J. Ayer would ascribe only to *a priori* propositions which are nothing more than tautologous. On the other hand the acceptance of inference as a basis of knowledge enables it to be true of this world thereby meeting the canons of the Empirical philosopher. Hence the confidence with which Aruṇandi invites the Lokayata to adopt the Śaiva path to freedom and experience it for himself.

Such an encounter with the numinous gains a degree of realism in the monotheistic frame of Śaiva Siddhānta. Witness to the Holy and the spoken words that follow are not descriptive of the encounter. Thus the Logical Empiricist model of a material-object statements is found wanting in its ability to convey the total experience involved. Often they are followed by the activities of praise and worship. A classic example would be Mānikkavācagars's *Śivapurāṇam*. The blissful experience that comes

into being in the total absorption is not to be confused with the claims to identity as interpreted in a monistic framework. Divine grandeur and grace finds self-abasement and loving adorations as complementary.⁸⁵ The formal features of the experience defy description.⁸⁶ One is struck by dumb amazement—the state of absorption and the consequent loss of a sense of identity as among lovers—a sense of being possessed. Thus ‘the unique original feeling response’ that Otto refers to find its poetic expression in *Manikkavācagar*.⁸⁷

Mundane analogues could be given such as responses to the beautiful, the wonderful and the marvellous. It is by no means subjective for it is a response at something external. But experience of God is something unique and analogies could only suggest the sense in which the expression is used. In the circumstances paradoxical pronouncements are not unusual.⁸⁸ The invisible can be seen. The setting is also vital to the experience தேடிக்கண்டு கொண்டேன்—implies the element of striving.⁸⁹

Further, the fact that monistic interpretations are not involved does not lead to a negative theology of *neti neti*. The supreme being is not to be denied attributes. This does not mean that they are pure subjective states confined to the realm of psychology. Mundane analogies of a beautiful scenery, and acts of marvel, wonder or amazement cited before bring out the significance of religious experience. The latter is not merely a response ‘at’ but also involves a response ‘to’ something other than self. Add to this the mystical strand. It is not merely seeing new attributes in a familiar environment not accessible to the senses (for concealing activity is involved மறைத்தல்—*Maraithal* which demands as a condition the need to strive அருந்தவம்—*Arundavam*.) It transforms the experiencing subject as well that leads to renunciation and a new valuation of one’s environment and self-less activity in dedication to a more powerful being. Herein lies the difference between the verificationists and *Lokāyata* on the one hand and the man of religion (in this instance the *Śaiva*). The dispute is not differences over facts but differences in how they feel towards the facts (J. Wisdom—‘Gods’). It is a difference over points of view—involving a dispute over the meaning one reads into the states of affairs.

In short, it is the answer they continuously give to the question of the meaning of existence.

Another point of departure could be by way of the analysis of the self. From the point of view of dogmas, it is treated in isolation to assert the fact of its existence. The dimensions applicable to sense objects do not apply here. The knowing by way of the instruments of the Sense-organs is said to pertain to material objects that possess extensions. This term could also refer to knowing or sensing particulars. In this instance it refers to its inability to gain access to spiritual entities. How can the perceiving subject, it is asked, make of itself the object of perception.⁴⁰ The existence of the Self is thus established negatively⁴¹ thus showing the limits of a language that deliberately confines itself to findings of the Sense-organs. And yet, ordinary language contains within itself concepts meaningfully applied in discourse that cuts across the boundaries arbitrarily imposed upon by the Logical Empiricists. (We do not, here, refer to the limits imposed by language itself in to terminological moulds, whereby variegated shades of meaning are shorn of their content to fit into available vocabulary. That is a different problem altogether, where one refers to limits and suggestions).

The argument to establish the existence of the Self also points to the instrumentality of the human frame, thus emphasizing the self as a free-agent, though simultaneously its freedom is being constrained by its total dependence on identifying itself with its environment. The analogy of the fire's dependence on fuel is cited to provoke our imagination.⁴² (This is a remarkable insight into the nature of human psychology that has implication for Śaiva emphasis on the right type of educational environment). It is this insight that allows for a paradoxical situation when we find the soul to be both free and not free. The Śaiva concedes a free will but it is of a weak sort often exposed to inclinations that atomis its immense potential. (The latter is accounted for in terms of the dark principle of *āṇavam*). Aruṇandi sees the Lokāyata extolling the life of the inclinations, at which level one does not become sensitive to the machinations of *āṇavam*. It is

the spiritually sensitive beings, revealing a higher stage of development, who see in such surrender to the inclinations a life of misery for they have by now gained glimpses of their original blissful nature—Anādi Śivarūpam—(அநாதி சிவரூபம்) which is their—Śvarūpam—(சுவரூபம்). Comparison therefore instills in them a yearning for emancipation from an alienated existence. Continued existence in that state is viewed as spiritually unbearable. Pressure of the forces of evil and the awareness of their role bring to light the essential weakness of human will and its proneness to falter. (This appears to be no problem for modern (scientific) psychology and the Logical Empiricist who view human experience in constricted dimensions.) The Śaiva devotee therefore appeals to a higher and more powerful being—the repository of all perfections.⁴⁸, ⁴⁹. A glimpse of the divine enables them to pass judgment over life's experiences in retrospect⁴⁸, ⁴⁹ and yearn for clinging on to the new transformed status⁴⁷ and on winning it expresses his gratitude⁴⁸ and finally sums it up as a special favour bestowed on to him.⁴⁹ Hence the difference in attitude and the way they 'feel' about their environment compared to the Lokāyata and the Logical Empiricists. Thus what is meaningful to the latter is essentially meaningless to the Śaiva. Although language remains the same, the emotive component that gives life and blood to it differs, for their respective views of the Universe are diametrically opposed to one another. One spurns at what the other extolls. Thus what is ideal to the Lokāyata is viewed as the pleasures of the pig wallowing in filth by the Saiva.⁵⁰ The Knowledge upheld as of value gets down-graded as *pāsājnāna*—awareness of which makes the Saiva conscious of his alienation.

The soul that yearns for emancipation struggles its way upwards in historical time and space. Thus we speak of the lives of the Saints. This forms the content of Sekishar's Periyapuraṇam. The canonised saints constitute the most advanced among the sensitive beings who have left behind their experiences and thus constitute the most authentic in the Saiva tradition as witness to the truth of the Scriptures. It is assumed that they see in the Lokāyata's stand an inadequate account to explain the existence of the variegated modes of being.⁵¹ It is also found defective in

exploring the varied physical equipment that is essential to knowledge. Nor could all experiences be accounted for in terms of the combination of elements. It is not the mere theoretical account alone that matters. More so is their awareness of a sense of alienation from their essential nature that becomes painful to the point of becoming unbearable. Thus what cannot fit into the Lokāyata mould theoretically, is also felt existentially as one of helplessness. This is the way the problem of evil is formulated in the Śaiva tradition. It is not merely the balance sheet of pleasure and pain when the Lokāyata is castigated for his failure to account for the phenomenon of pain as such.⁵² The formidable presence of the fact of evil is felt existentially. (Here the Śaiva religious conception of what ought to be done and therefore that which is good is different from that arrived at on rational grounds. Even if a devotee sins it is no sin, and all good actions of the non-believer have no title to goodness—another instance of paradoxical pronouncements. Being good need not necessarily be good, and fanatical zeal need not be a sin. Aruṇandi cites Dakṣa and Caṇḍeśvara in illustration. What matters is love of good.⁵³ But suffering is experienced in spite of total surrender to God⁵⁴ mourns the Saint). This may be another argument against belief in God's existence—a fact, which provokes Russell to say of the hypothetical being as 'an unjust God'. But the experience of the fact of evil or suffering is merely a test of faith. The devout never abandons faith in God because of it. Evil is the result of their past deeds of *Karma*. 'Explaining it away' or 'death by a thousand qualifications' of the fact of God's existence and his gracious acts can lay no claim as criticisms. The fact that it intensifies faith in the devotee has to be recognised. Criticisms that are leveled at such assertions, arise only when one ignores the educative effect of suffering. Did not power-drunk politicians mature to become statesman after a period in the opposition? This is only a crude analogy. The Saint's awareness of its role as a test of faith is a further step towards godliness. To view otherwise is to isolate and adopt a segmented treatment of propositions as qualities predicated of the Supreme being. No system allows for dismantling into pieces. Nor is the system a

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय

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mere string of propositions alone. Besides one should get the sense of a proposition—by placing it in its setting. While the Lokāyata views all change as specific to the nature of the elements, the Śaiva views it in terms of an all-powerful, omniscient and just will.⁶⁶ In the circumstances some of the standard problems of modern Philosophy become pseudo problems.

But what the Saints speak of in their visions of the divine is eternal and infinite—though this should not be pictorially viewed as extended time and space. Some modern theologians (Paul Tillich for example) in recognising this realm tend to reduce symbolisms as symbols of something, which would therefore not contradict the deliveries of ordinary experience. Two factors are involved in this interpretation. Symbols have to symbolise something. In any case that is how it is used in language. Besides Tillich is a Christian theologian, to whom the historical Jesus is central to belief. Hence the grafting of religion on the findings of science. (Acceptance of this ideology dogmatically has prevented the development of Indian Science. This is by the way). But what the *Purāṇas* refer to are in fact the realm of the archetypes. They indicate to us how we fall short of the ideal and at the same time suggest models for emulation. (Some would follow Tillich and say that the *Purāṇas* are meant for popular education—not knowing that where matters spiritual are concerned both literate and illiterate are at par—both being in need of divine grace). Sambandar's vision of the divine as wearing the ear stud (தோடைய செவியன்) is the bisexual nature of the divine. Being free, it is able to assume any desired form to reveal itself to its devotees. To the Lokāyata this appears as false and to the Logical Empiricists as meaningless assertions. But their meaning is conditional to the mode of life prescribed. Aruṇandi's prescription is worded thus:—

புறச்சமய நெறிகின்றும் அகச்சமயம் புக்கும்
புகன் மிகுதி வழியுமுன்றும் புகலும் ஆச்சிரமம்
அறத்துறைகள் அவையடைந்தும் அருத்தவங்கள் புரிந்தும்
அருங்கலைகள் பல தெரிந்தும் ஆவணங்கள் படித்துந்

P-3

அன்பளிப்பு :

தஞ்சாவூர்

நடராஜ பிள்ளை உலகநாதன் M.A.B.T

சிறப்புடைய புராணங்கள் உணர்ந்தும் வேத
 சிறப்பொருளை மிகத் தெளிந்துஞ் சென்ருந் சைவத்
 திறந்தடைவர் இதில் சரியை கிரியா யோகஞ்
 செலுத்தியபின் ஞானத்தாற் சிவனடியைச் சேர்வர்.⁵⁶

To come back to the bisexual nature of the primitive relationship—this, when viewed by the Lokāyata, gets reduced to lustful relationship (ஈசனார் அயனார் மாலோடிந்திறன் தெரிவை மார்பாற் பேசொணு வகைகளெல்லாஞ் செய்தன்றோ பெரியோரானார்).⁵⁷ To this Aruṇandi replies,

ஆதியே உலகத்தில் ஆனெடு
 பெண்ணு மாயனை காரியம்
 நாதன் நாயகி யோடு கூடி
 நயந்த காரணம் என்பரே.⁵⁸

In the Śaiva scheme it constitutes the model of the perfect sexual relationship between man and woman. Thus we see that the very same relationship is an extended continuum from the profane to the sacred. The same terms and the same language but their functional value is different. Religious language points to be sacred. This is increasingly brought to light by the researches of Historians of Religion—pioneered by Mercea Eliade, who gained his inspiration in India. Fortunately for us the Tamil language is yet to be overwhelmed by modernism (Kailasapathy—அடியும் முடியும்). Vestiges of *Purāṇic* terms continue to survive and thus maintain its pristine richness to convey different shades of meaning that higher experience reveal to us. There is no need to demarcate spheres of discourse. The language of science and morals are subsumable within the sphere of religious discourse.

CHAPTER II

CAUSATION—S'AIVA AND BUDDHIST

The problem of causation is to be viewed in the background of two religious systems and as such it cannot be confined to its conventional treatment in isolation. The question of causal necessity and the arguments adduced in support of such claims therefore should not attract our attention so much as the broader question of the meaning of existence and the way to freedom. The specific discussion of the problem of causation pioneered by David Hume and subsequently developed in academic circles had two aspects: (1) The discussion of the problem of necessary connection between cause and effect with the laws of the sciences as a model, and (2) showing the futility of metaphysical systems that rested on the notion of necessity. Not that it did not interest the Indian philosopher. Scholastics in all the Indian traditions did busy themselves in such a discussion both to establish the truths contained in their systems and also to deride and prove rival systems as false. What is intended here is to focus interest on the problem of how the protagonists of each system sought to view the world.

The Buddhists reduce the person in his relation to the world around him to a composite of five factors of *śkaṇḍa*. These are in the nature of a causal continuity of short-lived events operating above time.¹ They base their claims on the basic insight into what the Sautrantikas referred to as momentariness (*kanam*) of all phenomena. The Sanskrit term *kṣaṇika* in *kanathil pankam varum*² strictly means 'having the property of perishing as soon as it is produced'. What is implied is the impermanent nature of all things, which is one of the three *lakṣaṇas* or characteristic marks of all that is experienced of the world and which is referred to as existence—the other two being the doctrine of no-soul and suffering. The basic problem or inner human need from the Buddhist point of view is to extricate oneself from the grip of

existence. The Śaiva theistic categories of God, soul, space, time and direction are of no significance in the quest for freedom.³ The Śaiva sees this world as a theatre for human activity that has been deliberately created by God. Each system therefore has a distinct set of practices in achieving this goal though both may be said to possess the same metaphysical background.

There does not appear to be a conscious effort to formulate a theory of causation at the initial stages of the history of Buddhism and Śaivism. The mystics in both traditions were primarily concerned with the problem of salvation and do not seem to have taken time off for speculation.

A more specific discussion of the problem arises only during the period of system building. Under conditions of religious rivalry, debate and disputation induces a scholastic discussion of what constitutes causation. It is Vasubandhu (5th century) who first draws (in fact constructs) the general theory in what, he claims, is implicit in the Discourses of the Buddha.⁴ It gets a more rigorous treatment in the hands of the Sautrāntika logicians of South India. A parallel trend is also discernible in Śaiva history. Although hostile reference to the Buddhists are found in the hymns of the saints, a more systematic formulation vis-a-vis the Buddhist theory is only found in the period of philosophical disputation—to which period the Śivajñāna Siddhiyār belongs.

The Siddhiyār however confines its polemics with the Buddhists to certain specific issues so that the area is clearly demarcated. The debate centers around what constitutes the human predicament, and [the way of salvation.⁵ Arising from it are allied issues such as the conception of the individual *karma* and rebirth. Understanding the differences in the points of view on the above issues make a discussion of causation crucial. It appears to be the key to an understanding of the differences at the doctrinal level.

Neither the Sautrāntika nor the Śaivas select the starting point for systematisation in an arbitrary manner. It is not based on the experience of ordinary men. Both parties to the contest draw on

the experience of those who had fulfilled the conditions necessary for attaining spiritual knowledge in the respective traditions. To the Sautrāntika the appeal is to the *Sūtra-pitakas* or the scriptures, which are the words of the Buddha or the enlightened one himself.⁶ The Vedas and the *āgamas* as revealed by God and as experienced, preserved and handed down by the sages constitute the scriptural authority for the Śaivas.⁷ The starting point therefore was the intuitions of the spiritually perfected as regards the true nature of reality.

However, a significant difference in method needs to be noted. The Buddhist seeks to transcend human limitations and gain an unimpaired vision of things as they are by the technique of meditation. On the other hand, the Śaiva seeks to participate in divine vision and understand god's purpose by evoking his grace through the technique of devotion. Discrepancies in the description of what constitutes reality are therefore to be linked with the methods adopted to apprehend it.

The Sautrāntika claims that his descriptions are true of reality as opposed to what is mere fancy.⁸ What he experiences are more impermanent states.⁹ The notion of impermanence is in fact treated in its most extreme form and is referred to as momentary, also described by Stcherbatsky as 'instantaneous being'.¹⁰ Implied in the Sautrāntika doctrine, though not expressly stated in the Siddhiyar version, is the notion of no-substance. The self or soul, as a permanent substrate of all our psycho-physical states is denied.

Since a comparison with the Śaiva position is involved, it is worth probing into what constitutes the unit of experience for the Sautrāntika is distinct from his adversary in debate. This may also be linked with the central problem of concern from which salvation was sought.

Emphasis on individual experience is found in his exclusive reliance on perception and inference as the only valid means of knowledge of reality.¹¹ Consciousness and the objects of consciousness gained through perception and inference are momentary.

According to the Siddhiyār version, they operate in the nature of a cycle comparable to the behaviourist model. There are the forms derived from the elements of matter with which contact is established by the senses.¹² The seeing is the mind or consciousness (*kandathu cittam*—lit. that which is the seeing is mind) followed by action in terms of judgement of good and bad.¹³ This account tallies with the version given by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakosakarika*.¹⁴ 'The Sautrāntikas', it is stated 'recognise the weight of the scriptural text "when he sees an object with the eye....." but, by referring to other scriptural evidence, they show that the problem is not well stated: What is the use of this discussion? Very much like "chewing space". It has been said by the Lord that "the eye being given and a visible object also being given, there arises, depending on both a visual cognition". Therefore, such a question as "who sees?" is not justified, as therein no activity comes to play. These are only correlated phenomena, causes and effect—in fact a blue image resulting from a mechanical process, no seer, no vision. It is said that the eye sees, that the discernment (*viññāna*) discerns (*viññati*)—mere metaphorical phrases which we must not take literally, on which we must not lay stress (*abhinivesa*) says the Lord. This is in contrast to the orthodox pāli school who held that the eye being matter does not see and that seeing belongs to consciousness.¹⁵

The unit of experience therefore is in fact a unit of activity. It is said that action leads to consciousness, and consciousness in turn leads to action.¹⁶ Such a stand does away with the subject of activity as a substantial entity. Experience is viewed in terms of moral responses to stimulus that is external to the source of the response.

This phenomenon, which is devoid of substance and is momentary, is referred to as a 'dharma'¹⁷ in all the Buddhist schools. This comes into being as momentary flashes from out of non-existence and returns again into non-existence after having been in existence for an instant.¹⁸

This central notion of flashes of instantaneous being provides the guidelines to interpret reality. Words that appear to refer to

some object that exists merely refer to an aggregate or group of momentary phenomena (*sol tharum thokai*—lit, group given by word.)¹⁹ This implies that a thing merely refers to a sum total of its parts. These groups come into being one after another in succession (*thodarci*). The apparent persistence of an object is only the succession of the aggregates or groups which are also in themselves momentary.²⁰ All things that are produced or come to be are destructible.²¹

The human personality is viewed as a group of the five *skandhās*—corporeal phenomena (*uruvam*), feelings (*vethanai*), cognitions (*kurippu*), active tendencies (*pavanai*) and consciousness (*viññānam*). They have only momentary existence for whatever comes to be passes away. This mode of coming to be of the groups is in the nature of causal continuity, one ceasing to be as the other comes to be. To hold that a person is over and above the group of parts or states, that he persists in all times and that he is the self same individual surviving apparent change (i.e. to uphold the doctrine that a self as a permanent entity exists underlying the psycho-physical states) is classified under false belief.²²

In contrast, the Śaiva asserts the eternal character of substances. There is, to begin with, the intuition of the self as the subject of all experiences (referred to variously as *unarvu*, *arivu*, *potham*, *jñāthiru* and *uyir*—which merely refer to a distinct spiritual entity), and the reality of the world of matter (*māyā*) as the substrate of all physical and psychological phenomena (i.e. as the basis of one's psycho-physical framework and his experiential plane). The unit of activity involves the participation of three eternal entities—the self as an intelligent principle and subject to limitations, matter and a supreme being that is devoid of all limitations and which is both immanent and transcendent and which is characterised by love.

The respective approaches of the Sautrāntika and the Śaiva to the problem of human experience being stated, it would be worthwhile probing into the significance of the problem of causation in the light of this information.

The experience of suffering or ill leads to a search for a remedy or a way of release from all suffering or ill. To the Buddhist, it constitutes one of the characteristic features (*lakṣana*) of normal life. It could also be treated as a corollary to things being impermanent.²³ Thus suffering or ill while being an experience could also be viewed as an evaluation of the worth of what is being experienced. To the Śaiva too suffering is to be dreaded as fire.²⁴ In both instances it is suffering because it is impermanent. It changes. Hence the need to explain the processes of change for suffering can be traced to the emotions that we generate towards things that change. Besides, both in opposition to the Materialist Lokāyata, have faith in some unchanging order as the basis of the good life. Faith in the possibility of salvation springs from this belief.

To the Buddhist, reality being reducible to atomic events or states that are impermanent, it would not be meaningful to speak of a reality that changes. It just disappears. What does not disappear does not exist. It is the very essence of existence therefore to disappear. The Sautrāntikas among the different Buddhist schools also appear to have worked out the logical outcome of this notion in their theory of momentariness. 'Change' therefore is not to be used in its conventional sense as signifying a process and therefore continuation. It does not involve the dimensions of space, time and direction (*thikku*—another criteria of locating an object that the Śaivas adopt), for these cannot be experienced and therefore do not enter into Sautrāntika calculations. It is only 'pure change'—a mode of existence into which all phenomena could be subsumed.

The Śaiva, unlike the Buddhist, experiences the world only as operating within the dimensions of space, time and direction. Change is true only in these circumstances. But this does not apply to intelligent or spiritual entities whose existence is not to be apprehended in terms of space, time and direction with which the existence of material objects are identified. Thus when it is said that a thing 'exists' and 'changes', it is true only of non-intelligent or non-spiritual objects—i.e. material objects (*jaḍa*).

It is this world of material objects that constitute the objects of perception. Besides the perceiving entity, though not material, utilises the material framework—i.e. the physical body—to perceive.²⁶ The objects thus perceived have forms. This could also be taken to mean that it is only objects with forms that present themselves in perceptual experience (*suddunarvu*—lit. perceiving particulars). Since these are described in terms of gender—i.e. as he, she and it—it involves all animate and inanimate objects.²⁶ Their mode of change (*varumurai*—lit. the mode of their coming to be) is to come in to being—i.e. birth, persistence and ceasing to be (i.e. death).²⁷ The Śivajñāna Bōdham refers to it as the three-fold process (*muvinai*).²⁸ To the Śaiva therefore, reality or that which is *ulporul* (உள்பொருள்) and which presents itself as an object of experience is subject to the threefold processes of birth, life and death.²⁹ Meykandar states that a beginning and end are specific to the existing only.³⁰ Alternatively it could be stated that existence is characterised by change. Meykandar reasons that the non-existent cannot come to be இல்லதற்கு தேற்றமின்மை யின் (*illatharku thorraminmayin*).³¹ This implies, that which does not change does not exist.

The nature of the causal account sought for is also determined by the character of the problem posed. Buddhist pragmatism confines the area of enquiry to the problem of suffering. Salvation involved the removal of suffering and the attainment of a blissful state. Suffering—the way normal experience is viewed—is treated as an ailment (*piravippini*) and the Buddha is held as the physician who cures the ills of life (*piravippini marutthuvan*).³² In the analogy of methods in medicine, the ailment of suffering is said to be removed if its cause is removed. The main focus in causal explanation was to discover the conditions or circumstances which give rise to suffering. The emphasis is on 'how' things come to be, and such wisdom, which is gained only through intense self discipline bears within itself the capacity to remove all causes of suffering. The ultimate stage of the Buddhist eight-fold path being the gaining of insight or wisdom (*jñānam*) as the final outcome of the contemplative life, theistic categories such as

an eternal self and a supreme being beyond the range of sense-experience. operating in space, time and direction are viewed as non-verifiable and therefore declared to be not true of reality. It is false and is as fanciful as a hare's horn. The rejection is categorical and the Sautrantikas at least were not agnostics. Their account of how things come to be dispenses with the need to posit the existence of these categories. Upholding such doctrines was therefore treated as a foolish speculative exercise arising from sheer delusion (*pitthu eri*).

The Śaiva too is concerned with overcoming problem as suffering. But unlike the Buddhist, the experience of suffering as such does not exhaust his problem. He has the intuition of a self, which as the subject of all experiences is in its fallen state enshrouded by some primitive darkness that prevents it from realising its capacity for wisdom. He is aware of his basic inadequacy to free himself from the clutches of this basic impurity (*malam*). As such his problem is one of alienation from his essential nature. He experiences a supreme being that responds with grace to his devotion in a state of abject self-surrender. It is in the nature of a love relationship between parent and child, friend and friend or husband and wife of which the relationship between man and God seems to be a legitimate extension. It is this form of relationship that guarantees bliss. The hymns of the Śaiva saints are often the responses in poetic language to such experiences.

It is in this background that he views change in the world. Its cause cannot be ascribed to inert matter nor to finite selves. In the analogy of the potter working on clay to produce a pot, change in the world is traced to an omniscient and omnipotent being. The Śaiva sees in God's loving nature the reason for change. Thus in his apologetics, his concern is not merely with 'how things come to be'. The problem 'why things come to be' become more crucial for apart from 'order', he also discerns a 'design' operating in nature. The conception of causation therefore does not merely imply 'regular sequence'. It involves

the 'reason why' as well. His was not a problem of sit and see but to live and act.

'Change' as seen earlier, has a restricted area of applicability. God and souls being beyond the dimensions of change are beyond change and do not therefore demand a causal explanation. They are eternal and uncaused. Change as such applies only to non-intelligent matter alone.

But change does not take place spontaneously in inert matter. It involves the application of energy from an external source which has to be non-material. When a thing changes it is being acted upon (by an intelligent agent) as the clay is acted upon by the potter. 'Causation' therefore in the Śaiva system is synonymous with 'creation' (*akkuthal, pannuthal, uthippitthal*). It is intelligent activity on unintelligent matter. Unlike Buddhism, where the impersonal character of the causal law becomes central to the whole doctrine, the primacy of will, as reflected in intelligent activity, is asserted to account for all change.

The meaning of the term 'causation' as found in actual usage goes to confirm the doctrinal presuppositions that underlies the conception. (Very often refutations of rival doctrines are based on the interpretations given to common terms from one's own standpoint. Since the Buddhist and the Śaivas use a broad set of terms arising from a common cultural base, it is essential that the terms be examined in the background of usage. It may also help to expose the futility of much of the polemics that was bitterly engaged in). Causation in Buddhist usage means 'origination in functional dependence' (*sarpil thonruthal*—lit. come to be or be born in dependence.⁸⁸ *sarnthu uthikkai*—lit. arise in dependence)⁸⁹ of an effect upon other factors. 'Thonruthal' means 'to appear' or 'to come into existence'. The Śaivas on the other hand use it as a causative verb in the transitive and active voice 'Thorruthal'—which literally means 'to make appear' or 'to bring into existence'.⁹⁰ It involves an external agency engaged in giving form to matter—i.e. production. Both forms of usage stem from

radically different presuppositions. One presupposes an inherent dynamism in nature, while the other transports into the arena purpose and deliberate activity on the part of an intelligent entity—God.

The Sautrāntika conception of causation is directly linked to their theory of momentariness. Reality or instantaneous being (dharma), according to the Sautrāntikas, arises out of nothing (*enrumilatha onru inru varum*—lit. that which was non-existent before becomes existent).⁸⁶ But these dharmas do not arise haphazardly. They are interdependent on one another in the order of regular sequences. One ceases to be as another arises. The course (*vali*—lit. route) of regular sequence is a series (*santhanam*—lit, lineage), which is the notion that does away with the notion of the fixity of objects.

A *dharma*, though in itself distinct and unique, is functionally dependent on a multiplicity of causes or conditions. The term '*pratitya*' in '*pratitya-samutpada*' means 'arising on account of' is used to describe this state of causal dependence. Unlike in the orthodox tradition, the Buddhist theory involves a multiplicity of causes.⁸⁷ Causal dependence as conveyed by the term *pratitya-samutpada* means, according to Stcherbatsky,⁸⁸ that every instantaneous being arises in dependence upon a combination of instantaneous beings to which it necessarily succeeds and that it arises in functional dependence upon a totality of causes and conditions.

Such a conception of causation though attained through experience, its necessity is not a contribution of the understanding. It is as much part of the reality experienced and is independent of any particular experience. In the discourses of the Buddha we have the following statement: 'What is causation? On account of birth arises decay and death. Whether the tathāgatas arise or not, this order exists namely the fixed nature of phenomena, the regular pattern of phenomena or conditionality'.⁸⁹ This is in conformity with the claim that the description is true of reality.

In the abstract the formula of the theory runs thus:—

If C (*asmin sati*), then E (*idam bhavati*).

If not-C (*asmin asati*), then not-E (*idam nabhavati*).

In its concrete form as found in the world of change it is:—

When C arises not, E arises not.

When C arises, E arises.

inkithillavali illaki, inkithullavali undaki—lit. when the route (or path) has not this, that is not, when the route (or path) has this, that is). The relationship is equally determinate in either direction. This implies that under such and such conditions the result appears, and with the removal of these conditions the result is removed.

The problem of momentariness raises the issue of the possibility of production of an effect by that which is devoid of duration. The Sautrāntikas appear to get over it by treating 'existence' as nothing but 'efficiency'. A thing is to be identified in terms of activity. A stanza ascribed to the Buddha himself is reported thus; 'All (real) forces are instantaneous. (But how can a thing which has (absolutely) no duration, (nevertheless have the time to) produce something? (This is because what we call) 'existence' is nothing but efficiency, and it is this very efficiency which is called a creative cause'.⁴⁰ This goes to affirm the dictum "*ya bhutih saiva kriya*"—i.e. cause and existence are synonymous. Commenting on this Stcherbatsky states thus; 'Existence is dynamic, not static, and it is composed of a sequence of point-instants which are interdependent, i.e. which are causes.'⁴¹

The Theory of momentariness has also implications against holding any other conception of causation. There cannot be the production of a thing as effect by another thing or a personal will as cause because a cause and an effect cannot exist simultaneously. Other things or persons are as much governed by the principle of momentariness that they cannot persist to produce. Since simultaneous existence is not possible a thing or an effect has to spring from nothing. There is no scope for efficient causation within the theory thus formulated. Efficient causation

involves the acceptance of deliberate activity in producing an effect' which in turn presupposes the simultaneous existence of cause and effect. This form of production of an effect is denied. The cause in this sense is, according to Stcherbatsky, 'unemployed' (*nirvyāpāram eva*).⁴² 'Production' as such is merely treated as a conventional expression. The mere existence alone constitutes its work (*sattaiva vyāprtiḥ*).⁴³ The term 'efficiency' (*śakti*) is not treated in the Śaiva sense of being the power of an intelligent being (*śaktimān*) capable of giving form to an inert substance. It gets a reduced meaning in being a mere capacity to precede an event invariably.

The whole discussion of the problems of causation centers around the issue of analysing the nature of the person. The central problem is with the predicament of the individual, which entitles Buddhism to be called a religion of salvation. The analysis of the problem and the path shown does sway with other categories that were held on to in Buddha's times.

One sees no conscious attempt to formulate a general theory of causation, which makes one doubt whether the discussion of causation in relation to the individual is in fact a special application of a general theory at the earlier stages of Buddhist history. The indications are that it must be a later development which can be linked with developments in the conception of the Buddha. His omniscience gradually developed to become co-extensive in meaning with that of God in theism. With Vasubandhu we see that it was held that the Buddha as an omniscient being could know the infinite variety of all causes for any particular event. Quoting Rahula, Vasubandhu says in the *Abhidharmakōśa*:

'Every variety of cause
which brings about the glittering shine
In a single eye of a peacock's tail
Is not accessible to our knowledge
The omniscient knows them all.'

On the other hand the non-Buddhist *Sarvadarsanasamgraha* in stating the Vaiśeṣika version of the Buddhist conception tends to

restrict its meaning to knowledge of what is worthy of acceptance and rejection in life. However the *Siddhiyār* in its section on refutation assumes the Buddhist conception to be co-extensive in meaning with what they would attribute to Cod.

One significant difference between the Buddhist and the Śaivas is that the latter accept the authority of the scriptures (*āgamā*) as revealed truths. Thus when the *Siddhiyār* attempts at a systematic statement of Śaiva doctrine, it is merely a rational attempt at demonstrating truths that are to be realised in experience. Much of it involves inferential leaps from the known to the unknown.

It begins with the data of sense experience which refer to what exist. What is thus presented have forms which are masculine, feminine or neuter—i.e. covers all possible objects of our normal experience. They exist independently of the observer. They have a beginning, a period of duration and an end. If this is not true of objects of sense experience, then they do not exist (*ilporul*).

Change as such is not specific to the nature (*svabhāva*) of the object that changes. If it is in the nature of objects to change then it is not possible to speak of the nature of objects, for 'nature' as such presupposes something permanent. The *Siddhiyār* in refuting the materialist stand states:

*iyalpukan thorri maikai enridin iyalpinukkuc
ceyalathinriyalpu ceithi ceithiyel iyalpathinram.....*

(lit. if birth and decay be nature⁴⁴—nature is devoid of change—If change is nature—change is not nature.)

When it is said that things change—i.e. they are subject to birth, persistence for a while and death, it implies that because they are non-intelligent and subjected to activity (*ceyatpadum acethanatthal*—lit, because being subjected to activity as non-intelligent) there is a need for an activator (*ceyal ceṭṭan oruvan vendum*—lit, an activator of the action is necessary).

A naturalistic account is ruled out for what is treated as cause (the elements) is itself subjected to the three-fold process of change. They are incapable—being non-intelligent—of producing an effect. The commentator to the *Siddhiyār* refers to the capacity of the cause to make things become effect.⁴⁵ It appears that an unchanging intelligent entity alone is capable of effecting change. Hence the supreme being who is beyond change is found necessary as the cause.⁴⁶

There is some ambiguity in the use of the term 'world' (*loka*) உலகு. It could mean the sum total of observable particulars that could be classified as masculine, feminine and neuter.⁴⁷ But it could also refer to the world as a whole over and above the parts. In fact the *Śivajñāna Bōdham* refers to it as *sakam* சகம் which is the 'jagat' in the Sanskrit sūtra and the commentator refers to as 'pirapancham' or the Universe.⁴⁸ This is also the underlying assumption for it is the theme of the first sūtra both in the *Śivajñāna Bōdham* and the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* to establish in God the cause of the cyclical process of evolution and destruction.⁴⁹

It would appear that the Śaivas are arguing from what is true of directly perceived objects to making assertions about the world as a whole. But this is not true. The Śaivas instead seem to hold that the argument which is true of the parts holds good for the whole. The criticism that the Śaivas are arguing from the parts to the whole does not hold good because particular processes are seen as part of a larger evolutionary process. As against the Materialists and the Mimamsa who hold that the world is eternal, they hold that the five elements are themselves subject to the three-fold processes of change and therefore in need of an external intelligent agent. In fact they perceive the elements as changing.⁵⁰ The inference here is from the effect to the cause—i.e. from the known to the unknown, and not from parts to the whole as Piet and Paranjoti would have it.⁵¹ The cyclical process too is similar. When the time is due, it (the world) will perish (*ulaku kālañcērnthidap peyarnthu sellum*).

Creation in the sense described above takes place at two levels. There is the initial setting into motion of the whole process of cosmic evolution. Further there is the continuous creation of particular objects. These are all part of one vast evolutionary process and the intervention of the supreme being is continuous.

Causation does not involve origination or new production—i.e. the effect is not seen as something arising out of nothing and that causal connection is a mere correlation of distinct phenomena. That which is not, it is argued, cannot come to be, and that which is need not come to be. Causal change does not involve 'origination' or 'new production'. It is the mere transformation of what is. This allows for the continuity that change implies. It is the transformation of the basic stuff into things with forms, which have a beginning, duration and an end. It is this latter process that is treated as impermanent. It is this that is presented in sense experience which entitles the phenomenal world to be viewed as impermanent. The effect as phenomenal world exists in the cause,⁵² for if it did not exist before it could not come to be. The effect arises because of the agency of an activator.⁵³ It is this identity that accounts for the necessity in causal relationship for otherwise the potter could bring out cloth off clay instead of a pot.⁵⁴

Śivajñāna Muni in his commentary to the *Śivajñāna Bōdham* refers to the Śaiva argument as being based on the *satkaryavāda* of the Śāṅkhyās.⁵⁵ There seems to be a liberal borrowing or sharing of arguments and illustrations especially among the astika or orthodox schools. Besides the Śaiva Siddhānta system was a relatively later development. Although there is evidence of a mystical tradition much earlier than the period of the sastras, it is not clear to which philosophical tradition its method of argumentation belongs to. Several of its philosophical aspects appear to be comparable to features in the more entrenched systems. Some contemporary writers do quite rightly call it an eclectic system. In its mode of argument on causation there is certainly much similarity with the Sankhya that preceded it in time. They

must certainly have borrowed from the Sankhya to give to their system a rational basis especially so under conditions of debate. But there is also evidence of developing the argument to fit a theistic stand.

The *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* enumerates the following properties that are characteristic of effects:⁵⁶

(English)	(Tamil)	(Sanskrit)
caused	<i>ethuvudaiyathum</i>	<i>hetumat</i>
not eternal	<i>anitthiyamum</i>	<i>anityam</i>
limited	<i>avyāpakamum</i>	<i>avyapti</i>
continually changing	<i>kiriyaityudaiya</i>	<i>śakriyam</i>
manifold	<i>anēkamāvathum</i>	<i>anekam</i>
dependent	<i>sarpudaiyathum</i>	<i>asritam</i>
possessed of properties	<i>kuṛiyudaiyathum</i>	<i>lingam</i>
has parts	<i>avayavamudaiya</i>	<i>savayavam</i>
submissive to an external agency	<i>pirarvayamudaiya</i>	<i>paratantram</i>

The *Kārikā* states that that which is possessed of these properties is *vyaktam* or manifest—i.e. is an effect. It is these properties that point to the necessity for the existence of an eternal, free and intelligent being (*anathi muttha citthuru*). The Sanskrit text of the *Śivajñāna Bōdham* merely affirms the existence of an activator (*asti karta*). The state of the effect is what is really presented in sense experience. This gross form (*thula rūpam*) points to a subtle form (*śukumarūpam*) as cause.

The atoms of Nyāya and Śāutrāntika are treated as merely in the nature of effects and are therefore further analysable. It finds its dead end in 'Maya' from which the world is evolved. Its closest parallel is *prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya, which in Śaiva cosmology does not constitute the most primitive state of matter.

But Maya is not self-evolved as in Sāṅkhya. As the term indicates (*ma* in *matthal*—to perish, and *a* in *aithal*—to be)⁵⁷ it is subjected to change and therefore presupposes an intelligent activity. But it is not the self of *purusa*, for the latter acquires

its cognitive powers only with the aid of the evolutes of *Māyā* and is therefore subsequent to it in activity.⁶⁶ Since the latter is non-intelligent there is one who is not so bound (*amalan*) that brings it forth. In this context it is interesting to note that Time and Karma, though essential to the causal process, are said to be constituted of matter. They are treated as only auxiliaries to the process (*thunai karanam*). Hence the inference contained in the Sanskrit sutra of Śivajñāna Bōtham (whose detail formulation is only worked out in the Siddhiyar) that in the presentation of the effect (*karya darsanat*) we conclude the existence of the (divine) creator (*asti karta*).

The Saiva scheme therefore contains a triad of causes involved in bringing about an effect. There is the first (*muthal*—here it implies the material cause), the auxiliary cause (*thunai karanam*). This is illustrated in the analogy of the clay, the wheel and the potter whose joint contribution leads to the production of the pot. From the impermanent a contingent character of the known world the Śaiva infers the eternal nature of the efficient cause. From the notion that the effect must exit in the cause, the nature of *Māyā* is inferred. Others in the process are treated as instruments. The clay is *Māyā*, the wheel the sakti or energy and in God is found the potter's parallel.

CHAPTER III

K A R M A

The Śaivas and the Buddhists regard human existence as being devoid of freedom. In such a state man is said to be in a state of bondage and which is the source of suffering (*pantha thukkam*). But they differ in their analysis of what constitutes the nature of the person and he comes to be in a state of bondage. A discussion of the doctrine of Karma—the sphere where the causal theories find their application, becomes useful at this juncture.

Karma and the doctrine it refers to is the solution that is offered to the problem of suffering in the Indian religious tradition as a whole. This doctrine therefore holds a key position in the Buddhist and Śaiva system as well. In essence it implies that all actions produce their appropriate consequences. (In the Buddhist doctrine it does not include certain actions that are said to be karmically neutral. It is only those actions that are rooted (*mūla*) in greed, hatred and delusion that have effects.¹ The *Manimekalai* states that an action, to have its consequences, must be a deliberate act of will.² The quality of the consequence as effect is the same as the quality of the action as cause. A good action will produce good effects while an evil action will give rise to evil consequences. In illustration is given the analogy of the cultivator who reaps as he sows. It may not be appropriate to refer to the doctrine in terms of reward and punishment at least in so far as Buddhism is concerned. Although heavens and purgatories do find a place in Buddhist cosmology, the impersonal nature of causal laws prohibit the use of the above terms for they definitely imply an external agency sitting in judgement.

The term 'Karma' as such refers to action (*vinai*). But when it refers to a doctrine it has a whole host of other (related) connotations as well. It ranges from the analysis of an action (which as conduct is traced to its initiation or source as an act

of will) to the actual experiencing of the fruits or outcome of action (*karmaphala*). It involves the whole realm of action and the consequences it sets in its trail. The latter implies a consequence born of necessity (*thodarvinai*—lit. action that clings). With the necessary experience of the consequences of one's actions, Karma assumes the role of a causal law. The regular nature of the sequence by which an action rebounds on the doer himself bears within itself the principle of justice. Karma is also therefore the moral law. The forces we release by action must eventually ripen and actualise in experience.

The operation of Karma becomes intelligible only when viewed along with the twin doctrine of rebirth. The chain of moral sequence does not have its course terminated at death. The occurrence of the effect of an action as an event need not be immediate nor is its fruition to be realised only within the life span of any one individual. A single life-span is found insufficient for all one's good and evil actions to bear fruit. In order that actions may mature and bear fruit, time in terms of aeons and aeons is allowed to enable the debt to be settled. Belief in rebirth therefore arises as a corollary to belief in Karma. The moral sequence continues from one phase of existence to another. The personal history of an individual therefore transcends the limit of birth and death. It is an endless series, so much so that Karma has to be discussed in terms of the 'macro-individual'.

But rebirth itself is not arbitrarily posited as a convenient working hypothesis. It is not brought into account for the efficacy of the operation of Karma. Rebirth is as much treated as a fact as Karma is. It is hardly contested in inter-school debates or thought to warrant an exhaustive proof. Its truth is taken for granted.

Belief in rebirth involves belief in numerous existences. This is treated as an endless process that comes to an end when one attains complete freedom or salvation. The *Manimekalai* refers to the endless births that recur (*pandum pandum palpirappu ulaval*.) It is a fact that those who are born have to die, which is the

extension of the principle of impermanence that which comes to be passes away. The transition phase from death to rebirth is compared to the difference in experience between the waking and dream states.³ The Śaivas too subscribe to the view that there are endless births.⁴ The *Śivajñāna Bōdham* refers to rebirth as such, as the process of going and coming (*poku varavu*, sutra 2.), which in the *Siddhiyār* is described as unceasing as a whirling fire brand or a fan.⁵ The *Siddhiyār* too compares the transition from one mode of existence to another to the transition from waking state to dream state.⁶

Karma as operating through the process of rebirth has been described as 'The Indian solution to the great riddle of the origin of suffering and the diversity of human condition'.⁷ This 'diversity of human condition' receives a restricted and therefore a distorted interpretation in the hands of a few bent on identifying suffering with lower social position i.e. as a form of rationalisation of caste structure. In seeking to account for particular instances of suffering as the necessary outcome of the operation of Karma, J. Bowker cites the *Milindapanha*, which is liable to be interpreted the above way.⁸ The King said; 'Revered Nāgaseṇa, what is the reason that men are not all the same, some being short-lived, some long-lived, some weakly, others healthy, some ugly, others comely, some of few wishes, others of many wishes, some poor, others rich, some belonging to low families, others to high families, and some being weak in wisdom, others having wisdom?'

The Elder said: 'But why sire, are trees not all the same, some being acid, some salt, some bitter, some sharp, some astringent, other sweet?'

'I think, revered sir, that it is because of a difference in seed'.

'Even so, sire, it is because of a difference in karmas that men are not all the same.....And this, sire, was also said by the Lord: 'Young men, beings have their own kamma, they are heirs to kamma, kamma is the matrix, kamma the kin, kamma the

arbiter, kamma divides beings, that is to say into low and lofty'. Maraimalaiyadikal, a contemporary exponent of Śaiva Siddhanta too seeks to incorporate into 'diversity of human condition' states of poverty and lower social position.⁹ But neither Buddhism nor Śaiva Siddhanta appear to uphold this point of view. In fact both systems arose in protest against caste hierarchy. Besides the problem of suffering transcends the limits of sociophysical context. The Buddhism suffering is one of the characteristic marks of existence itself, which when viewed logically arises as an implication of the notion of impermanence (another characteristic mark of existence). Nothing of value could be ascribed to the fleeting or momentary. But in normal unreflective states of experience where the momentary nature of existence goes unheeded, suffering follows as a necessary consequence. Even the happiness experienced in the higher worlds of Buddhist cosmology is impermanent. If the Manimekalai can be taken to be nearer to the Sautrāntika position, then the latter school at least appears to be more consistent. 'Diversity of human condition' in the *Manimekalai* is treated as 'diversity of spiritual gift' and the recurrent nature of human existence allows scope for spiritual progress. The Śaiva mystics too, conscious of the tiredness involved in recurrent births, appeal to God in a state of helplessness for a higher realm of permanent happiness.¹⁰ Thus 'diversity of human condition' must be seen as arising from Karma and rebirth, with the final goal of salvation in mind.

Karma may also be misconstrued as a form of fatalism,¹¹ in so far as the latter subscribes to the view that all experiences including actions are to be viewed in a strictly deterministic framework and that it does not allow scope for free choice. Karma cannot be subjected to such an interpretation. Both Buddhism and Śaiva Siddhanta carry a two pronged attack on (i) the indeterminism of the materialists to assert the possibility of a moral order and uphold their position as doctrines of salvation, and (ii) against strict determinism to allow for the possibility of moral responsibility and thereby point the way to salvation. It could be treated as fatalism only in so far as the examination is

confined to a specific to a specific experience as the necessary outcome of events over which the experiencing subject has no control. But the doctrine traces the said experience of any one individual to a specific action group of actions for which the said individual was himself responsible. In the last analysis one's experiences can be said to be one's own seeking thus illustrating the potency of actions.

Perhaps at this juncture it might be worthwhile pointing to the grounds for such a belief in the two systems. As against the Materialist, who holds that the truth is that which is verifiable in terms of sense experience, they argue the possibility of inferring truths that transcend sense experience. In the *Manimekalai* it takes the form of a dialogue (though *Manimekalai* does not address the reply to the Materialist):

Materialist: This existence and the fruits of this existence are realised in this world itself. It is false to uphold rebirth and Karma.¹²

Manimekalai: (To herself).¹³

How do you know (as an orphan) that you had a father and mother other than through inference? Without a spiritual insight knowledge of spiritual truths is not possible. You can only remain sceptical. (But) you are incapable of receiving spiritual truths.

The Śaivas too use the very same argument in refuting the Materialist contention that it is all in the nature of things.¹⁴

You, who holds that which is, is that which can be perceived and whose parents were stealthily consumed by death in your childhood,

Now that you are old enough to assert that they did really live, Tell me the method how?

Thus both the Buddhist and the Śaiva point to the 'unaccountable' in sense experience. It becomes an inference to fill in the gaps of our knowledge based on sense experience. But this is so far as argument is required against those who challenge the doctrine.

In both traditions however its truth is arrived at not through conventional methods of proof but realised through religious discipline. It is first accepted on faith not in the intellectual sense being without proof. It calls for all the noble qualities that faith implies. Faith as a prerequisite for the understanding of the truth of Karma refers to right commitment (Right view—the first in the eight-fold path in Buddhism). The adept in Buddhism attains to a state of the two super-knowledges (*abhijñā*),¹⁵ when the saint sees the past births of his own and that of others. The *Manimekalai* introduces several characters, each in different stages of insight of past births. Knowledge (*jñāna*) here implies gradation. Being a correlate of the level of spiritual progress it defies all conventional definition. In a perfected state the saint sees it as true. (However in the Pali tradition its truth appears to be presented first as a hypothesis and later verified as true. “Prominent among the doctrines derived as an inductive inference on the basis of the data of extra-sensory perception”, states Jayatilleke, is Karma as taught in the Pali Canonical texts. There is said to be general as well as a specific correlation between the kind of life led in this world and one’s state of survival. Now it is said that ‘the decease and survival of beings is to be verified by one’s (clairvoyant) vision’.....But with this clairvoyant vision one is also said to notice a correlation between the character of a person and his state of survival.....It is this correlation between good character and a happy state after death, and bad character and unhappy state after death that is called Karma.....In the *Mahāsīhanāda Sutta*, *Majjhima Nikāya*, the Buddha claims to test this in a way analogous to the testing of a hypothesis. The Buddha says that he first examines by means of his telepathic powers the mind of a certain individual in order to gauge the general tone of his character. From this knowledge in the light of the Karma hypothesis he expects the individual to be born into a certain state after death. At a later time he observes this individual with his clairvoyant perception to see in what state he has survived and finds that the prediction made in accordance with the above hypothesis is confirmed, thus verifying the truth of the hypothesis’.¹⁶ Apparently the range of the faculty of extra-sensory perception gets restricted in scope according to this

account and does not appear to tally with Vasubandhu's version of the Buddha's omniscience¹⁷ or that given in the *Manimekalai*,¹⁸ where his knowledge also transcends the limit of time. In challenging Buddha's omniscience (*muluthunarntha*), the *Siddhiyār* is confirming the version of Vasubandhu and the author of the *Manimekalai*, as being also true of that of the Sautrantika. Faith, in Śaiva Siddhanta, implies the acceptance of the scriptures as the word of God, and the saint's (*mukta's*) knowledge involves understanding God's purpose. Knowledge of Karma is therefore subsumable under knowledge of God's purpose.

So much for the comparability of the two schools in relation to the doctrine of Karma and the allied doctrine of rebirth. More radical is the divergence with regard to how Karma operates. Here each school seeks to deny the presuppositions of the other. To get to the source of the differences, it is essential to link the doctrines with other doctrines that together lend coherence to each system. Further it would also be fruitful to see them in the light of the religious insights that are central to the respective systems—where one attains to a state of pure consciousness cleansed of all subjective content, while the other attains to a union with the divine through intense devotion. It would be best to begin with the Buddhist analysis of experience.

Every unit of experience has a passive and an active part contained in it. The passive element is what always arrives involuntarily and automatically, while the other involves something produced voluntarily.

The involuntary or automatic features of the passive elements point to the given. Where Buddhism is concerned not all these can be accounted for in naturalistic terms. There is the 'mysterious efficiency' of past deeds that have moral character of some force. Its necessity as the natural outflow of a previous cause represents the operation of a moral law, which is Karma. The experience of pleasure and pain etc. are the results (*vipaka phala*), but are in themselves 'indifferent'—i.e. karmically neutral, (*avyakṛta dharma*), for they arise of necessity from antecedent causes. They are not produced voluntarily.

On the other hand is the active element which is traced as the source generating good or bad effects. As has been pointed out all actions do not fall under this category. It merely refers to volitional action emphasising the significance of the will. In so far as the latter leads to the accumulation of Karma—i.e. the potentialities of producing good or bad effects, it has to be suffused with desire (*tr̥sna*) and other forms of defilements and impurities (*kilesa*, *sasava dharma*).¹⁹ Thus, it is action that can be morally qualified, which in turn points to mental and spiritual acts (*manasa*) and the bodily and vocal actions, which are born of volition (*cetana*).

It is difficult to identify the passive and active aspects of experience separately with any one factor or factors (*skandhas*) that replaces the self in Buddhist analysis. Although *rūpa* (corporeal phenomena), that includes sensations and *vedana* (feelings—pleasant, unpleasant and neutral) point to the passive aspect of experience, they do not exhaust the given. The category of *samskāra* (active tendencies of Karma-formations) contains within itself all the potentialities to be the immediate determinants of action and to that extent contain the given. The passive and active elements can only therefore be said to be broadly suffused with all the five factors, which in their aggregate constitute the structure of human personality at any one moment of experience.

However the passive and active elements reveal the operation of the law and the source of the generation of the law. Once produced by a conscious voluntary mental or vocal or bodily act, the said action persists by developing on its own accord retaining the momentum given to it by the act of will.²⁰ Such a process goes on without the agency of thought,—i.e. it proceeds unconsciously whether a man is 'sleeping, waking, or absorbed in contemplation'. Nothing can impede it in its course.²¹ This constitutes a part of a series (*santana*) which takes the place of the continuity of a substantial self. This is what guarantees the essential 'inwardness' of individual experience and lends it identity. This series goes on enabling the experiencing of the fruits at the appropriate moment when the act is said to mature (*ethu*

nikalcci—lit. an event that is caused. The terms '*Paripāka*' or '*Vipāka*' are more appropriate and pregnant with meaning). It is the experience of these fruits that constitutes existence. On the other hand it is human actions with the requisite moral force that renews the existence process (*samsāra*). Thus when the Buddhist theory of causality refers to existence as 'efficiency', it refers merely to this process of renewal, as if the existence process is recharged recurrently. It is such a conception that enable Poussin to state 'We are what we think. We are what we will' as the essence of Buddhist Karma. Every event in the universe with its three planes of existence and six types of lives is in the final analysis reducible to human acts involving human energy and free will. No external agency comes in to tamper with the causal process.

The existence process as such, unleashed by acts of will follows a course that possesses a rigour of its own. But it presupposes a natural course of events that include physical and biological phenomena which maintain a neutral stance. The moral and spiritual factor that causes its own trail is superimposed upon (a) the causation among the elements of dead matter where the law of homogeneity (*sabhaga-hetu*) between cause and effect obtains, and (b) the causation in the organic world, where we have the phenomena of growth (*upacaya*) involving qualitative changes. The existence process therefore is a triad of laws with the invisible moral or spiritual law at the apex.²²

It is in this background of such an integrated scheme that an individual's process of existence is analysed. It is what is generally referred to as the special application of the general theory of causation (*pratītya samutpāda*). This is also a method of accounting for the origin of suffering. The metaphysical notion of a permanent 'soul' and the ordinary belief in one's own self as surviving the different experiences is sought to be demolished. The nature and process of individual existence on analysis turns out to be a series of states (*santāna*) in the nature of a causal continuity. It is the Buddhist answer to the cause of suffering, which is the second of the four noble truths. Buddhist scholasticism

has also linked to it an analysis of the necessary conditions that underlie the craving for existence.²⁶ What finally emerges is a chain of twelve links (*panniru nithanam*), which can be stated in a forward or reverse order. The twelve links cover not only the present life-span of an individual but also extends itself into the pre-birth and post-birth phase to bring to light the essential continuity of the macro-individual.

In the *Manimekalai*, the chain begins with ignorance (*pethamai*) and ends with the effects of Karma (*vinaippayan*) which involves disease, decay and death. The order fully stated is as follows:—

- (a) The group that precedes the new life and which is the cause of the latter (*athikkandam*—Karma process).²⁴

1. *Ignorance* (*avidyā*) which consists in upholding the non-existent as true—e.g. the hare's horn. This consists of the defiling influence that denies one discriminating knowledge.

2. *Volitional action* (*ceikai*—lit. what had been done; *Samskara*—also rendered as active tendencies or Karma formations). These are instincts arising in accordance with good or bad actions and which cling to the individual from conception onwards and come to fruition at the appropriate moment when they are experienced in terms of pleasure and pain.²⁵

- (b) The group that arises on account of the preceding group (*irandam kandam*—Rebirth process).

3. *Consciousness* (*vijñāna*). This is here viewed as pure awareness that is devoid of content compared to the state of deep sleep.²⁶ It is, as Conze states, not concretely determined by specific activities or objects.²⁷

4. *Psycho-physical complex* (*aruvuru*) which is conditioned by consciousness (*unarvu sarntha uyirum udampum*). This is the sphere of the activity of the physical and biological laws—i.e. the sphere of the activity of the eighteen *dhatus* or elements.

5. *The six senses (Ayatana*—lit. the door. In Buddhist usage it is explained as '*Ayadvara*' literally 'the door of coming into existence'.)²⁸ This includes the five senses and the mind. This serves as inlets for knowledge to arise in consciousness for it involves the six sense-organs and the six fields-or objects that lead to the arising²⁹ of six types of consciousness.
6. *Contact or Impression (uru)*. This refers to the course of sense-organ, object and consciousness.
7. *Feeling (vedana)* where the consciousness experiences the sensations (*unarvu pulankalai nukarthal*).
- (c) This is the third group (*muntran kadam*) where the arising of feelings allows the difilements and moral actions to come to play (*nukarcci olukkinul kuttramum vinaiyum akalane*).
8. *Craving (trṣṇa)* refers to the continuous arising of the desire for the feeling.
9. *Clinging (upadanam)* refers to the state in which one hangs on to the unrestricted desire for the 'continuous feeling'.³⁰
10. *Process of becoming (bhava)* involves a state in which the accumulation of Karma (*karuma iddam*) conditions the appropriate results (*tharumarai iuthuvenath thanthan carthal*).
- (d) This is the fourth group (*nankam kadam*) where the fruits of Karma merge with the new life (*pirappil ulakku payan athalin*).
11. *Re-Birth (jāti)*. Here consciousness is destined to come into being (*gati*) in the forms (*urukkal*) which operate according to the causal law in terms of Karma.³¹
12. *The effects of Karma (vinaippayan*—which is also disease, decay and death). These constitute the different

stages of suffering that are experienced as lamentation, pain, grief and despair (*avalam, aratruk, kavalai, kaiyaru*).

- (i) Disease (*pini*) operates in a series distinct from the twelve links and implies going against nature causing bodily pain.
- (ii) Decay (*jara*)—things being impermanent one loses steadiness progressively till the end.
- (iii) Death (*maraṇa*) refers to disappearance of the body that has psycho-physical qualities. It is compared to the setting of the sun (*vilkathirena marainthiduthal*).

Each stage is causally conditioned by that which precedes it and in turn conditions that which follows. The *Manimekalai* divides the twelve links into four groups with the first and third acting as the foundation for what follows in the next group. This tallies with the Pali *Abhidamma* version as given by Nyanatiloka.

The chief factor to which the whole nature of the human predicament is traced is ignorance. But it refers to more than intellectual ignorance. It involves the entire psychological state or states that are the immediate determinants of action. This refers to the defilements that are identified as the qualities (*kunam*) or greed (*lobha*), hatefulness (*dvesa*) and delusion (*moha*).⁹² It is in their presence that actions become karmically unwholesome (*akusala*)⁹³ and liberation demands that they be progressively reduced.⁹⁴ Yet the process is not to be treated in the nature of a chain. It is to be viewed as operating in the nature of circle (*mandila vakaiyai*). It could be that all factors are present at any one instant, which accounts for the fact that the Sautrantikas do not treat time as a significant category.

The link or the causal connection involved does not presuppose that degree of necessity which implies that the process is inevitable. Since it has been initiated by an act of will, it necessarily implies that the link can be made to snap equally by an act of will. While pointing to the obligation to experience the fruits of one's

actions, this doctrine also points to the possibility of salvation by the individual on his own accord.

But once the Karmic process has been set in motion (i.e. process of existence as the outcome of Karma) it follows unimpeded its own course. No external agency can erase or even mitigate the consequences of action—i.e. the environment of internal experience or states and the external physical and social relationships that one encounters because of Karma. If one performs deeds that are not according to the Dharma evil consequences become inevitable (*maran cei thunathenin valvinai oliyathu*). There is no scope for miracles that could arrest the operation of the law of Karma.²⁵ The saint or guru could only show the way or path of liberation but he cannot arrest the course of Karma. In the state of pure consciousness the saint sees things as they are as mere momentary phenomena. But he does not acquire omnipotence along with it.²⁶

The individual, who lives through the cycle of rebirths according to his Karma, is therefore subject to the regularities that are universal in their application. In fact the analysis indicates that the individual is absorbed into the rest of nature. But the whole universe consists of regular sequences that are initiated by acts of will. In fact the entire theme of *Manimekalai* is meant to illustrate this fact. The Karmic paths of the different characters in the epic, neatly synchronise with one another to produce what appear to be events in time and space—i.e. History. The killer and victim of a murder or the giver and recipient of an act of charity are mere meeting points of Karmic paths. It does not merely vindicate the ethical principle that one reaps as he sows, but retribution has it that the killer was once the victim of murder, and the recipient once the giver of alms. It works so neatly that the spiritually advanced could see its operation with different degrees of clarity as the level of spiritual attainment permits.

The basic difference between the Buddhist and the Śaiva conception of Karma arises in their respective approaches to the

problem of existence. To the Buddhist existence is evil. To the Śaiva it is not merely evil as such. To the latter what really constitutes evil is the wrong purpose attributed to existence or to see no conscious purpose at all. He seeks to understand the universal purpose underlying the cosmic scheme in which he is placed and attempts to attune the purposes of his own actions with this basic underlying scheme. Hence his interest in the 'why' of things, which makes causation synonymous with creation.

The Śaiva is interested in discovering why he is provided with a physical framework and why he has experiences of various kinds. The inner essence of the self as an eternal intelligent or conscious entity is seen as subject to the limitations of a physical body thus limiting its inherent capacity for knowledge. Hence the notion of *mayamala* or the physical obstacle to knowledge. This is one of the three obstacles that are brought in to account for the nature of alienation that the devout experiences. There are besides experiences that are not accountable in naturatistic terms and which somehow occur. This is Karma which is the second of the obstacles or impurities referred to. The third and perhaps most dreaded obstacle is *āṇavam* or the experience of a primitive darkness. This is often rendered as the principle of egoism in man—a form of primitive taint that clouds the vision of man. One becomes sensitive to it only at the higher levels of spiritual development. It is the ill-effects of *āṇavam* that the saints mourn about and against which man is said to be helpless. In the Śaiva ontological scheme, it is as much eternal as the categories matter, soul and God.

The human body and the material environment one lives in is seen as constantly changing. These physical forms (*urukkaḥ*) must of necessity have a creator. The latter of course, according to the causal doctrine of *satkāryavāda*, is not creating them out of nothing. He merely imposes the forms. But then a mere imposition of forms does not exhaust the Śaiva causal account. It must possess a purpose as well. The creator was identified as the supreme being or God, who was free of all the obstacles or impurities to which finite selves are subjected (*nirmalan*). The

search therefore is to discover the divine purpose for the creation of the world and the various living forms with their differing equipment for knowledge.

If God be the creator of the universe—i.e. the cyclical process of creation and destruction—it cannot be for the sake of matter, for the latter is unintelligent and therefore incapable of acting purposefully (*acētanam*). Nor is it for himself for he is not in need of anything as he is perfect. By a process of elimination, it is inferred that the entire process of creation is for man (more appropriately the soul). Creation here implies the setting into motion of the evolutionary process from the primitive substance called *māyā*. The individual obtains his body (*thanu*), organs of perception and action (*karaṇam*), the world (*puvanam*) as the objects of his experience and the experiences themselves (*pōkam*). These are evolved out of maya. The aim is to help the soul to rid itself of the basic impurity which is *āṇavam*.⁸⁷, ⁸⁸

The knowledge of God's purpose arises essentially from religious experience. Philosophical argument could at the most (if the causal theory subscribed to be accepted) be treated as an inference hinting at what could be experienced in fact. It is the nature of the experience of God,—who incidentally is not arrived at through reasoning but through intense devotion—that reveals to his devotee his loving nature. This is his grace or *śakti* which is the manifestation of the dynamic nature of transcendence (*sat* meaning pure intelligence which is not static). Thus God's immanence is as much a feature of his transcendence. Hence the interpretation of the notion of Advaita or non-dualism which is quite distinct from that of other Vedic schools. It is God's energy that generates the evolutionary process and provides it a purpose.⁸⁹

In the liberated state, the God-man relationship is manifested in the essential synchronisation between the divine will and man's will. But then in the existential predicament of man—i.e. in the state of his alienation from the constant beatific vision of God and from which he seeks liberation to attain his essential nature—he is in bondage to *āṇavamala*. It is God's love for man and

his desire to effect man's salvation that accounts for the entire cosmic process. Thus 'existence' in terms of the soul having a body and experiences could be traced to an act of grace. It gains meaning because it is willfully created, sustained and destroyed to provide him a theatre to learn and experience his true nature. Suffering subsumed under this overall purpose ceases to be suffering as such and therefore ceases to be evil. In this way God is absolved of the charge of being cruel, for suffering becomes a means to an end. The Śaiva theory of Karma therefore has to be viewed in the light of this overall divine scheme meant for man. In fact much of the discussion in the *Siddhiyār* centres around this basic assumption of not merely the fact of Karma but also its operation within this divine plan for man's salvation. Its difference from that of the Buddhist interpretation arises because of a difference in world view.

The Śaiva unit of experience too has its passive and active phases. But it differs from the Buddhist analysis in that it has a permanent experiencing subject (*jñāthiru*)⁴⁰ over and above the experience and the objects of experience. Unlike in Buddhism, the conscious principle though dependent on the organs and objects,⁴¹ does not come into being because of them. It is not therefore absorbed into the rest of nature as with Buddhism. But it is associated with the rest of nature by its link with the body. The latter is of two kinds—the gross (*thūlavudal*) and the subtle (*sūkshmayudal* or *sariram*). The latter is the medium by which it has experiences in a state of dream and with which it migrates from one birth to another. In its passive role it has the experiences of pleasure and pain (*inpath thunpap palaṅkaḷum nukarum*—it experiences pleasure and pain as effects). In its active phase it wills, thinks and acts (*inccā, jñāna* and *kriyā śakti*).⁴²

The classification of Karma in terms of types fits into the dichotomy of passive and active phases of experience. These refer to the subconscious impressions (*samskāra*) or basic equipment with which one is born according to which he reacts to the world and shapes his future—i.e. acquires further *samskāras*. The latter refer to the freedom of action that the soul possesses not

merely in building for oneself an improved set of impressions for the future but also in arresting the intensity of past *samskāras*. (In Śaiva Siddhānta this involves a two way process—man's spiritual maturity and God's grace in the analogy of the monkey and its young). There are three types of *samskāra* or sub-conscious impressions :

- (a) *Sañcita*. This refers to all accumulated *samskāra* of past lives that await an opportunity for fruition. The commentator to the *Sivaprakāśam* refers to it as 'ēṇchu vinai' (Karma left over).⁴³
- (b) *Prārabdha*. It determines the present life of an individual. This refers to the human body and the experiential environment one is placed in.⁴⁴ It is referred to as 'ēru vinai' (Karma that comes to fruition). The Karma that was done before is its cause.⁴⁵
- (c) *Akāmiyam* is the Karma earned by way of action in this life that will have its consequences for the future.

It was seen in the case of Buddhism, that actions with sufficient moral force only had Karmic consequences. In Śaiva Siddhānta it covers actions that have the element of 'I'ness or that which are 'ego' centered⁴⁶ which in practice tantamounts to what Buddhism refers to as karmically unwholesome (*akusala*). These are actions that are willed at the level of mind, speech and the body (*manam, vāṅku, kāyam*). Their effectiveness to produce consequences is dependent on the force with which good (*iṭham*) and bad (*akitham*) actions are performed—the parallel of 'sufficient moral force' in Buddhism.

The mode in which consequences of past actions manifest themselves is by coming to fruition as experience after remaining in a subtle state.⁴⁷ Here we get a conception comparable to the position of the Ājivikas which treats the consequence of a karmically potent action as material (*jaḍa*). It is devoid of the 'force' necessary for it to pursue its own course as in the case of the Buddhist interpretation. The actions proper born of moral effort perish in this life itself. The good and bad effects, though not

denied, do not possess a will of their own (*acetana*) to enable them to progress unimpeded in seeking the occasion to come to fruition. It becomes and remains material (*mūlathathāki*).

Yet its operation is based on principle.⁴⁸ This principle is also referred to as '*vidhi*', which is also the term used for a 'law'. Here, a comparison with the Buddhist conception of law becomes interesting. The latter view takes the physical and biological phenomena as given, but operating in the nature of regular sequence to which the term 'law' is applied. This is the given in Buddhism. On this is superimposed the moral or spiritual phenomena, whose source is traced to an act of will that is human. This enables exponents of Buddhism to conclude that the Universe is man made. The Sautrantikas, of course admit the existence of a world of objective matter that exists independent of perception. 'Universe' as such is therefore what is subjectively oriented—i.e. the world carved out by the false view of the self. This is the world born of ignorance. It is this world of phenomena that operates on the basis of a triad of laws. This is what they finally trace to the human will. The Śaivas, on the other hand, trace all phenomena to God's will. The 'given' in human experience is given by God. 'Law' in the final analysis is therefore God's will.

Into this divine will or law is subsumed the operation of Karma. For Karma by itself involves the body, organs, place, time, direction, action and object—which is the analysis of the instruments involved when a soul acts or enjoys its experience. These by themselves, being constituted of matter, cannot merge with the soul to become *prārabdha* or the determinants of present existence. Nor is it within the capacity of the soul which has become finite. Their merger has to be effected by one whose knowledge is infinite.⁴⁹ It is God who in his mercy effects the merger of the good and bad effects of Karma to the souls in his role as creator.

The nature of the dispensation of Karmic effects is accounted for in the analogy of the role of the king and the physician.⁵⁰

Those who violate the law are punished, and those who do good are rewarded with power (The Śaiva goal is power to act with freedom, and God is seen as the power behind all power).⁵¹ But retribution has contained in it the power to reform for the punished will never be involved in bad actions thereafter.⁵² These are likened to the medicines administered by a physician (*Vaidhyānāthan*). The ailment referred to is the primitive darkness of egoism or the state in which one is subject to *āṇavam*. The medicines are administered with due sympathy but with considerable degree of detachment lest the disease be not cured. The treatment may be surgical and harsh, or the medicines may be soothing. Similarly God treats and removes Karma by giving pleasure or pain.

The plane at which Karma operates is the physical body. Actions performed by the agency of a physical body that has perished are able to have their impact felt in the present physical frame because, the latter is a continuation of the former. It is in the nature of the tree which it survives in its seed.⁵³ When the gross body of the elements (*puṭhanā sarīram*) ceases at death, the subtle body with the eight *tattvas* including *buddhi* and *akaṅkāram* (*Yāthanā sarīram*) remains as the plane in which the experiences can be had. Hence the effectiveness of punishment or reward in hell or heaven. On rebirth, the soul is linked to the appropriate evolute of *maya* (*sūkshma sarīra*) by God. This is done in accordance with Karma that is yet to be exhausted.⁵⁴ This process which is without beginning (*anādhi*) comes to an end only when the soul attains communion with God (*S'ivam*—lit, bliss).

Since law can be defined as divine will, the implications of such a point of view in determining what constitutes good and bad actions radically differ from the Buddhist conception. In Buddhism bad actions include all those that are motivated by desire. These spring from ignorance of the Dharma that is characterised by the three marks of impermanence, sorrow and not-self. The notion of self has no basis in objective fact. Such a notion of the self is not denied in the Śaiva scheme. The human body and the world we live in are made use of in the

effort to realise the higher potentialities of the self. The purpose of human action should synchronise with that of God. It is in a state of love of God, which involves absolute self-surrender, that such an objective could be attained. Love putifies actions performed in a state of love of God, even if they be deemed bad, are said to become good. On the other hand actions that are not motivated by love of God, even if deemed good, become bad.⁵⁵ Since the scriptures are the word of God, good and bad actions are judged by their conformity or otherwise with the scriptures.

Unlike the Buddhist conception, in Śaiva *satkāryavāda* the link in the causal chain is bound by necessity. The given in life has a divine will activating it. The operation of Karma comes as inevitable experience. But since it has God's will as its source, its effectiveness can be mitigated or even erased by his grace. Again unlike the Buddhist conception, the individual though capable of release, cannot attain it on his own initiative for the processes involved are not to be traced to one's own will. It calls for the intervention of divine grace.

CHAPTER IV

IGNORANCE

Unlike in the Judaeo-Christian tradition that seeks in 'original sin' the very source of men's troubles, the root-evil common to all Indian religions is ignorance.¹ It has been variously described as 'original', 'aboriginal' and more appropriately as 'beginningless' (*anādi*) ignorance—to drive home the fact that it is the basis of the human condition which is one of suffering. It is ignorance that accounts for what Mercea Ellade refers to as the problem of the "temporality and historicity of man".² There is no parallel in the Indian tradition to the Judeo-Christian myth of primitive man consuming the forbidden fruit and thus holding the human race collectively responsible for deviationism. The doctrine fits in with the conception of a pulsating universe and by implication gives rise to a different conception of history. It is the individual and not the community that bears the guilt and it is left to the individual himself to work out his own salvation.

The doctrine of ignorance also reveals another significant feature common to all Indian religions. The concept of the person as held ordinarily and which is the subject of study in experimental Psychology is not to be identified as true of our essential nature. It is an alien element and which is the source and very definition of suffering. To the Buddhist it is a mere false construction, while the Śālvās treat it as a false identification similar to the position of Samkhya and Yoga. In either instance, self-centeredness and the trail it sets into being as actions and consequences (*karma*) implicates us in the cycle of rebirths (*samsāra*). Liberation or salvation therefore can only be attained by freeing oneself from *samsāra*. The Buddhist seeks to attain a state where he is not conditioned by external factors. On the other hand the Śaiva understands by freedom identification with God. Herein lies the meaning of the terms *paratantra* and *svatantra*. In both

instances it is ignorance that acts as an impediment to attaining the final goal.

The term that is commonly used to denote ignorance is 'avidya' (a+vid) which implies the negation of knowledge. The Pali 'avijja' has also its parallel in Śaiva Tamil texts (*aviccaṭ*). Doctrinally the Śaiva parallel is 'aṇavam'. But knowledge (*vidya*) need not necessarily be the opposite of *avidya*, for 'vidya' in normal usage refers to the arts and sciences.³ This certainly is not the goal of the Buddhist for he aims at attaining wisdom (*prajna*). The Śaivas do not deny any value to knowledge as defined above. In fact *kala* (the arts of which there are sixty-four in number) and *vidya* are significant points in the Śaiva evolutionary scheme,⁴ but their spiritual significance is treated as limited though essential for progress.

But ignorance (*avidya*) is not negation in the abstract. Viewed existentially it has a positive meaning. 'It is important to realise that', states Jayatilke, 'although we translate *avijja* as 'lack of knowledge', the negative in Indian thought has a positive connotation (e.g. *ārogya* means 'a state of health' rather than the absence of disease') and *avijja* includes the totality of the false and erroneous beliefs that we entertain about man and his destiny in the universe'.⁵ It is more appropriate to treat it as the opposite of 'wisdom' for the latter is treated as the highest virtue of all.⁶ Since wisdom is to be attained by following a path (*mārga*) involving discipline, the state of ignorance could be viewed as belonging to the other end of the scale, whichever the path. Since 'wisdom' is the goal to be attained, ignorance therefore is the way the alienated state of man is characterised.

The term 'aṇavam' in Śaiva Siddhanta does not directly mean ignorance. Rather it is the principle that accounts for ignorance. But it could be treated as the doctrinal parallel of ignorance in other religions belonging to the Indian tradition. Its adoption could be traced only to the period of the Theologians and not beyond. In the hymns it is merely referred to as 'pāsam' that accounts for the limited condition of the human personality

(*pasutvam*). The word '*āṇavam*' (from *√aṇu*) signifies 'the state or character of the atom'. Such a usage cannot be traced in the vedic tradition. It is the influence of non-vedic religions—particularly the *Ajivakas*. It represents the principle that limits and accounts for individuation in terms of a body in time, for what is an otherwise a pervasive soul.' It is also called 'darkness' (*iru!*) for which '*aru!*' or divine grace is the antidote.

The doctrine of ignorance poses two possibilities for a comparative study of its significance in two religious traditions: (a) Ignorance is the term the protagonists of one school would like to brand as characteristic of the protagonists of the other school and (b) it could also be treated as the obstacle to higher states or experiences central to each system.

The first possibility (a) reveals the spirit in which much of the debate between the schools was conducted in the course of the history of Indian religions. The Buddhist *Mañimēkalai* and Śaiva *Siddhiyār* prove no exception to this tendency. There is no attempt at a sympathetic appraisal of the rival stand point. If religion X contains wisdom, then all other religions that are not X cannot contain wisdom. Being the opposite of wisdom it has to be none other than ignorance. This spirit is more evident in the expository texts that tend to reflect the polemical nature of the context in which the expositions took place.

Avidya or *Pethamai* in the *Mañimēkalai* is defined thus:

If it be asked what constitutes ignorance, it is to ignore the meaning of the afore mentioned (i.e. Buddhist) teaching and in delusion, forget what is presented (by perception and inference), and believe on testimony that the hare has horns.⁹

The 'afore mentioned teaching' here refers to the four noble truths that gives a causal account of suffering and presents the way for its removal in the eight-fold path. 'Authority' or testimony, here refers to the non-verifiable in terms of Buddhist religious experience and corresponds to the 'totality of false and erroneous beliefs' that Jayatilleke refers to.⁹ It has its parallel in the two-

fold ignorance of 'no theory' and 'false theory' mentioned in the *Visuddhimagga*, where Nyanamoli suggests the possibility of rendering them as 'agnosticism' and 'superstition'.¹⁰ In the *Siddhiyār* version of the Sautrantika statement, belief in God, soul, space, time and direction (the main framework of the Śaiva system) is dismissed off as delusion arising from physiological defects.¹¹

The distinction between 'wisdom' and 'ignorance' is not a mere intellectual one. Rather it is presented as two alternative courses pressing for their acceptance—one leading into the state of liberation while the other into the deep pit of hell or purgatory.

'*Aṇavam*', in the Śaiva theological texts goes beyond the connotation of foolishness, which the Buddhist would give to '*avidya*' in their effort to uphold an elitist doctrine. *Aṇavam* represents conceit and arrogance as revealed in a system which upholds individual effort alone as sufficient for attaining release. To claim human authorship of the scriptures is treated as an effrontery to God's omniscience towards whom the attitude should be one of selfsurrender. In the Śaiva broadside against all contemporary religions as revealed in the *Parapakkam* of the *Sivagnāna Siddhiyār*, the Buddhist system is dismissed off as based on ignorance and adherence to which would only lead one into the deep pit of sin.¹²

Both the Buddhist and the Śaiva polemicists treat the rival doctrine as based on ignorance. There is no scope for toleration, for only one of the doctrines has to be opted for, if one is to attain freedom or release from suffering. The other doctrine merely guarantees purgatory. 'Ignorance' therefore, in the context of polemics, is an emotionally charged term reserved only for the adversary in debate.

It is (b) 'ignorance' as an obstacle to entry into the religious path and the realisation of higher states which as a sphere of enquiry promises fruitful results. The other category (a) merely guarantees a heap of abuses arising from the stand point of dogmatism. (Of course, to the truly committed, an effort at a

sympathetic understanding of rival stand point might appear to be a silly academic exercise that seeks to compare the true with the false).

1. Buddhist conception of Ignorance: Understanding the Buddhist conception can be made easy if the problem is viewed in terms of epistemology and psychology. Perhaps this might be an arbitrary division for the entire conception is of an organic nature reflecting a state of conditioned existence. But this method helps to penetrate into the nature of the problem, which in its religious sense is a description of the human predicament from a Buddhist point of view.

To the Sautrantika what is true is what exists.¹³ Wisdom therefore consists in an insight into the true nature of the *dharma*s. Since this insight is born through intense discipline, it is referred to as penetration to the *dharma*s as they are. Ignorance therefore has the mark of being unable to penetrate to *dharma*s as they are.¹⁴ It does not merely refer to the absence of penetration into the true nature of *dharma*s. It also refers to a false construction. This amounts to a false or wrong interpretation of facts. (The Sautrantikas¹⁵ contend that our processes of thought do not represent a direct picture of external reality but follow each other in a thought series of its own. It is true that it is under pressure from without, but it remains autonomous. As such there is much scope for false construction).¹⁶

This wrong interpretation is also the proximate cause of the inability to penetrate to the nature of the *dharma*s. These are the four perverted views called *viparyāsa*. Under their influence one looks 'for the Permanent in the impermanent, for ease in suffering, for the Self in what is not the self, and for the lovely (*subha*) in the repulsive'.¹⁷ They refer to the tendency to seek permanence in the essentially impermanent, ease from what is inseparable from suffering, selfhood in what is not linked to any self, and delight in what is essentially repulsive and disgusting. This is what the scriptures refer to as 'unwise attention', and what Conze describes as 'mis-searches' and 'reversals

of the truth'.¹⁸ This four-fold division of perverted views has to be viewed as a meditational technique for purposes of analytical contemplation to impress on one the actual state of affairs that obtain in normal experience—i.e. that our experience is corrupted from the very source by ignorance.

In so far as ignorance as an impediment (*nivaraṇa*) prevents the penetration of the *dhammas*, the perception of the three marks of impermanence, ill and not-self as true of reality is denied. In practical consequence it has the evil effect of denying knowledge of the true nature of suffering. 'Whatever.....is not knowing in regard to anguish, not knowing in regard to the uprising of anguish, not knowing in regard to the stopping of anguish, not knowing in regard to the course leading to the stopping of anguish.....is called ignorance'.¹⁹ In fact absence of positive perception and the wrong interpretation of what is claimed as facts appear as the two sides of the same coin. In discussing the meaning of ignorance, Buddhagosa says it finds (*vindati*) what ought not to be found (*avindiya*), and conversely it does not find (*na vindati*) what ought to be found (*vindiya*).²⁰

The psychological or subjective aspect of the problem of ignorance is its role as one of the main motivating factors or springs of action that keep the existence process going. Ignorance in this context is referred to as *moha* (*mayakkam*—confusion). Confusion or *mōha* involves stupidity (*pethamai*), dullness of mind and soul, delusion (*maruḷ*), bewilderment (*thadumāttram*), and infatuation (*vēddal*) (one of the three cardinal affects of *citta*, making man unable to grasp the higher truths and enter the path). These being the root of evil (*moho-akusalamūlam*) *moha* is held to be synonymous with the ignorance element (*avijjadhātu*).

The existence of bias and prejudice as the source of doubt and pride (*avijjānusaya*) is traced to the presence of ignorance. It is one of those responsible for intoxicating the mind not to rise to higher states or knowledge (*asava*). It is the flood of ignorance and vain desires which sweep a man away from the serenity of emancipation. It is a positive obstacle to the ethical

life (*avijjogha*). It is also treated as one of the ten bonds or fetters (*avijja sanyojana*).²¹ All these represent the inability of a normal human being to see the truth. 'Ignorance', states Buddha-gosa, 'has character of unknowing. Its function is to confuse. It is manifested as concealing'.²²

Ignorance viewed from the subjective angle—i.e. in terms of *viparyāsa* as located in the mind, is threefold. They affect theoretical opinions (*drsti viparyāsa*), perception (*samjñā viparyāsa*) and thought (*citta viparyāsa*). The assertion of the existence of permanent objects—such as the soul, creator god etc., comes under *drsti viparyāsa*. Conze describes it as 'perverted opinion'.²³ That which concerns perception and thought appear to be more significant for they concern habit formation. It is the latter that lead to false interpretation of facts as they are. Perceptual error makes one blind to the transcient nature of things and events and becomes the decisive factor in the false construction of permanence and selfhood. As for *cittaviparyāsa*, Conze states thus, 'we speak of a perversion of thought where the inclinations of the heart put a patently false construction on events and where their appearance is manifestly distorted by fantastic alterations and additions imported in deference to our wishes and fears'.²⁴ To regard the repulsive as attractive, which is the fourth *viparyāsa* concerning the distortion of the objective world too comes under *citta-viparyāsa*. The chief among these is food and sex, which though inherently uninteresting arouses one's interest instinctively. The *Maṇimēkalai*, in fact carries a lengthy sermon on sex and the repulsiveness of the human body. What is treated as attractive among the features of a young woman and that which drives the young lover into states of poetic imagination, does in reflection on old age and in death, prove a false construction.²⁵

The above description of the forms in which ignorance or the want of spiritual insight manifests itself is to show how suffering perpetuates itself. Inability to penetrate to the own being (*svabhāva*) of dharmas, (—i.e. in so far as the *viparyāyas* continue to reverse the truth in one's experience) necessarily results in the overthrow of inward calm. Hence all the suffering that ensues in its trail.

According to the Buddhist theory of causality, it is ignorance that enables the active tendencies (impulses, volitions, dispositions, etc. *samskara*, to act and thus generate karma. Given the state of ignorance as the condition karma-formation is brought into being thus bringing about the continuation of the life-series.

Since 'Ignorance' stands at the head of twelve *nīdanas* or causal links (the most systematised presentation of the formula of (*patitya-samutpāda*) it is liable to be interpreted as the first cause. The latter is ruled out as a meaningless question in the Buddhist texts. Besides Buddhist pragmatism confines the quest to the state of affairs that are relevant to overcoming a state of ignorance. In fact emphasis on ignorance is to show that it is knowledge or wisdom that guarantees release. The attitude to the search for the first cause or origins is treated as childish as in the case of Samkhya or Yoga²⁶ or the Śaiva Siddhanta, where the state of bondage is treated as beyond time and eternal (*anādhi*). In fact the problem is got over by treating the causal process as circular in the nature of a wheel. 'The wheel of becoming' becomes common usage in scholastic circles where the process is said to continue without halting. It is continuously renewed and Buddhagosa views 'defining of factors' as one 'summarization'.²⁷ Nevertheless, ignorance does along with craving receive particular emphasis as starting points in the round because they are treated as the 'outstanding causes of karma' 'that lead to happy and unhappy destinies'.²⁸

There is however room for interpreting the whole nexus of causally related factors beginning with ignorance as being simultaneously present at any one single moment. It has been asserted that 'the whole chain of the (12) conditions of origination represents one single karmical moment of personal experience'. This is of course countered as a 'senseless assertion' because cause and effect cannot arise at the same moment.²⁹ It is also pointed out that it leads to a paradox like birth (*jāti*) and death (*maraṇa*) being simultaneously present. Confusion in interpretation stems from the fact that the links are not uniform in character. As Smart states, 'The puzzlement occasioned by the doctrine of

origination partly arises because some links in the chain are related horizontally, in time, and others vertically. Partly, too, the trouble is that the doctrine is an amalgam which has been put together over a longish period.⁸⁰ But it must be realised the doctrine has been treated as an intricate or perhaps the most intricate doctrine in the Buddhist tradition. The Buddha himself is quoted saying, 'Profound, indeed Ananda, is this Dependent Origination, and Profound does it appear, etc'. (*Mahānidāna Sutta, D.*)

Inability to penetrate into the nature of the dhammas necessarily implies the need for the cessation of ignorance (*avijja nirōdha*). Hence the significance of ignorance in the Buddhist scheme of emancipation. In fact its meaning can only be understood in these terms for otherwise there is no need to distinguish its opposite from knowledge of the arts and the sciences. Since the analysis of the human situation is strictly determined by the pragmatic aim⁸¹ of discovering the cause and the method of removing suffering, the self is seen as a series of phenomenal states that have a beginning and an end. This series is also seen as regulated by causal laws for the self here is absorbed into the rest of nature. That which is subject to change (or more appropriately 'becoming') in the Buddhist sense of re-becoming or be subjected to rebirth, will be subject to the impediment of ignorance (*avijja-nivarana*). Thus ignorance also involves the ignorance of the causal factors operative within us. But the Buddhist theory of causality does not posit the existence of a relationship binding the cause with effect for such a mode of relationship is not possible with phenomena that is by nature transcendent. Thus, if ignorance be the cause of the beginning of the existence-process then it could also be removed as there is no tie binding cause with effect. The eightfold path is in fact the disciplinary medium by which this end is brought about.

Jayatilke in an article on '*avijja*'⁸² raises a problem concerning the role of 'right belief or views' which stands at the head of the eight-fold path. 'If with the removal of all ignorance with regard to matters moral and spiritual, the mind slips into a state

of emancipation, the non-emancipated mind' states Jayatilleke, 'is in a state of ignorance'. To him this implies that right up to the state of attainment of 'right knowledge' (*samma-nāna*), which is hastened by the right attunement of the mind (*samma samādhi*) in the jhanic states, 'the mind is in a state of ignorance'. He states that this argument will only lead to the conclusion that the entertaining of 'right beliefs or views' (*samma-ditthi*) at the initial stages of the path will take place in a state of ignorance. Scriptural sources are cited to support the above possibility (the occurrence of evil states of mind in the wake of a lack of sense of moral shame or fear is preceded by ignorance (*avijja*) and the ignorant person, lacking foresight, tends to entertain false views'.

In another passage Jayatilleke cites in the said essay, it is stated that a man 'with knowledge, possessed of foresight, tends to entertain right views'. This passage, he opines, suggests—'that long before the attainment of right knowledge (*samma-nāna*) at the culmination of the noble eight-fold path, it is possible to be led by knowledge (*vijja*) which precedes and actuates the adoption of right views or beliefs'. Apparently this is seen as a paradox because he seems convinced that knowledge and belief are mutually exclusive, and that '*samma-ditthi*' when translated as 'right belief or views' is not entitled to the claim of knowledge. 'Strictly, both right or true beliefs, as well as wrong or false beliefs, 'states he, 'must be included within ignorance (*avijja*), the latter because the beliefs are false and the former because they are still beliefs, not amounting to knowledge'. He is committed to the view that beliefs do not possess the certainty that knowledge does and concludes thus, "Yet, we find in tradition that 'right view' or 'beliefs', (*samma-ditthi*) are held to be synonymous with, or are included within knowledge (*vijja*)".

But 'right view' (or belief) along with 'right resolve' concern commitment to the Buddhist path. Smart's interpretation appears more coherent with the overall scheme for emancipation when he states that they 'concern the correct attitudes for embarking on, and conducting, the quest'.⁸⁸ In fact to present 'belief' as the

contradictory or even as not amounting to 'knowledge' does not fit in with the Buddhist attitude to 'doubt'. Buddhagosa on the authority of '*Petakopadesa*' speaks of doubt as 'the contrary of belief, confidence or faith'.⁸⁴ Belief here does not in any way connote the truth or falsity of things. Rather it refers to the right attitude which amounts to faith. It involves the trusting and taking refuge in the three jewels of Buddha, Doctrine and the Order. Buddhagosa states, 'it is an act of believing in the sense of plunging, breaking, entering into qualities of the Buddha and the rest, and rejoicing over them'. Thus the antidote to 'ignorance' is not knowledge or insight (*panna*) in the immediate sense, as right faith. Belief or faith as the opposite state of a mind that is obsessed by doubt admits of gradation—from that of the ordinary man of the world to that of the *Arahat* who is devoid of faith (*assaddha*).

There is a tendency among Buddhist writers to present the not self (*anatta*) doctrine which is one of the three characteristic marks of reality as being none other than the negation of the *atman* (soul or permanent self) doctrine found in the other Indian schools. Perhaps such doubt about the correctness of such a presentation may itself be seen as the foisting of alien traditions on interpreting the Buddhist doctrine of *anatta*. The Hindu tradition is viewed as opposed to the Buddhist. But here, Hinduism is exclusively taken to mean the monistic tradition. This has been highlighted as that which is typical of Hinduism by some influential contemporary Indian scholars and European Indologists, who concentrated their attentions on the Vedanta alone. They fail to draw the distinction between Aryan and pre-Aryan features in Indian religions as a whole. Buddhism shares a good many features in common with Jainism, Samkhya, Yoga and Śaiva Siddhanta such as plurality of selves, rebirth and karma.

Further, there is considerable disagreement on what precisely were the words of the Buddha, as is made evident from the proliferation of schools within the Buddhist fold itself. The Sautrantikas themselves, it is said, arose as spearheading a movement to return to the *sūtras*, which, if true, is indicative of the

extent of the interpolations involved in the scriptures. In the context of inter-school rivalry it is difficult to sift the polemical from the actual. The former could have been inspired by extra-religious factors.

The whole problem centers around the issue of the human personality which in Buddhism is characterised as finite and impermanent. This is seen as permeated by sorrow and in the context of the acceptance of the common doctrines of karma and rebirth and the notion that it is ignorance along with craving that are the outstanding causes of karma, the goal seems to be one of transcending the state of human existence. (This prime feature of self-negation is common to all the Indian schools). The twin doctrines of 'impermanence' and 'non-self', as the analysis of substances, in terms of a succession of impermanent states and the denial of the existence of eternal selves underlying psychological states, has to be viewed in terms of the sick nature of the human personality. The '*viparyāyas*' make their full effect felt because one is deluded into the belief that the human personality is something permanent. The break up of the individual in terms of the aggregate of five *skandhas* serve as a model, which as objects of meditation would help all notions of 'I' and 'mine' disappear. It is the latter attitude which precipitates unwholesome karma and results in suffering.

The Buddhist theory of causality does away with other presuppositions. The analysis of what is apparently treated as a persistent self into a combination of states of five categories and treating them as momentary in duration is treated as self-sufficient in accounting for the causal processes involved in rebirth. The main objective is to overcome pain arising from the conditioned nature of existence. To presuppose the existence of other categories appears from the Buddhist point of view as superfluous and therefore idle speculation. The problem is to nurse the wound that demands immediate attention rather than dissipate one's energies tracing the source from which the arrow that caused the wound was shot from. Buddhist metaphysics therefore is a great deal determined by the ideal of the contemplative life. The Buddhist

saint seeks peace (*sānti*), which is one of the epithets used about *nirvāṇa* to signify its peacefulness.

Having analysed the nature of the individual in empirical terms (i.e. as verifiable in terms of perception and inference)—the range being constricted by the problem posed,⁸⁵ and simultaneously condemning materialist annihilationism (i.e. with death the individual's chapter is treated as closed) the Buddha proceeds to deny that after his decease, the Buddha or the saint continued to exist. This merely spotlights the inability of making any positive statements about transcendent states—a region where language becomes inapplicable. The 'four-cornered negation' (*catuskoti*), undetermined questions (*avyākrtāni*) and the Buddha's silence on these matters may therefore be all viewed as reflective of one attitude only—i.e. the impossibility of describing transcendent state or states.⁸⁶

However there is some reference to a permanent element to which description in terms of language is not feasible. In fact, evil in man is treated as an extraneous outcome of his *samsaric* conditioning. The mind of man is treated in Buddhist texts as comparable to gold-ore, which is said to have the defilements of iron, copper, tin, lead and silver. When these impurities are removed, then the gold is said to regain its natural lustre and shine. The Buddha states that, 'the mind is naturally resplendent though it is corrupted by adventitious defilements'.⁸⁷ This naturally suggests a state native to the mind from which it is temporarily alienated, which is also the basis of hope for salvation. The causal theory merely indicates the possibility of freedom. But then, this transcendental state is indescribable. Here, therefore it presents a strange resemblance to the *Upanisadic* attempts to describe the permanent self in negative terms (*neti neti*).⁸⁸

Perhaps at this juncture it may be useful to refer to Das Gupta's comments on this issue. He states, 'The important postulate of the Buddha is that which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self. The point at which Buddhism parted with the *Upaniṣads* lies in the experience of the self. The *Upaniṣads* doubtless considered that there were many experiences

which we often identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is found in the *Upaniṣads* that there was associated with these a permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence which was the true and unchanging self, the blissful..... But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and therefore sorrow [and therefore non-self, and what was non-self was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me as my self'.³⁹

Whatever the nature of the resemblances, the Sautrantika polemicists seem to come down definitely against theistic categories of the Śaivas. They deny god, soul, and those categories essential for Śaiva causal scheme to operate. The Sautrantika (and also the Buddhist as a whole) scheme of emancipation treats them as irrelevant. Their main interest is on actions that are done in ignorance and the sequence that follows. There is no such thing as an agency involved, which if admitted, would render a permanent substance necessary. The *Mañimēkalai* refers to the process represented by the doctrine or *pratitya-samutpada* as being devoid of a subject that performs the action nor is it performed on any. There is no scope for notions of 'I' and 'mine' which lies as the substrate of the cycle of rebirths.⁴⁰ It encompasses within its fold actions, their fruits, rebirth and emancipation.⁴¹ It is in the nature of things that they come to be and pass away according to their own causal pattern. Insight into the fourfold truths leads to emancipation. Want of such an insight is treated as ignorance. *Avidya* therefore becomes the anti-thesis of *ariya-satya*.⁴² Belief in god, soul, and the factors in the Śaiva causal scheme which are inessential to the Buddhist scheme of emancipation is therefore treated as coming within the area that ignorance covers. 'Meaninglessness' in this sense could also be treated as synonymous with 'fruitlessness' for they do not matter in overcoming the problem of suffering.

The divergence in approach could be traced to the fact that there are two distinct types of religious practices involved. The

Buddhist saint seeks calm as opposed to the turbulence that attachment to the fleeting involves. The latter is because of one's ignorance of the true nature of things. Ignorance as a subjective factor also acts as a positive hinderance to attaining the final goal. The emphasis is on mental control and right awareness (*sati*), which demands of the Buddhist aspirants to be clear of his psychical and physical states and thereby be aware of his motives, etc. The individual thus chopped up to exhibit his structure and also the karmic course he takes become very convenient as an object of meditation. The main aim is to attain self-pacification (*upasama*) so that through interior self training the destruction of craving is effected. This mode of religious life does not involve any relationship between man and a supreme being, which is the essence of Śaiva Siddhanta. The latter has of necessity an entirely different world view within which it seeks to work out its course of salvation.

The Śaiva Conception of Ignorance

The Śaiva conception of ignorance presupposes the existence of a soul as the subject of all experiences. Its essential nature is one of bliss—*sivarūpam*,⁴³ which is the term used to describe the form of god.⁴⁴

Another feature of the soul is that it has no distinct form of its own. It assumes its role accordingly as the substance it is allied with. When in association with matter it becomes non-intelligent. When it allies with god it becomes pure spirit (bliss or *sivam*). It is referred to as 'that, that becomes'. It assumes the form of that with which it is associated. It clings on to something and assumes 'that' as its essence. As such, it is said to be neither matter (*asat*) nor pure spirit (*sat*) but is said to possess both qualities (*sadasat*). The position of the soul is described in the *Sivajñana Bōdham*⁴⁵ thus:⁴⁶

In the presence of the real all things are non-existent;
so the real does not know (them). The non-real is not;
so it cannot know (the real). (Therefore) that which
knows both is the soul which is neither.

The term 'know' is here used in a dual sense. In one sense God (*sat*) being omnipresent, there is no need to know things as objects. He is *vyāpya*—i.e. everything is pervaded by him. The other sense of knowing is in terms of sense conditioned knowledge. (In the Śaiva ontological scheme the evolved states of [matter—*māyā*, or *tatvas* are treated as aids to obtaining empirical knowledge).

To 'know' in the empirical sense is also treated as followed by the realisation that one needs to be free from it. What is known is here treated as the source of bondage (*pāśam*), which consists of the three-fold impurities (*malam*) of physical and psychical framework (*māyā*), karma and *anavam* (principle of ignorance). The *Sivappirakasam* states it clearly thus:⁴⁷

(lit.) That this is *sat* *asat* can never know (being inert),
sat need not know *asat* and free itself,
 that which knows them *asat* and *sat* is *sat* (soul),
 (as) in the nature of the eye (associated with)
 darkness and light (and yet stands separate),
 Since together with *sat* it removes *asat* it is
sadasat.

It is the soul that is credited with the capacity to know in both ways, though both do not function simultaneously. It can be described as an 'epistemological focal point'. In either instance it functions in the nature of the crystal that reflects the colours of its environment and thereby assumes the nature of that which it reflects. Yet it is not of the nature of the empirical self in essence, nor that of God. Unlike God, who is the essence of knowledge (*ñānasvarūpi*) its knowledge is not constant and therefore its nature is not that of *sat*. It has to be instructed. Nor is it of the nature of *asat* because it has to experience the fruit of works (*karma-phalam*) for *asat* cannot do so. Hence its peculiar status. The analogy of the scent in relation to the flower is cited in illustration.⁴⁸

Perhaps at this juncture it might be worthwhile sorting out the meaning of the terms *sat* and *asat*. 'Sat' is that which is,

It is permanent. 'Asat' is that which is not. It is not permanent. It is devoid of knowledge (in this sense it is non-sentient, *jada*). Both serve as aids to knowledge—lower and higher. In the state of bondage (*kaddu nilai*) the instruments of knowledge are the sense-organs (*karanam*). In the state of communion with God (*oddu nilai*) the instrument is divine grace (*aru!*).⁴⁹

Two types of knowledge is here presupposed—the higher and the lower. In terms of the higher, the lower is treated as ignorance (*ajñāna*). Here the soul is said to experience delusion (*mayakkam*—the Śaivaite synonym for the Buddhist *moha*). Though used to describe the state of the soul before association with the sense-organs—i.e. the initial unconsciousness, it is often used to signify the soul's sense-conditioned knowledge, as knowledge of the empirical phenomenal world. But it is *ajñāna* or non-knowledge of the real (*sat*). It is in this sense that empirical knowledge is treated as ignorance (*ajñānam*) which is the antithesis of higher knowledge (*meijñānam*). In relation to the latter, the former is delusion, a state arising from its association with *āṇavam*.

The *Parakhyāgama* gives in a succinct form the state of the person as conceived of in Śaiva Siddhanta. (This enables one to contrast it with the Buddhist conception that was discussed before).⁵⁰

'*Pasu*'—soul—is distinct from the body, indestructible, endowed with impurities, non-innert, enjoyer of the fruits of its own actions, an agent, possessor of limited knowledge and having an overlord.

'*Pasu*' is the term used for the soul in its conditioned state. In its liberated state it is called '*anma*' (*atman*). It is imperishable as it is capable of continuous experience and also experience the operation of karma. It is not of limited dimension for it is not impermanent. It is pervasive thus providing a plane for the operation of karma. There are a multiplicity of souls accounting for the diversity of experience and allowing for the possibility of individual salvation. It is endowed with impurity (*samalah*) which prevents it from attaining higher knowledge. The *Siddhiyar* traces

the notion of individuality—(in the sense of independence—(*svatantra*), possessed of arrogance and conceit (to talk of 'I' and 'mine') to the presence of such an impurity.⁵¹ They are not inert (*ajadah*) because they are intelligent and active. 'The body and mind etc., are over activated by their controller, the soul, for they are inert by nature like a pot', says the *Paushkaragama*.⁵² The soul, it is stated, is possessed of the power to know, to feel and to act. It is a responsible agent. It is possessed of limited knowledge and is continuously guided by god.

The Śaiva conception of the soul credits it with spiritual qualities, which though comparable to those that are attributed to God, nevertheless falls short in perfection. Hence it is referred to as 'qualified *cit* and *sat*'.⁵³ Instead of attaining the perfection of these attributes it finds itself constricted by the qualities described above. However it has the capacity to transcend these limitations, for just as much as it seeks to identify itself with the qualities of empirical existence it also has the capacity to identify itself with the qualities that the perfect and supreme being possesses. What is characteristic of the soul is the twin capacity to reflect and to assimilate or identify.⁵⁴ What prevents the attainment of perfection is the presence of *āṇavam*.

A discussion of the Śaiva conception of *jñāna* or knowledge would be useful to bring out the distinction from what constitutes ignorance. A further bifurcation in terms of the epistemological and the psychological may allow for its comparability with the Buddhist conception that was discussed before. There are various senses in which it is used but primarily it is used to signify the essential quality (*svarūpa lakṣana*) of the soul.

Jñāna is of two kinds—(i) *Anubhava* or immediate experiential knowledge, and (ii) memory (*śmṛti*). The latter does not represent direct knowledge as it is based on *anubhava*. Besides it is said to be the outcome of the functioning of the intellect (*buddhi*), which in Śaiva ontology is the product of matter.⁵⁵ Immediate experiential knowledge is either valid and true of things as they are (*yathārtha*) or invalid and not true of things as they are

(*ayāthārtha*). Into the latter could be subsumed doubt (*samsaya*) and error (*viparyāya*).

Anubhava or immediate experiential knowledge involves three factors (a) the self as a knower that apprehends (*jñāna śakti*), (b) that it knows through a medium, and (c) it imbibes the character of the thing presented by identifying itself with it. The objects thus known may be a substance, a quality or an action. It does not merely refer to the presence of the knowing subject and the object known, but also refers to the willingness of the subject to know. It is then that *anubhava* arises in the soul. Thus a thing known becomes a thing experienced. The former viewed in isolation from the fact of experiencing becomes a mere abstract conception. Further the relationship between the self and the object of experience is one of non-difference—*advaita*, which according to the Śaiva interpretation does not imply identity. They are not identical. Yet the relationship is found binding in the nature of substance and attribute (*guṇa-guṇi-bhāva*) as the soul or self tends to identify itself with the thing experienced.

Doubt in *ayathārthanubhava* is merely treated as a state where judgement is suspended. It may be the basis of valid or invalid knowledge. But it is *viparyāya* or erroneous knowledge as a component of *ayathārthanubhava* that is mainly relevant to the discussion. Here the *jñāna śakti* or the knowing potency of the self gets deluded and cognises one object as another because of similarity. It is of two kinds—either, one of perceptual error (or illusion) or one of error of conception. As an example of the former is the stock example of mistaking a rope for a snake, and in the case of the latter is the judgement that the body is the soul. In either instance it is stated that it arises because of a defect.⁵⁰ Though subjective in origin it is not treated as a mental construction. The presence of similarity merely indicates selection of appropriate perspectives of the real world. The perspective is false because of *āṇavam* (root-evil) which is in union with the soul from eternity.

Yathārtha anubhava is of three kinds—indeterminate (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) and determinate (*savikalpajñāna*), and finally in point of significance and stage of spiritual perfection-knowledge of God (*sivānubhava*). The mere presentation in awareness is indeterminate knowledge. But the Śaivas also see in it distinctions of name, class, quality, action and meaning⁸⁷ but in a subtle state. It is *savikalpajñāna* therefore that guarantees the reality of the world for the Śaiva. These are the two modes of correct knowledge in the embodied state (*pettha nilai*), where the soul makes use of the product of matter (*māyā*) such as the senses (*indriyas*) and internal sense-organs (*antahkaranas*) for knowledge of objects. In the released state (*mukti nilai*) however, the soul that is relieved of its psycho-physical limitations, does because of its essential nature (*svarupa lakṣana*) imbibe the character of the object of knowledge, which is Śaiva. Such knowledge is distinct from sense-conditioned knowledge, for divine immanence illumines the soul. Hence the statement that God is beyond speech and thought (*vākku manāthitham*).

It is from the state of *sivānubhava* that the existence of *āṇavam* is realised, though the painful experience of the existence of the *āṇavam* as an obstacle has been realised by the mystics who had glimpses of the divine nature long before attaining release. Hence Śaiva Siddhanta can establish the existence of *āṇavam* as a distinct category only on the basis of scriptural authority. Efforts to prove its existence by rational means are merely of the nature of inference.

We know on the authority of the scriptures (here it refers to the reports of the mystics) that since sense experience as much is tainted by this root-evil (*āṇavam*), it is not accessible to the senses. Its existence can only be identified in terms of the qualities of embodied existence, which are treated as the effects of *āṇavam*. These qualities are seven-fold—(1) *Mōha* or stupefaction, (2) *madam* or pride, (3) *rāgam* or passion (source of desire), (4) *vishādam* or sorrow, (5) *sōsham* or a depressed state of mind (6) *vichitriyam* or loss of discrimination and (7) *harsha* (joy). These are treated as the impurities of the soul.

These impurities suggest the existence of *āṇavam*, which is only established by a process of elimination. It cannot be the outcome of *māya* (i.e. the quality of *taṃas*). If the latter be true, then it must have occurred at a definite point in the evolutionary process. Further it must be due to a specific reason, which if not to be found, the impurities might continue to linger on even in a liberated state. Hence there must be an entity distinct from it to be the cause of bound existence. In fact the physical and psychical framework of the individual lend themselves to the rise of thought, feeling and action native to the soul.⁵⁸ If they are to conceal (*jñānatirobhāva*), then they cannot perform the above function that helps to reveal (*vyakti*) and shed light (*prakāśa*). That which obscures (*avṛti*) and creates darkness (*andhakara*) therefore must be a different entity from that of *māya*. Nor can the cause be the *śakti* of Śiva, for an intelligent principle cannot bind another intelligent principle. Further it tends to tarnish the image of God as one of love.⁵⁹ It cannot be of the nature of the soul. If so, it cannot be removed in liberation. The soul is by nature that which knows and to posit ignorance as another quality native to the soul is to posit two contradictory qualities of the same substance.⁶⁰ It must therefore be a totally different substance.

However, Śaiva Siddhanta refers to the existence of three types of impurities (*malam*),—*āṇavam*, *karma* and *māyā*. But it is *āṇavam* among these that is treated as the prime evil (*mūla malam*). It is the first among those that bind (*pratibandha*) by being one with the soul and concealing its powers. Karma, pursues the soul thus accounting for pleasure and pain and is therefore called *anubandha*. Since matter (*māyā*) is found in conjunction with the soul providing it with a body (*tanu*), organs (*karāṇa*), the environment (*bhuvana*—lit. world) and enjoyment (*bōgha*) it is called *sambandha*.⁶¹ But the presence of *māyā* and *karma* and their operation can be traced to divine activity. They are inspired into creative activity to remove the prime evil that is there in man.

Āṇavam has been variously characterised as *pasutva* (a term used for the fallen state of man), *pasunihara* (Mist of soul), *mṛtyu* (death), *murcca* (stupefaction—in the sense of loss of

consciousness), *mala* (impurity), *ajñāna* (collyrium) *avidya* (ignorance) and *avṛtti* (shroud).⁹² It is viewed as much a substance endowed with several powers (*anekasakti*) that binds the innumerable souls as dirt in copper. Hence its primal role as the source of bondage. It's God's love for souls that leads him to create the world and operate karma so that souls may gain an experiential medium (an opportunity graciously given) to realise their true nature. All existence therefore gain their reason for coming into being and also their very meaning from God. It is through the experience of suffering thus gained that the soul is schooled into its higher stages of spiritual evolution. It is when the soul attains its due stage of maturity that divine grace is said to descend upon it, when the weakening traces or *āṇavam* is said to be burnt off.

'Ignorance' we have seen, assumes a significant role both in Buddhism and Śaiva Siddhanta. It is the prime evil present in man towards the removal of which the entire religious path is being demarcated. Neither system concerns itself in identifying its origins. The main problem is its removal. Its presence is seen as an obstacle to realising higher possibilities. In both systems the ultimate goal is knowledge or wisdom, which in the Buddhist case guarantees peace, while in Śaiva Siddhanta it enables the soul realise the bliss that is its essence.

But the position assigned to 'ignorance' in the systems differ, arising from two different conceptions of the world picture or perspective. In Buddhism it is seen as the source and grounds for the existence process to come into being. In contrast, the Śaiva position assumes that the entire creative process comes into being because of it. God activates matter into its different forms and governs the operation of karma, which makes it essential to trace the existence process to him. Under such a conception the world and its various forms are treated as real, though subject to continuous transformation. It is guided by purpose, which is to enable the soul realise its true nature. As a result the 'temporality and historicity of man' or the human form as such is treated as a divine gift. In contrast Buddhism does not posit such a scheme. It narrows its focus to overcoming the problem

of suffering. It sees all phenomena as part of a natural process into which the human existence process is subsumed. Ignorance is seen as setting into motion a causal process. The reversal of this order guarantees the removal of suffering and all the disciplinary stages are calculated to enable man attain the capacity to reverse this order. It is not so in the case of Śaiva Sidhanta, where man is expected to accept the reality of the world and suffering. This enables him to accept the reality of 'ignorance', and the meaning of all creation and therefore understand the purpose of life. Overcoming ignorance is a two way process. Living through the different life-cycles enables him to realise his helpless condition and appeal for God's grace. This is the stage of maturity when divine grace is said to descend upon him and remove *āṇavam* by burning it away. Thus it is that ignorance, which is a common factor in both systems is removed in two distinct ways. It merely reflects the way of two divergent paths.

T. N. S. Raganathan ..

CHAPTER V

SALVATION—BUDDHIST AND SAIVA

If 'ignorance' be the root evil that accounts for suffering, and if living in ignorance be treated as synonymous with conditioned or bound (*pantham*) existence where one is not truly free, then salvation consists in liberation from such conditioned or bound existence and must necessarily imply overcoming ignorance. Overcoming such a state is tantamount to the attainment of wisdom or *jñāna* (*jñā*—right knowledge). The liberated is released (*mukti*—the state of release) from suffering. Since he is no more conditioned by extraneous factors he becomes truly free and enjoys uncontrolled spontaneity in all his actions. Since it is a state that is devoid of suffering, it may also be regarded as a way of describing the blissful state (*inpaṃ*)¹

It must be noted that the issue that sparks off the debate between the Śaivas and Sautrantika Buddhist (it could as well be true of all religions that engage in polemics) concerns the path that leads to the blissful state of release (*mukti neri*). The way of deliverance is crucial for it calls for a particular mode of religious life to the exclusion of any other. But both religions have several features in common, as they appear to draw from a common stream. Thus there are found among them several comparable features in terms of terminology and the conceptions they seek to convey, along with specific techniques of deliverance and their respective cosmological models. It could be that different forms of religious practices are happily blended on what was a traditional scheme, thus making similarity of features purely superficial (and thus justifying the ruthlessness of the polemics).

Jñāna or Right Knowledge:

Emphasis of *jñāna* or right knowledge had been accepted as the means to salvation by almost all Indian religions from the *Aranyakas* onwards. Even those religions that had acquiesced with popular forms gave *jñāna* an elitist status.

The term *jñāna* refers to directly 'seeing' or intuiting ultimate reality. Although it is sometimes used to refer to knowledge based on the five senses, it generally refers to knowledge derived by means of extra-sensory perception.² In the Indian tradition perception is not confronted with the problem of affirming the existence of things in themselves. The fact of the essence (*svalaksana*) of things is not denied. In fact the characteristic mark of having attained to the essence of things is a feeling of saturation, where the deep-seated urge to know ceases. The perceiving subject is satisfied (*jñāna-tṛptah*). Instead what is held suspect is the data as provided by the sense organs perhaps because the problem of knowledge is intimately linked with the problem of salvation. It is this data furnished by the sense organs (in the Indian classification, this includes the mind organ as well) that is the source of despair and suffering. Hence the intimate link between psychology and epistemology in the Indian systems.

Jñāna: Sautrantika Conception

Dharmottara, a commentator on Dharmakīrti's *Nyayabindu* (regarded as a Sautrantika treatise on Logic and Epistemology) describes right or perfect knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) as 'an invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man desires to have'³ (Perhaps 'desire' in this instance refers to its fulfilment in the 'feeling of saturation' referred to above. This is a state experienced in yoga (*jñāna-tṛptah*, which will be discussed later). The knowledge by which one can acquire the thing he wants to acquire (*arthādhigati*) thus becomes the criterion by which right knowledge can be identified. The process of knowledge therefore is three phased :

- (1) the bare presentation in perception as generated by the object of perception, which is devoid of any association with names or relations (*kalpana*), and which is not erroneous. (The latter features that account for illusory perception are the work of the senses which are perverted. It is the 'correct presentation' through the senses of the object in its uniqueness (*svalakṣaṇam*) that is implied here,

- (2) Our promptings in accordance with it, and
- (3) the final realisation of the object as guided by knowledge. Inference, which is also treated as the other means of knowledge, presents the objects (in terms of links with perceptual presentations) and helps to realise them and thus also fulfils a practical need.

'Knowledge' states Das Gupta, 'is sought by man for the realisation of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought by men'.⁴ It finds its culmination in the feeling of saturation. In contrast are illusory and dream perceptions which (as false perceptions) do not lead to the objects which they present as existing. Hence the bafflement involved in not finding the object. As noted earlier they also indulge in a false construction apart from denying access to things as they are. Thus knowledge does not merely play the role of an invariable antecedent to the realisation of any desirable thing but also helps to prevent the realisation of any undesirable thing.

The Sautrantikas of course make a distinction between the thought series and the real series (which helps to spark off the former). Perhaps this is the basis of their distinction between 'nominal' and 'ultimate' realities.⁵ The objection could be raised that the percept is only similar but distinct from the presentation. In answering the objection the Sautrantikas state that it is the felt sameness between the knowledge and the object that enables us to speak of the object from the awareness. (This is realisable in highly cultivated forms of perception—*yoga pratyaksa*).

The above definition of perception that calls for dissociation from all names and relations (*nirvikalpa*) and other forms of error does not represent the actual nature of perception. Rather it refers to the correct conditions to be fulfilled to attain an insight into the actual nature of things. The correct conditions as the causal conditions necessary for the attainment of right knowledge involves the need to refer to the techniques of salvation enjoined in the scriptures. (Besides what constitutes the Buddhist

goal—i.e. *Nirvāna*, has been the source of much debate. Perhaps some conception of it can be gained if we do not lose sight of the problem as seen by the Buddhists, the techniques of salvation suggested in their scriptures for the solution of the problem which may help us gain an insight into it). However an account of the doctrinal edifice they (Sautrantikas) built on what they claimed was the actual nature of the presentation could be of value for a comparison with the Śaivaite position.

To begin with the Sautrantikas make a distinction between nominal and ultimate realities. The latter is viewed as a series of instants that are momentary in duration. They also see in these momentary existants the capacity to give rise to other instants (*arthakriyākāritva*). This is what gives them an insight into the triad of causal laws of which the law of Karma lies at the apex. All individual existence (which gets absorbed into the rest of nature) is the fruition of Karma. This is what makes them evaluate all existence in terms of impermanence, ill and not-self. What prevents an insight into the true nature of existence is ignorance. The path to deliverance therefore lies in overcoming ignorance.

Jñāna : Śaiva Conception

Unlike the Sautrantika, the Śaivas do not view consciousness as a function of a given perceptual situation on the contrary it is indicative of a permanent element, whose existence is known by a means that is different from knowing material objects. Thus the three-phased activity in knowing that we noted among the Sautrantika is here credited to a permanent entity called the soul (*ānma*, *ātman*). It is the soul that wills (*iccha*), knows (*jñāna*) and acts (*kriya*) for it is possessed with the capacity (*śakti*) for them. Whereas the Sautrantikas would deny a subject that knows and an object that is known and would assert the knowing as such, the notion of '*advaita*' or non-duality (such a yogic conception is common to both Buddhists and Śaivaitees) as such, the Śaivas contend, presupposes a relationship between a knowing subject and the object known. Since it is in the nature of the character of the soul to reflect the thing known, it tends to identify itself with the thing known.

The term '*jñāna*' in Śaiva Siddhanta, though sometimes used to refer to the 'process or method of knowing', or 'the product of thought' or even to 'indicate a particular type of worship', it is nevertheless primarily meant to refer to the essential quality of the soul (*svarupa laksana*). Consciousness is not a function of the given perceptual situation. Rather, it refers to the capacity of the soul (*śit-śakti*) to know and which when given the occasion knows. It pervades the object as when it is said 'an object is in my consciousness'. Being a quality of the soul which is not bound by extension as is the case with physical objects, consciousness too is as pervasive as the soul. The soul, in cognising an object (physical or psychical), gets illumined by *Śiva śakti* and assumes the character of the object that is pervaded by its consciousness, identifies itself with the object and thus becomes aware of it.⁶

There is no such thing as a mere presentation as with the Sautrantikas. The object is drawn into the field of consciousness by a deliberate act of will for the soul has the capacity to wish as well (*iccha śakti*). Otherwise the entire range that is available to consciousness will vie for the status of knowledge and this is not true. In normal sense-based knowledge the soul is able to know only limited or specific fields as fed by a particular sense—organ (*jñānendriya*). (Here another assumption of Śaiva Siddhanta is involved. The soul engages the sense-organs as mere tools or agencies for gaining sense-based knowledge). Since deliberate activity is involved the object cognised is also the object experienced.

The means of knowledge specific to the Śaivas differs from that of the Sautrantikas. Over and above perception and inference, the Śaivas accept the authority of the scriptures (*urati*). Perception is of four forms:

- (1) with the aid of the external senses the true nature of the five elements is perceived,
- (2) with the aid of the internal senses acting on the preceding impressions retaining and reflecting on similarities and differences; and

- (3) perception by feeling of pleasure and pain, which is also the stage at which the soul becomes the experiencing subject (*bhokta*) with its instincts of hate and desire.

(The above three forms refer to the indeterminate and determinate stages which the Śaivas affirm are true of the external world, if it is devoid of doubt and error. It culminates in cognition of the form 'I am pleased' and 'I am sorrow stricken' etc.).

- (4) The fourth is yogic perception (*yokakkadchi*, *yogapratyaksa*) where the yogi seated in one spot perceives all things that are remote in space and time.⁷

Inference, though not as direct as perception, nevertheless does allow access to the external world if it proceeds according to rules.

The scriptures (*urai*, *āgamam*) are treated as the word of the Perfect Eternal Being.⁸ The *tantra* portion deals with the rituals essential for salvation. The *mantras* treat of the techniques to be followed in controlling the senses and contemplating God. The *jñānakāṇḍa* deals with the nature of the Supreme that is beginningless and endless.

It must however be stated that the Śaiva Siddhantin does not treat these three means of knowledge as adequate in themselves. All empirical knowledge thus obtained though not erroneous, is treated as imperfect. The existence of *āṇavam* or the limiting principle with all its infinite number of potencies is liable to render the latent capacities of the soul inoperative. *Āṇavam* along with *Karma* and *Maya* serve as the fetters (*upādhi*) that account for life and its experiences. The knowledge gained in such a mode of existence (*petta-nilai*, lit. the state that is given) is referred to by Ponnaiḥ as 'relational knowledge'.⁹ In the Śaiva Siddhanta classification, it is called *pāsa-jñāna* or knowledge arising from attachment. Such knowledge is held to be an accidental characteristic of the soul. It is in the state of liberation (*mukti-nilai*), when the soul has freed itself of the fetters that it gains (or more appropriately regains) true knowledge. But the fetters do not remove themselves on their own accord, nor is it within the power

of the soul to extricate itself out of their grip. The human condition therefore is treated as a helpless condition. Thus a supreme being Śiva is posited as one who is real (*sat*), intelligent (*cit*) and blissful (*ānanda*) and who controls the destiny of each soul. The soul being other dependent (*paratantra*) has to be illumined by Śivaśakti of Śiva who is seen as self-dependent (*svatantra*).

The true knowledge that the Śaiva Siddhantin speaks of is *Sivānubhavo jñāna* or immediate experiential knowledge of Śiva. By virtue of its essential nature (*svarūpa lakṣana*) it (soul) is able to imbibe the character of the object of cognition—i.e. it attains to the cognition of Śiva and his qualities or character. Unlike in empirical knowledge such an experience is not gained with the aid of the sense-organs etc.¹⁰ Here the soul's consciousness gets merged with that of Śiva and that is how it gets the character of Śiva. This is the stage of *patijñāna* or knowledge of the Lord.¹¹

But *jñāna* or right knowledge as such becomes incomprehensible unless viewed in the overall doctrinal scheme of which it lies at the apex. It is not a mere concept that can be analysed and understood. In fact it is treated as a goal to be attained and on the attainment of which salvation is guaranteed. As a goal it demands stringent moral and spiritual training for its achievement. Thus for a clear understanding of what constituted the goal the doctrinal scheme (which has been touched upon in the earliest phase of this chapter) and moral and spiritual practices essential for its realisation must be stated.

Analysis of Terms :

Perhaps the term used in the two religious systems for salvation, if analysed, might help to give a clear perspective. It might reveal what precisely the respective conceptions imply. In both religions salvation is sought because of an inherent dissatisfaction with life as such. The Buddhist roundly dismisses it off as one of suffering. The Śaiva views it as a form of separation from his natural union with Śiva. He gets glimpses of the blissful

state from which he is alienated, but this alienation is seen as a method of testing the devotee's ripeness to be saved.

The goal or summon bonum in Buddhism is referred as *Nirvāṇa*—a term which though commonly adopted by almost all the Indian religions is specifically associated with Buddhism. *Nirvāṇa* literally means 'waning away' (as of a flame) or 'cooling off'. This suggests that it is an antidote to that which burns or a state of 'hotting up'. In fact ordinary existence is said to be marked by craving—*trṣṇa* which is literally 'burning thirst'. Commenting on the *Visuddhimagga*. Bhikku Nyanamoli¹² gives its etymological derivation as from the root—'√vā', which is to blow, originally by bellows and later by any means. By analogy it was extended to cover extinction of greed etc., in the *ārahant* with resultant extinction of the process of five aggregates on the arhant's death (*vāṇa*—fastening to successive becoming. The prefix 'nir' involved its negation).¹³

The Śaivas adopt a number of expressions to convey the meaning of the term salvation. Most common among them are 'mutthi' and 'vidu'. The former gets its sense from the root meaning 'to liberate', a term the *Siddhiyar* retains to refer to both Buddhist and Śaivaite goals. 'vidu' literally means home, and since both terms are used in an interchangeable manner, salvation literally consists in 'going home'. It virtually implies salvation from a state of affairs alien to one's nature and a return to a realisation of one's essential nature.

Thus an examination of terms used (or emphasised) and an understanding of their implications point to fundamental differences which are reflected in the respective doctrinal schemes and spiritual practices. The Buddhists seem to focus their analysis on the state of 'burning thirst' and are conscious of the pressing need for 'cooling down'. This suggests that a clear conception of what constituted Buddhist salvation cannot be gained by an inquiry into what constituted 'salvation to'. It is the issue of 'salvation from' that is important. Hence their analysis of what constituted the human situation and an attempt to gain an insight into the

course events take, after a Karmically wholesome or a Karmically unwholesome act. They seek the antecedent causes and conditions that give rise to suffering. In this quest the human personality is subjected to a rigorous analysis having in mind its dynamic character (here again the general framework is common to most of the Indian religions that draw on the early Sāṅkhya conception). The structure is literally dismantled both horizontally (in terms of personal history) and vertically (to understand the factors involved in Karmic actions). But in doing so they fail to come across an entity to correspond to the term 'self'.

The Śaivas on the other hand read into the '*purusa*' of Sāṅkhya an inherently dynamic entity which is helpless by itself and is therefore other-depended (*paratantra*). The basic unit of experience is one of relationship with an entity that is external to the self. Having entered into a relationship, it tends to reflect and identify itself with the object with which it has entered into a relationship. Our normal empirical existence is viewed as a relationship that the soul enters with the evolutes of matter determined by *Karma*, and its normal faculties made inoperative by the existence of the evil force of *āṇavam*. But the material accessories with which the soul attains to empirical knowledge cannot in themselves be treated as evil. The only thing that may be said of this state is that the knowledge thus obtained is defective. That is why the Śaivas tend to accommodate normal empirical knowledge gained through the three means of knowledge which was described before (i.e. *kalāvidya*). It is merely given a lower status as it were. As with the Jains, it is viewed as a partial insight into the true nature of things. It is essential because it helps the religious awakening of man by enabling him to gain glimpses of the truth through the cracks (i.e. the senses). Hence that which is roundly condemned as suffering by the Buddhists,¹⁴ is in the case of the Śaivas, treated as at least necessary suffering essential for the religious education of man. Human experience therefore is not to be spurned at. In contrast, though not the goal, at least it serves as the best educator. It is by suffering that one yearns for salvation. Viewed in the totality of the scheme it becomes a necessary evil.

Nor does the Śaiva merely seek to transcend the causal order—i.e. empirical existence. 'Mutthi' or 'vidu' consists in attaining to higher mode of relationship whereby the soul identifies itself with Śiva and partakes of his nature. In this instance examining the issue of 'salvation to' becomes a meaningful quest. (Thus what is meaningless in the case of Buddhism gets transformed into the meaningful in Śaiva Siddhanta. Of course in the latter instance language attains to divine status perhaps to allow for discourse on those spheres that transcend the empirical zone. In fact the scriptures are said to be written in the 'noble language'—*āriyam*.¹⁵ The term '*āriyam*' tends to be identified with the Sanskrit language, although a legend exists that the first instructor in Tamil grammar was Śiva himself).

The implications arising from an examination of the terms used for salvation in the two traditions also reveal another fact. While the narrow focus allowed by the Buddhist definition of the problem permits for an economy of doctrinal elaboration, the Śaiva's version calls for a proliferation of categories related to the material world, the soul, the fetters and God. It's essentially a religion of worship and in formulating their theology the medieval doctors seem to have drawn very liberally from other schools.

The central issue in the polemics concerns the path of liberation that leads to blissful states. Each party to the contest admit to the need to free themselves from the weariness born of bound or conditioned existence. 'Just as a man faint with heat longs for cold, so too this meditator scorched by the burning of the eleven fires...in the round of rebirths longs for *nirvāṇa*', states Buddhaghosa. Further to the question 'why do they attain it', he suggests that 'wearied by the occurrence and dissolution of formations' the monk resolves 'let us dwell in bliss by being without consciousness here and now and reaching the cessation that is *nirvāṇa*'.¹⁶ The Śaiva too is exhausted on account of recurrent births. But he does not resolve to overcome it confident of the adequacy of his own resources.¹⁷ He appeals to be saved. But his religious awakening arises only by going through the different life-cycles. It is this that reveals to him the hand of a Supreme Being that guides the course of events.

Experience of Bliss :

'Bliss' (*ānanda*) could come to be or arise only with true freedom—i.e. when man is released from the grip of conditioned existence. But this is a state of inner feeling private to the released and thus cannot be shared.¹⁸ Thus it is said, 'The evidence that a man is feeling bliss or joy lies in his behaviour, including the utterances he makes, but not in the way we might infer that a man has seen something by observing his behaviour; for the feeling is revealed in the behaviour, not so the perception'. But this may be true of the bliss of a theist, whose utterances may not be descriptive of what is being experienced but may be mere responses to what is being experienced. His behaviour it is true shows signs of transformation. He is no more of this world and his behaviour is compared to that of children¹⁹ and mad men by the mystic philosopher Thayumanavar.²⁰ Perhaps this is because he has set himself free from the cares of this world. Yet there are instances where he is aware of his experience and seeks to convey it to those who have not experienced it. Here again Thayumanavar states that it is inexpressible purely because words are inadequate for the task (there is no bar imposed on language. The bliss or joy is of the highest type qualitatively, arising from the highest possible type of relationship). The term 'inexpressible' does not imply that nothing can be said about it. It merely seeks to show that the quality of the bliss is of the superlative kind,²¹ merely indicates the existence of different degrees of pleasure of which experiencing God consists of the highest. The pursuit of pleasure (happiness or joy or bliss) it must be said, is not what is aimed at. Rather it comes or arises as the outcome of a particular type of experience. And the unit of experience, as we have seen, consists in establishing a particular mode of relationship.²² Thus knowledge in Śaiva Siddhanta, which covers the totality of the processes involved in this relationship, is also subject to this gradation in terms of quality. The highest is *patī-jñāna*, the experience of which is reflected in bliss. Here again it is inexpressible because it is incapable of description as such. There is no such thing as a presented object that can be described. An object is sought for, absorbed into consciousness

and identified with the self. So it is with the highest state—*patijñāna*. The feeling of bliss is not private. It is shared as with lovers who have completely surrendered themselves to each other, having transcended all notions of separateness (i.e. notions of 'I' and 'mine'), Since love is the main ingredient in attaining God, and the soul being the helpless junior party to the relationship, the soul shares God's supreme bliss when it unites itself with him and feels his grace.²³ *Patijñāna* and the attendant bliss implies an achievement—the attainment of *sivānubhava*. But to 'become one with Hara' calls for an effort only on the part of the soul, for God or *Hara* is already in union with the soul guiding and creating for it opportunities for salvation. Salvation therefore consists in realising the inherent potentialities of the soul. The problem is to remove the impediments on the path. Once having attained to the state of advaitic union with Siva (also called *Hara*, the Supreme Energy) he experiences his actions to be God's actions.²⁴ Bliss is here shared but at the same time it is given by the grace of God when the soul has attained to true maturity.²⁵

On the other hand the Sautrantikas (true of all Buddhist schools, particularly the non-Mahayana schools) tend to assert what they had perceived to be the truth. There is the saturation point in knowledge (*jñānatṛptah*), the attainment of which is manifested in observable physical effects as is seen in Maudgalyayana's remark on meeting Sariputra: 'Friend Sariputra, your countenance is pure and clear, and your senses serene. Have you, o venerable Sariputra, found the immortal and the way that leads to the immortal? Your countenance is that of a religious man, clear like the blossoming lotus. Serene and calm are your senses. Where did you obtain the immortal whereby there has been shed over you this two-fold shining and bright blaze of radiance?' The seeing of the truth implies seeing in terms of impermanence, non-soul and sorrow. Seeing or knowing here means the realisation of it, which makes *jñāna* different from the ordinary sense of the term knowledge. Seeing or knowing the truth in terms of impermanence etc., involves transcending them—i.e. to free oneself from their grip. That is why their positive assertions about reality

merely possess a negative content to show that which is transcended. Bliss therefore has to be viewed as a negation of or the transcending of sorrow (*suka* as the negation of *dukkha*). Besides the Sautrantika identify *nirvana* with the living world itself and deny the Vaibhasika theory that it is a separate element transcending the living world.²⁶ Bliss here could mean a life without sorrow. Of course the bliss experienced does not result in the state which makes the Śaiva saint sing and dance in ecstasy. As contrasted with sorrow which is one of the three marks of conditioned things, it implies being at peace or 'being free from any oppressive disturbances of its peaceful calm, and from any kind of suffering'.²⁷ This is what the penetration of dharmas results in.²⁸ Again in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* it is stated 'Impermanent surely are conditioned things. It is their nature to rise and fall. For, having been produced, they are stopped. Their pacification brings ease.'²⁹ Bliss is therefore the sense of ease that is born by the removal of suffering.

There is something to be said about the respective conceptions of what constitutes bliss in both systems. Both systems seek a state of cooling down (When the Śaiva seeks the feet of God he cites the analogy of the shelter of a spreading banyan tree on a hot day. '*Adi Nilal*' literally means the 'shelter of feet')³⁰ for sense-based experience or normal life is characterised by turmoil. The Buddhists refer to it as the 'five terrors',³¹ while the Śaiva calls it 'the fire that's life of sorrow'.³² However they seek to incorporate it in doctrinal schemes that differ radically from one another, for they imply different spiritual practices for the achievement of the goal.

In the *Siddhiyar* version of the Sautrantika theory, the alternatives are clearly formulated in the nature of that which is the sacred and that which is the profane. The perpetuation of normal existence or (more technically) the phenomenal series (*santāna*) is what constitutes the sorrow of bound existence.³³

According to the commentator, 'sorrow of bound existence' is not merely descriptive of the state of affairs in the human situation where determinism prevails, but is also reflective of the false view

underlying it. The false view is held to be the conception of causation which posits the persistence of a cause as an underlying substrate surviving all transcient phenomena. This corresponds to the category of 'superstition' (false theory) as distinct from 'agnosticism' (no theory) as given by Nanamoli in his notes on the *Visuddhimagga*.⁸⁴ These then cover *dr̥ṣṭi-viparyāya*,⁸⁵ which along with the erroneous habits (born of *saṃjñā* and *citta-viparyāya*) constitute the springs of action that lead to unhappy destiny. As observed earlier, this is how *avidyā* or ignorance gains a positive connotation in Buddhism. Human existence (viewed as a Karmic circuit) is finally traceable to the source of springs of action (in terms of thought, word and deed) that are tainted by ignorance. It is such an impediment (*avijjā nivarana*) that accounts for rebecoming and the continued life-cycle (*samskāra*). It is the traces or impressions (*samskāra*) left by Karmically wholesome or unwholesome acts that constitute the activity of the sub-conscious and which reveal the operation of Karma and shape the nature of experiences as situations arise.

It is Karma at the apex of the causal order that gives rise to the nature and qualities of a person, or in the words of T. W. Rhys Davids 'the bodily and mental parts and powers of man'.⁸⁶ The notion of the 'five groups' used to describe the empirical self in its dynamic form does away with the need to posit a metaphysical substratum that persists. Such an analysis is found adequate for an account of the cause of suffering.

Suffering, it must be noted does not merely refer to physical pain. It extends to include within its fold spiritual deficiency or a genuine sense of the want of true freedom. And this, according to Indian religions that accept Karma and rebirth is descriptive of the state of human existence.⁸⁷ This is perhaps the reason why the Buddhists classify persons into 'holy persons' (*arya-pudgala*) and 'the ordinary people' (*bala-prthag-jana*—lit. foolish common people).⁸⁸ The latter are in an ignorant and unenlightened state, whose wills are constricted by ignorance of the laws that govern psycho-mental life. Their mode of existence involves a surrender to the inclinations or cravings.⁸⁹

In their analysis of states of consciousness (all such states being declared painful)—the Sautrāntikas describe a karmically effective action in terms of the given world of material elements (*bhuta*), the sensations (*upadhana-rupa*) the mind (*citta*) and karma or that which evaluates a given situation as good or bad.⁴⁰ The last feature of course allows for the capacity to transcend the realm of the causal laws. In normal existence of surrender to the inclinations, the sensations born of the given data, serve to defile the whole stream (*klista*—‘impure’). They exclude the possibility of pure (*aklista*) states being contained in the mental stream.

The fact that Karma is allowed the capacity to see the good and the bad does not therefore permit a purely deterministic interpretation resulting in pessimism. Stcherbatsky refers to a ‘special law of causation’⁴¹ in the Buddhist scheme to account for the fact that the elements in the stream are either all of them pure in the saint or are all impure in the ordinary man.⁴² He further points to another fact which maintains that *avidya* or ignorance is not a constant faculty that cannot be removed or suppressed (*prahina*). It is countered by the presence in the stream of two constant faculties—*prajña* (faculty of appreciative analysis) and *samādhi* or yoga (concentration of thought on a single point to the exclusion of other considerations and occurrences). These then can overthrow the defiling elements in the mental stream which then becomes purified—a quality associated with saintliness (*ārya*).

The central concern in Buddhism is the removal of all pain and suffering. According to the third of the four noble truths this necessitates the removal of all craving, which we have seen in our discussion of the twelve *nidanas* is anchored in ignorance. But ignorance is not merely the holding of false views but also involves the surrender to the inclinations—i.e. the ignorance of the causal factors operative within us. Thus Buddhist goal (*nirvana*) does not merely consist in the holding of right views but more importantly, consists in a disciplined transcendence of the causally conditioned state of affairs—i.e. the inclinations, consisting of

rāga (lust), *doṣa* (malice) and *mōha* (delusion, bewilderment and stupidity etc.).⁴³ It involves the definite reversal of the causal scheme—by ‘disentangling this tangle’, by the ‘substitution of opposite qualities’.⁴⁴ It refers to the struggle that goes on within the stream (*sañtāna*) between the *kusala* or *akusala* or defiling inclinations. It calls for the acquisition of that mystic power which alone guarantees the removal of the traces of *samskara*. Thus wisdom consists in not merely ‘knowing’ but also in mastering and conquering human nature. It is the practical knowledge that serves as a guide to freedom or release. The emphasis here is on individual striving. The individual can by his own efforts acquire the divine power of freeing himself from sin by literally taking possession of himself. It dispenses with an external agency.

The attainment of such a wisdom reveals itself in the transfiguration of conduct. The sources of the spring of action are no longer tainted by ignorance. Seeing the truth results in the conquest of the inclinations and does not result in action conducive to becoming. *Nirvana* therefore is purification of character whereby the liberated or enlightened proceed beyond good and evil. They are no more constrained by factors over which they have no control. ‘Good actions’, states Smart, ‘seem to flow naturally out of the newly acquired tranquillity’ (here implying that it is the opposite of turmoil).

The urge to free oneself from suffering, the view that the world of phenomena is momentary and fleeting, and the consequent evaluation that preoccupation with common interests is unsatisfactory because perishability is a defect and can never be a source of abiding value, arises from a conviction born of a correct picture of the religious situation. But the conviction must necessarily precede evaluation and the adoption of a self-denying attitude. The novice or initiate therefore should accept the guidance contained in the scriptural pronouncements in faith (with the passing away of the Buddha, guidance is secured from the teaching. The Sautrantikas emphasise the dharma when they refer to it as ‘*vaṣṭuvil āgamakkaḥ*’ (—lit. defectless scriptures).

Such an acceptance is made in faith although the duration of such faith comes to an end when one sees the truth for himself. But the truths contained in the scriptures cannot be confirmed unless one fulfills the requisite moral and spiritual mastery enjoined in the scriptures. Otherwise the scriptural pronouncements could have no meaning. Their truth consists in their realisation in terms of one's experience, for the aim, as we saw, consists in purifying the springs of conduct. The Sautrantikas therefore proceed to state their path or *mārga* after stating their doctrinal position.

'If the eight-fold path, that is beyond reproach and which is defectless, is adhered to, one attains the steadfastness of the contemplative life which results in the wisdom that destroys the fetters'.⁴⁵ The attainment of wisdom here refers to its two-fold function. It involves the removal of the fetters, depravities or intoxicating influences. Simultaneously it enables one to see the truth. The contemplative life which guarantees wisdom comes in the final phase (not in a temporal sense). It necessarily involves cultivation of moral and spiritual mastery. This is what 'struggle within the stream' implies, often described in the analogy of crossing the stream. Moral mastery demands the suppression of the evil qualities by cultivation of their opposites (the ten qualities classified in terms of speech, bodily action and thought).⁴⁶ This also involves the requisite spiritual training of suppressing the sense-based instincts and impulses that result in evil qualities and the cultivation of neutrality with regard to pleasure and pain.⁴⁷ Pleasure and pain are not viewed as two distinct types of feelings. They are both treated alike as sorrow for pleasure is shortlived and often leads to pain. The 'neutrality' referred to above involves withdrawal from all forms of judgements or perceptions.

It is true that the goal suggests itself when one becomes sensitive to the agitated human condition. But the correct analysis of the human situation and the basis of hope for deliverance from it does not arise from it. The *Milindapanha* states 'it is from hearing the words of those who have seen *nirvana* that those who have not received it know that it is blissful'.⁴⁸ The Sautran-

tikas treat the scriptures as the word of the Buddha, the great ascetic who is their Lord.⁴⁹ Thus the correct picture of the human situation and the hope of salvation is drawn from faith in the Buddha. This is how the Buddhist dharma receives its soteriological value. It does not merely seek to give a correct analysis of the world of sense experience (i.e. the human situation) but also seeks to guide one to adopt correct attitude towards it.

But the words of the Buddha, or the enlightened one, posit the existence of a higher realm of interests that is to be aspired for, if one is to be free from suffering. The mind is no empty *tabula rasa*. It does not merely see things as extended in space etc. It also sees them as interesting and uninteresting, important and unimportant etc. 'Viewed as being of interest (because they give occasion for pleasure and pain, because they are useful, beautiful, useless and ugly...)', states Smart, 'they constitute what may be called a realm of interest, and this realm is set over against another'.⁵⁰ Life is evaluated as 'suffering' and therefore in need of renunciation only from a higher standpoint. Thus neither 'suffering' nor 'nirvana' can be treated in isolation from one another—both concern the quality of living, the higher and the lower. They do not, ontologically speaking, signify any clear cut stratification (a way of analysing that had led some interpreters to speculate in terms of either 'annihilation' or 'eternal felicity').

'Burning thirst' and 'cooling down' appear to be the two ends of the same pole. The higher realm merely results from the successful cultivation of a self-denying attitude (which therefore makes the issue of 'salvation for whom' entirely redundant). According to Buddhaghosa, it is the 'remainderless fading away, remainderless cessation' of all craving,⁵¹ or as with the Vaibhasikas 'the entity (*dharma*) called *nirvana* is the thing in which passion (and life) are extinct'.⁵² The Sautrantikas conception does not differ substantially except that they hold in opposition to the Vaibhasikas that *nirvana* is not a material entity or '*vastu*'.

Extinction, as we have seen above, merely implies the extinction of craving and ignorance. Thus the terms '*māttthal*' and '*alitthal*'

(meaning extinction) mean none other than the suppression of the source of defilement in the life stream. Since the latter state is none other than the human condition (i.e. the basis of the notion of self), what is aimed is self-negation. It is a call for a definite reversal of human values and could thus be treated in a sense as 'anti-social' and 'anti-human'.

The eight-fold path by which self-negation is to be achieved clearly indicates that salvation is not attained by mere accident nor as an act of grace by an external agency. It clearly spells out the rules, gaining proficiency in which results in the attainment of the goal. It calls for a rigorous procedure in interior self-training—the cultivation of *prajña* and *samādhi* (among the ten constant faculties—*cittamahābhūmika*) to their full potential so that the defiling *avidya* may be suppressed effectively. Thus the eight-fold path helps to purify the stream which is tantamount to saying that it helps purify character.

Spiritual progress is therefore depicted as an inner struggle that goes on within the stream (*saṁtāna*), the practice of which is referred to as launching on the path. In this, Buddhism appears to be operating within the tradition of yoga mysticism except that it puts a different construction on the experiences thus gained. In fact there is evidence that the Buddha had during the period of study and experimentation come to know Sankhya and the practices of yoga.⁵³ Attempts to disclaim any such influence may be a polemical stance adopted by later scholastics. The Buddha himself is quoted saying that he had 'seen the ancient way and followed it'. As Eliade points out rejection can only imply that the Buddha had progressed beyond it.⁵⁴ Buddhism therefore seeks, in the tradition of yoga, to direct its quest inwards and gain direct knowledge of (which includes control over) the true nature of the 'self' or human personality.

Perhaps at this stage it might be worth recounting the goal and the different stages of the meditational techniques of Patañjali's Yoga. It is true that this is linked to Sankhya metaphysics. But the Indian tradition as a whole regards Sankhya as the oldest

darsana and the Buddha does draw on Sankhya ideas especially with regard to the conception of the psycho-physical flux (he merely knocks the bottom off—i.e. *Purusa* or an irreducible spiritual entity). Further Śaiva Siddhanta too draws heavily on Sankhya ideas. Yoga could also serve as a convenient plane to record similarities and variations in Buddhist and Śaivaite mysticism. Buddhism seeks to accommodate it with pluralistic realism without recourse to substance, while Śaiva Siddhanta blends it with devotionism. (Another feature to be mentioned is that *Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras* can be treated as a systematisation of practices that had been tried and tested for several centuries. Although Patañjali has been placed four centuries after the historical Buddha, the content of the *Yoga Sūtras* are contemporaneous with or may even ante-date the writing of the Buddhist scriptures).⁵⁶

The goal of yoga which is opposition to life as such, may be treated as the Indian version of the universal polarity between the sacred and the profane. 'The man who refuses his native condition' states Eliade,⁵⁷ 'and consciously reacts against it by attempting to abolish it is a man who thirsts for the unconditioned, for freedom, for 'power'—in a word, for one of the countless modalities of the sacred'.⁵⁷ (This is also incidentally the goal of the Buddhist and the Saivaites—*mutthi-inpam*). Further, Eliade helps us back to our feet and safeguards us against some of the pitfalls some contemporary interpreters of *nirvana* have been led into, by stating thus; 'For, by liberating himself, man creates the spiritual dimension of freedom, and 'introduces' it into the cosmos and life—that is, into blind and tragically conditioned modes of existence'.⁵⁸ 'Enlightenment' thus gets a positive meaning that is due to it. It refers to a higher quality of living. In Yoga it is tantamount to a 'regeneration or new birth', where man becomes 'autonomous with respect to the cosmos' and literally takes 'possession of himself'. He surrounds himself with strong 'defenses' and thus becomes 'invulnerable'. Since the mind is unstable because violated continuously by the activities of the senses, the sub-conscious and by the 'thirst for life', the aim is to suppress the psycho—physical flux (*cittavṛtti-nirōdha*), (which in Sāṅkhya is identified with a primordial substance called '*prakṛti*') so that

the mind is no longer 'distracted' or 'troubled' by the senses, sensory activity or memory. The target aimed at is to free oneself from being conditioned by—(a) stimuli arising from the outside world, and (b) the constraining influence of the sub-conscious that becomes a key factor in an act of volition. These together refer to the region where the law of Karma operates.

But *citta-vṛtti-nirōdha* does not imply the suppression of phenomena as such. The mind continues to receive sensory representation—i.e. the yogin continues to contemplate them, except that instead of knowing them through forms (*rūpa*) and mental states (*citta-vṛtti*), the yogin now contemplates the essence (*tattva*) of all objects directly (*yoga pratyakṣa*).

Citta-vṛtti-nirōdha is possible only if one practises the moral restraints, (so that the moral law which regulates Karma may not be infringed) and disciplines his bodily and psychic activities and also cultivates the postures that help to break through the veil of darkness and promote concentration. These are the first five of the eight classes (*aṅga*) of practices and disciplines. They are :

1. restraints (*yama*).
2. disciplines (*niyama*).
3. bodily attitudes and postures (*asana*).
4. rhythm of respiration (*pranayama*).
5. emancipation of sensory activity from the domination of exterior objects (*pratyahara*).

The final stages are (6) *dharana* (concentration), (7) *dhyāna* (meditation) and (8) *samādhi* (lit. conjunction). Their practice presuppose mastery of the first five *angas*. From now on the exercises are in terms of a subtle mystical physiology concerned with 'organs' that reveal themselves only with progress in yoga. These subtle organs have a relationship with the 'mystical letters' (A, U, M.) and the various states of consciousness (waking, sleep, deepsleep and beyond or *turiyatita*).

Pranayama (which signifies controlled respiration), *dharana* and *dhyana* appear to be linked together, with *pranayama* as the

standard measure. Patañjali defines *dhyana* as 'a current of unified thought',⁸⁰ which according to Vyasa's gloss to the definition is a 'continuum of mental effort to assimilate other objects, free from any other effort to assimilate other objects'.⁸¹ The 'density' or 'purity' of the mental continuum thus attained enables the 'penetration' and 'assimilation' and consequently the 'mastery' of phenomena. The mental continuum never escapes the Yogin's will.

The final stage is *samādhi*—a term initially employed in a gnosiological sense. Citing the Yoga Sūtras, Eliade states '*samādhi* is the state of contemplation in which thought grasps the form of the object directly, without the help of categories and the imagination (*kalpana*); the state in which the object is revealed 'in itself' (*svarupa*), in its essentials, and as if 'empty of itself'.⁸² The 'act' and the 'object' of meditation are no longer regarded as distinct. There is a real coincidence between 'knowledge' of the object and the 'object of knowledge'. The world as objects gets transformed into 'knowledge possession'. Thus *samādhi* is not so much knowledge as it is a state—which is invulnerable and completely closed to stimuli.

Samādhi is of two phases. The preparatory stage is called *samprajñāta samādhi*, also called *bija samādhi* (*samādhi* with seed). They are in relation with a substratum (support) and produce tendencies which are like seeds for the future function of consciousness. It is here that the yogin attains the 'faculty of absolute knowledge'. The higher stage is called *asamprajñāta samādhi*, which is obtained apart from any other relation—external or internal. It is a conjunction without 'otherness' (i.e. support in terms of object or idea)—a full comprehension of being arising unprovoked. It is a state of rapt absorption. It is neither a gift nor does it represent a state of grace. It is here that the 'impressions of all antecedent mental functions' (*samskara*) are destroyed (or burnt) and the Karmic forces are thus arrested. Besides it is at this stage that one gains absolute knowledge, where 'being' and 'knowing' are no longer separated. In terms of Sankhya metaphysics, it is absolute isolation from domination

by *prakṛti* (*kaivalya*), and as such the pain of existence is abolished. Consciousness is emptied of its objects and in return becomes saturated with a direct and total intuition of being (i.e. after thought becoming one with the infinitesimal nuclei of energy or *tanmatras*). It is the unconditioned state where there is no longer experience to be referred to as pain and suffering. There is no relation involved between consciousness and the 'world'. It is a mere revelation and the self remains free and autonomous. There is no scope for reference to the ego for human consciousness gets absorbed into *prakṛti*. It is an 'impersonal situation' where the liberated (*jīvan mukta*) has only a 'witness consciousness'. This is what is referred to as the 'rupture of the plane', and real transcendence where the liberated is guaranteed (in Eliade's words) 'macranthropic experiences'.

Mention must also be made of the *siddhis* (*iddhi*—lit. perfection. Generally it refers to 'magical powers').⁶² which refer to the miraculous or occult powers that a yogin acquires in the process of assimilating and taking possession of the objects of concentration. In this, no supernatural intervention is necessary. (Yoga here opts for the 'magic principle' that Hopkins refers to. The other means of obtaining are—(a) 'To ask for and get it', and (b) 'Bargaining with a saint's aid'. All three were recognised in the times of the *Jaiminiya Brahmana*). It is the ascetico-mystical conception of 'man-God', where one strives for and attains mystical or divine powers. (The acquisition of miraculous powers does necessarily involve violation of the laws of nature. This is a corollary to the yogin's aim of transcending conditioned existence and all conditioned things, it was noted, were subject to causal laws. As for their certainty, or the universality of the laws of nature, the evidence for it does not lie in consensus. What is treated as 'custom and experience' or the consensus referred to above is in itself conditioned from which the yogin seeks liberation. The evidence for it is qualitatively different and which therefore gives the yogin greater assurance of their certainty. The process of the acquisition of miraculous powers by way of yoga is in itself a violation of the laws of nature and hence the reference to 'struggle within' and 'reversal

of the causal process' in yoga centered religions). But the 'man-God' is different from that of a 'creator-God'. The yogin's *siddhis* does not cover the power to create a world. He merely accepts the pulsating universe as a reality.

One such power is the outcome of concentrating on the subconscious residues whereby the yogin becomes one with them. He replaces them in the whole from which they were detached and without experiencing can relive them. This is called *pratiloman* ('against the fur') where one emerges from time 'by travelling back through it' and transcending 'seed existence'. The object in emerging from time is because of its therapeutic value with regard to the operation of Karma.

Another such *siddhi* is the *samyama* on notion. It is the penetration into the inner dynamics of other people's psycho-physical states. The yogin makes his own the human destiny that had the notion—i.e. he realises the whole infinite series of other men's psycho-physical states. Other powers are also mentioned by Patañjali—such as the power to become invisible, the power to know when one is to die, and disappearance of hunger and thirst etc. and walking on water.

But all these powers do not in themselves help fulfil the aim of supreme freedom. The *siddhis* are said to provide mastery over the elements only in a provisional manner. They are 'perfections' only in the waking state (*vyatthana*) but are obstacles in the state of *samādhī*.⁶⁹ They are not conducive to total emancipation, for all possession is treated as a form of bondage to the thing possessed (i.e. to thoughts in terms of 'I' and 'mine'). In yoga terminology, it is merely participation in the 'divine condition', and the divine condition is far from the final goal of absolute freedom. One must not succumb to such temptations (in fact it is treated as the second temptation). In the final phase every such state is to be eliminated and burnt (*nirbija samādhī*). In short, human consciousness is suppressed completely and one becomes a *jīvan-mukta*, the 'liberated in life'. This state is referred to by Eliade as the 'geometric point' where the

Divine and human coincide.⁶⁴ It is a stage that signifies a radical modification of the human being's ontological condition.

On the attainment of *asamprajanta samadhi*, the yogin according to Eliade 'also realises a dream that has obsessed the human spirit from the beginning of its history—to coincide with the All, to recover Unity,⁶⁵ to re-establish the initial nonduality, to abolish time and creation (i.e. multiplicity and heterogeneity of the cosmos); in particular, to abolish the two-fold division of the real into object-subject'. "There is", he says, "a return to the beginning" but with the difference that the man "liberated in this life" recovers the original situation enriched by the dimensions of freedom and transconsciousness'. It is not a mere regression. It is on the contrary 'the conscious conquest of freedom'. Herein lies the secret of the existence of the world, man and suffering. By liberating himself from such a situation he introduces into the cosmos and life the 'spiritual dimension of freedom'.

Buddhist 'wisdom' too concerns itself with the nature of true reality, the meaning of life and the conduct of life.⁶⁶ The result also leads to the distinction between the realm of the sacred and that of the profane or *samsara*. The latter is the realm of anxiety and dread which is identified with the human personality. In terms of the structure of the mind that knows, it confines itself to the surface as opposed to the very depths that is calm. Thus wisdom is born of a struggle within—by interior self training. It is obtained by overcoming the distracting forces that have the power to act as enemies to our calm when, as Conze states, 'the ego identifies itself with what takes place on the surface of the mind'.⁶⁷ The goal therefore is to attain the state of peaceful calm and 'peace', which according to Conze is 'the resolute withdrawal from all possible causes of disturbance'. It calls for 'a rebirth of the whole personality including the body, the emotions and the will'. The outcome therefore is in no way different from the realisation of the aim of 'a radical modification of the human being's ontological condition' that we saw in Yoga.

! It is the 'distracting forces' above referred to which are the source of the illusion that lead one to assume that activities in the realm of the profane are 'my doings' and 'my concerns'. The problem is to dispel such illusions, which accounts for the presence in the Buddhist path of the symbolism of death, rebirth and initiation. The newly born 'son of Buddha' (*sākyaputto*) acquires 'transcendental faculties' (*abhinindriyam*) in the process of spiritual progress. The Buddha proclaims, 'Moreover, I have shown my disciples the way whereby they call into being out of this body (composed of the four elements) another body of the mind's creation (*rupin manomayam*), complete in all its limbs and members, and with transcendental faculties. It is just like a man who should draw a reed from its sheath—or a snake from its slough—or the sword from its scabbard, recognising the reed, the snake, or the sword was one thing and the sheath, slough or scabbard was another'.⁶⁶ Thus Buddhist yoga seems to be a continuation of the yogic tradition that was common to all Indian mystical religions. It refers to a mystical physiology and the acquisition of the wisdom or divine eye (*divya cakṣuḥ*)⁶⁷ by means of which the higher realm becomes visible. The acquisition of higher faculties has also its corresponding spheres of experience (i.e. the 'locative' sense of yoga that Stcherbatsky refers to in discussing the mystic worlds). Srilabha, a pioneer Sautrantika, refers to the different planes accessible to the senses. In the higher realms the sense of smell and taste do not function, and in turn, it is the sense of sight (*divya cakṣuḥ*) and the sense of hearing (*divya śrotram*) that are developed to their fullest potential.⁷⁰ (Stcherbatsky mentions a Mongolian monk who compared them to 'telescopes' and 'telephones'.) Further, the fact that the Gods are relegated to a lower status also indicates the Buddhist emphasis on the significance of human experience as the one possible realm that provides a plane for a true conquest of freedom.

Thus, Buddhist practice does not differ markedly from the techniques found in Yoga. It is a technique aimed at destroying illusions and purifying the ascetic consciousness, that he may be prepared for higher spiritual experiences. In seeking for 'continual experience' whereby he becomes conscious of all acts⁷¹ (which

were earlier done in ignorance and thus transmitted from life to life by the law of Karma), he is in a state of deep concentration and is thus freed from all distractions, forgetfulness, ignorance and all forms of causally connected phenomena and corresponding modes of behaviour. It is in this way that he transcends the law of Karma (Buddhism of course does not refer to the destruction of past Karma and thus has no parallel to the 'burning' of past sins). Buddhism too condemns surrender to the *siddhis* as being not conducive to total emancipation (correspondingly, it refers to the transcending of the 'incorporeal' sphere as well). Thus the five means by which Patañjali's yogin obtains *asamprañāta samādhī*: i.e. faith in the way of Yoga (*śraddhā*), energy (*virya*), memory (*smṛti*), *samādhi* and wisdom (*prajñā*) (*Yoga Sūtras*, 1, 20)⁷³ have their parallel in the five virtues of faith, vigour, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom which are acquired by the Buddhist on becoming a saint.

There is of course a significant difference. The Buddhist deny the authenticity of the final *samapatti* when it was claimed by non-Buddhists. They believed that 'the *samapatti* of the destruction of consciousness and sensation' which constituted contact with *nirvana* was a discovery of the Buddha.⁷⁴ Buddhist wisdom as the highest virtue of all was, according to Eliade not an 'unio mystica' (i.e. 'to re-establish the initial non-duality'). The yogic experience was only a preparatory stage for obtaining 'super-knowledge' (*abhiñja*) that led to *nirvana*. The ecstatic trance obtained in yogic concentration merely consists in calming down and does not lead to the 'reflection' of the *purusa* or imitating *Iśvara* (God as the supreme yogi). This acquisition of the faculty of wisdom adds a new dimension to one's view of the world—i.e. the world of *dharma*s. 'Wisdom' according to Conze, 'is the strength of mind which permits contact with true reality'.⁷⁴ It is at this stage that the liberated recognises the 'truth' revealed by the Buddha in terms of the synthetic nature of the human personality, the operation of causal laws and the four holy truths. It is this final phase that is treated as blissful in Buddhism for it is this insight which accounts for the 'violent Expression' of the difference between the conditioned and the

unconditioned or free state. The final goal was detachment from the world seen as impermanent and the traditional yogic *dhyanas* were not thus merely to be identified with *nirvāna*.

This wisdom that results in the seeing of the *dharma*s as they are provides the ultimate satisfaction (*jñānatṛptaḥ*) which the human spirit yearns for. Any other form of knowledge (or that which provides the illusion of being knowledge) has no object to correspond to it. Subjectively it amounts to the transcending of empirical existence. This involves adopting the eight-fold path, which is in fact the path of purification of character. The goal or *nirvāna* is obtained with 'the end of all passion and life'—i.e. 'the cessation of all personal life'. While they (Sautrantikas) concede the existence of Buddha's cosmical body, nevertheless they identify *nirvāna* with the living world itself⁷⁶—i.e. they deny it as a separate element that transcends the living world. They deny the materialistic kind of annihilation upheld by the Vaibhasikas. Hence the epithets of *nirvāna* are merely methods of contrasting it with what is invested with the three marks of impermanence, ill and no-soul.

When we examine the Śaiva conception of salvation, they too, as we observed before, emphasised the key role of knowledge in emancipation. Arulnanthi states: 'That which is caused by ignorance is bound existence. It is removed by the great and true wisdom as darkness is subdued by the radiance of light. When ignorance releases its grip, the tangle of bound existence is cut assunder. It becomes the state of release'.⁷⁷ It is this (saving) knowledge or (*Śiva*) *jñāna* that is treated as the highest in the spiritual ladder. (The commentator tends to classify all that is not *śivajñāna* as *ajñāna* and this includes the Nyaya, sankhya and the Advaita Vedāntin positions as well.) It is the knowledge that fulfils the basic human needs. In the later '*Thiruvārūḍṇayan*' Umapathi identifies it with divine grace.⁷⁸

The Śaiva conception therefore differs markedly from Yoga, which had been referred to earlier. In Yoga '*Isvara*' is a mere model of the completely emancipated that serves as the object to be imitated. Although Yoga techniques form part of the religious

discipline in Śaiva Siddhanta, the goal of Yoga darsana (*katvalya* is merely treated as a preparatory stage as in Buddhism. (There is of course one significant difference. The Śaivas will not accept the condemnation of matter or *prakṛti* as a fetter in toto. Their conception of the role and significance of human existence arises from totally different presuppositions). The Yogic goal of isolation of the spirit (*purusa*) is treated as a lower form of knowledge essential for the attainment of the final goal. In the Śaiva gradation, it is merely treated as *pasujñāna* which is tantamount to realising its dependent (*paratantra*) nature. Mere contemplation of oneself is also treated as the state where the fetter of *āṇavam* prevails and as a goal is roundly condemned as 'vain imaginings' (TVP, IV. 63).⁷⁰ The final goal is *patijñāna* (lit. knowledge of the Lord) which is obtained through divine grace alone with the teacher or guru as the medium. In Śaiva yoga, *samādhi* involves union with God—the highest form of relationship. In participating in divine omniscience the world of sense-objects ceases to be real (i.e. becomes *asat*)—a form of guarantee against all evil.⁷¹

The Human situation or more appropriately (from a higher standpoint) the human dilemma consists in the soul or human essence being drawn between the lower and the higher, between the suffering arising by identifying itself with what is alien to it—i.e. the defiling fetters and the veiling activity of Śiva on the one hand and bliss arising from the saving grace of divine omniscience on the other. The soul has the capacity to experience both—the higher and lower interests that we noted in discussing Buddhism. The mystic formula of the five letters or syllables—*si va ya na ma*,⁸⁰ (referred to as the Śaiva rosary) explains this truth in symbolic form. "On one side mystic dance of 'weakness', on the other dance of mystic 'wisdom',—soul between the two". The Commentary: "The syllables *Ma* and *Na* represent the energetic whirl of impurity in itself, and as operating in the soul; the syllables *Si* and *Va* represent the mystic action of sivan and of Grace. Between these stands *Ya*, which represents the soul".⁸¹ The polarity in this instance is between egocentricity and sivacentricity—between love of self and love of God,

The realm of the fetters is the sphere of sense-craving, where the soul identifies itself with the impermanent. This consists of the normal field of sense—based knowledge, the characteristic mark of whose objects is to change and perish. But sentient objects are by definition those that do not perish. Therefore, these objects have to be the products of matter. The psycho-physical aspects with which the soul is associated, thus accounting for the human personality, are material. These are not to be dismissed as a mere aggregate of the five *skandhas* as in Buddhism nor as a self-evolving *prakṛti* as in Sankhya, which have to be transcended because they are evil. The Śaivas see in change the hand of the divine artisan, which reveals the latter's grandeur. It is a revelation of the activity of divine energy on insentient matter or *maya*.⁸² It reveals the redemptive love of God for man, thus giving the creative process a purpose as well. The aim is to provide the soul a sphere or plane of existence that it may experience the fruits of Karma. The human body is the medium by which it could know (*jñānendriyas*) and act (*karmēndriyās*). The final goal is the cleansing off of *āṇavam* so that the soul may assume its role of the crystal that reflects divine radiance. Thus the human body (*thanu*), organs (*kāraṇa*), the worlds (*pavana*) and experiences (*pokam*) are deliberately evolved out of primal matter so that the souls may live and experience their way to salvation. Here the Sankhya ontological scheme gets transformed as God's *lila* or play. The evolutes of *maya* (which is a more elaborate development *prakṛti*) play their due role in acting both as a media for experience and sensations themselves (referred to as enjoyments—*pokam*). The sankhya *tattvas* here become lifeless entities that are activated by God as the 'indweller' and 'prime mover'. This is also the veil that he throws so that the soul may struggle for its salvation.⁸³ The world of sense experience is not to be dismissed as illusion, nor is it to be analysed into its component atomic units to discover regularity of phenomena. It is to be viewed in its totality so that meaning and purpose may be ascribed to it. It is said that by way of one's feeble perception of the senses as the soul's instruments, one learns how the soul itself is the instrument of grace.

God as the divine activator is beyond the realm of sense-based knowledge. The latter can only aid in obtaining knowledge of matter (which comes within the dimensions of space and time). It cannot aid one in seeing the very force or power that aids the seeing. Besides the whole realm of phenomena serve as a veil. While it hints it does not show the divine hand that operates it.

Just as much as the capacity to know sense objects is itself the work of grace (*thirotāna śakti*—the grace that conceals) the capacity to know God too is the work of grace (*aruḥ śakti* or saving grace). And this is not available to all and sundry. It is only to the awakened self that God reveals himself.

The awakening of the self is reflected in the stage of maturity of the devotee. He becomes indifferent to pleasure and pain (*iruvinaḥ oppu*—lit. both kinds of activity are alike). This is the stage of pure renunciation. It is also interpreted to mean that the good and bad Karma tend to balance and therefore cancel each other. The impurities or *mala* have become ripe for removal (*malaparipākam*).⁸⁴ It is at this stage that Śiva descends in the form of a guru to initiate the devotee into the path (*satkurūtharisanam, sat-guru-darsana*).⁸⁵ The mode of initiation is referred to as *dikṣa* (from the root 'di' meaning to shine). It is the means by which divine grace is said to descend on the devout (*śakti-nipādam*), whereby the soul is awakened to a sense of the divine presence. It is of necessity a turning inwards for it is a revelation of the very source of one's being. It involves the radical transformation that Eliade refers to in discussing Yoga. The awakening is mystical consciousness that results in a turn to higher levels hitherto denied to the soul. The energy of *śakti* that had hitherto acted as a veil, is now changed into a gracious energy of enlightenment and repose from physical perturbations. Thus (*Śiva*) *śakti-nipādam* involves the cessation of *Śiva's* 'veiling' activity.

The role of the divine agency in enlightenment is likened by Arujnanthi to the prince, who brought up among savages is not aware of his true nature until the King separates him from his wild associates, acknowledges him as his own and has him respected

even as himself. The 'savages' in this instance are the 'five senses'⁸⁶ from which one is saved and transformed.⁸⁷ It is after this stage that the soul yearns for spiritual marriage.

The religious practices that follow have their stages that could correspond to that of Yoga. But the specific practices differ markedly as much as the fruits they are expected to provide. The aim is to become detached from sense-pleasures and acquire spiritual qualities. The qualifications are stipulated (*adhikāri lakṣaṇa*) for it is said that one has to be hungry to be satisfied with food. Divine grace cannot descend on one if he is not ready for it. The intensity of the descent varies with differing levels of development. T.N. Olaganathan.

There is the level of physical activity—*caryai*, also referred to as *dāsa-mārga* or the way of the servant. (This is to instil the attitude of humility). Next comes the psycho-physical practices (*satputra-mārga*) which together with *caryai* constitutes the purgative way. These together parallel the stage of moral mastery found in Yoga and Buddhism. The next stage is *sahamarga* also referred to as *Yoga*, which is essentially psychological. This corresponds to the physical and mental disciplines of Yoga except that there are presiding deities to correspond to different phases according to the Śaiva ontological scheme.

The final phase—*jñānamārga* or *sanmārga*, is described as 'the reading of the *jñāna sastras*, and teaching and explaining them to others, learning from others and pondering over their purport. These constitute *jñāna* and worship or *yajna* and will lead one to the feet of the Lord'.⁸⁸

The aim of all these practices is to purify the physical and mental nature so that the devotee's real spiritual nature may become manifest. Thus in the final analysis the Śaiva saint too is to be identified in terms of purified character. But their view as to what constitutes purified character differs from their Buddhist adversaries. All activities that are not spurred by the love of God (for God is the source of light that guarantees the correctness of all actions) will not free oneself from the effects of Karma and therefore cannot assure one of total freedom.

God having revealed himself as immanent in one's own being, the flickering lamp of sense-knowledge gets overwhelmed by divine light of which it now begins to partake. This is referred as '*soham bāvana*' ('*sa*' meaning 'it' or the real, and '*aham*' meaning 'I' or me. It refers to 'I' becoming⁹⁹ God'). The liberated attains *samadhi* which could be rendered as 'blissful slumber'. Here the *jivan mukta* in a state of absolute surrender allows himself to be guided by what to him appears as divine guidance. His actions therefore are treated as God's actions. It is this form of advaita or non-dual relationship that guarantees the liberated, transcendence from the effects of Karma and therefore true freedom.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

SOME COMMENTS ON ŚAIVA LOKĀYATA POLEMICS ON RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

1. See K. N. Jayatillake's *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, an erudite attempt to apply the Logical positivist methodology to a study of Buddhist epistemology.
2. Arul Nandi Śivāchariyar, *Sivajñāna Siddhiyar*, Parapakkam, V. 14. நித்த இயல்பாம் இவை புனர்ப்பே.
3. Ibid. V. 25 போகத்தை மண்ணில் கண்டு.
4. Ibid. V. 26 சோழை மானுடர் தீதென்னும் கொலை களவாதி.
5. Ibid. V. 31 உணர்வு கெட்டுக் குணமெல்லாம்வேட்கையேயாய் நீடுவ தின்ப முத்தி இத்தில் நின்றார்கள் -முத்தர்.
6. Ibid. V. 26 உன்னையோப்பார் சொல்லிழனில்லை.
7. Ibid. V. 22 மனமுதல் ஆறினுக்கும் நேயத்ததாக வேண்டும்.
8. Ibid. V. 18 செய்திடும் கன்மமெல்லாம் செய்தவர் தம்மைப் பற்றி எய்திடும்.
9. Ibid. V. 19 மாய்ந்து பின் வயலிலிட்டவை தழை மலிக்குமாப் போல்
10. Ibid. V. 18 மெய்தரு தூலங் கெட்டுச் சூக்குமமாய் மேவும்.
11. Ibid. V. 41 உணர்வு இந்தியங்களும் வன்ன பன்மையும்.
12. Ibid. புந்தியோடிய வன்ன போக குணங்கள்.
13. Ibid. இவை பேதமாயிட வந்தவானினை தந்தவா.
14. Ibid. V. 21, 48 இன்பொடு துன்பமெல்லாம் எய்துவ கன்மம்.
15. Ibid. V. 22 காயத்தின் குணமதன்றிக் கண்டது ஒன்மா உண்டாயின்.
16. Ibid. Supakkam, third Sutra, V. 1 உயிரெனப்படுவது இந்த உடலின் வேருனதாம்.
17. Ibid. V. 1 உற்றுச் செயிருளும்.
18. Ibid. Parapakkam, V. 37 ஆக்குமவாரவர் வேண்டிடும்.
19. Ibid. Supakkam, Second Sutra, V. 1 அலகிலா உயிர்கள் கன்மத் தானையின் அமர்ந்து செல்லத் தலைவனாய்.
20. Ibid. Parapakkam, V, 49 அறிந்து அன்பினால் உறுகிக்கும் அப்புயன்.

21. Ibid. V. 17 ஒப்பிலா மலடி பெற்ற மகனொரு முயற் கொம்பேறித் தப்பில் ஆகாயபூவைப் பறித்தமை சாற்றினுரே.
22. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 114. 1951 8th Ed.
23. Aruṇanṭhi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit*, Parapakkam, V. 23 அருவமே இறை வனாகில் அறிவின்ற காயமாகும்.
24. Ibid. V. 23 பூதக் கூட்டத்தில் ஒருவனாகும்.
25. Ibid. V. 22 காயத்தின் குணமன்றிக் கண்டதான் மாவுண்டாயின்.
26. Ibid. மாயத்தில் சொல்லிவிடாதே.
27. A. G. N. Flew, *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*.
28. Aruṇanṭhi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit*, Parapakkam, V. 60.
29. Ibid. V. 57 இம்மையே தரும் கண்டிடே.
30. Sabāpathi Naṭalar, *Drāvidaprakāśikā*.
31. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, Ch. II, P. 5, 1926.
32. Ibid. Ch. II. p. 5.
33. Thāyumaṇavar, Ennat Kanni, 2, 4 பொய்கண்டார் காணப் புனிதமெனும் மெய்கண்டான்.
(This is Thāyumaṇavar on Meikanttar)
34. Rudolf OHO, *op. cit*, Ch. II, p. 7.
35. *Tiruvacagam*, Śrīvapūrāṇam, II, 58 to 60
நலந்தாலிலாத சிறியேற்கு நல்கி, நிலந்தன் மேல் வந்தருளி நீன் கழல்கள் காட்டி, நாயிற் கடையாய்க் கிடந்த வடியேற்கு.
36. Apparadigal, *Thevaram*, Vinavitai Tiruthantakam, V. 10.
இப்படியன் இந்நிறத்தன் இவ்வண்ணத்தன் இவனிறைவன் என்றெழு திக் காட்டொணுதே.
37. *Tiruvāsakam*, Kulaitḥapatthu, V. 7
அன்றே யென்றானுவிய முடலுமுடைமை யெல்லாமுங் குன்றே யணையா யென்னையாட் கொண்ட போதே கொண்டியோ.
38. Apparadigal, *op. cit*. *Tiru Alagamat*, V. 12.
திருமாலொடு நான்முகனும் தேடித் தேடொனாத் தேவனை யென்னுனே தேடிக் கண்டு கொண்டேன்.
No offence to Brabma or Vishnu is intended. It is merely a grateful acknowledgement of a unique privilege.
39. காட்சி or seeing here gets an extended interpretation. (varificationist often ignore this capacity to see more than what is seen.)

40. Aruṇanṭhi Śivachāriyār, *op. cit.*, Parapakkam, V. 51 காணுமோ கடம் கண்ட கண்ணினைக் கண்டு நிற்பதும் கண்ணதே, காணுணது உயிர் தானுமிப்படி கண்டிடுங் கரணங்களை.
41. Ibid. காடுனா, கரணங்களுக்குயிருண்மை யாவதுங் கண்டிசே.
42. Ibid. அங்கியானது கானுமொன்றை அணைந்து நின்று நிகழ்ந்திடும், பங்கியாது உயிர் தானுமிப்படிப் பற்றியல்லது நின்றிடா.
43. *Tiruvāchacam*, Śivapurāṇam, I. 31 consider for example, Maṇikkavasagar's appeal "எல்லாப் பிறப்பும் பிறத்தினைத்தேன் எம்பெருமான்".
44. Ibid. *Nithalvinnappam*, V. 1 சடையவனே தளர்ந்தேன் எம்பிரசன், என்னைத் தாங்கிக் கொள்ளே.
45. Ibid. *Koḷi Tiruppathikam*, V. 1 மாறி நின்று என்னை மயக்கிடும் வஞ்சப் புலனைந்து.
46. Ibid. *Kanta Patthu*, V. 9 இந்திரிய வயமயங்கி இறப்பதற்கே காரண மாய்.
47. Ibid. *Pittitha Patthu*, V. 9 யானுனைத் தொடர்ந்து சிக்கெனப் பிடித்தேன்.
48. Ibid. *Koḷi Tiruppathikam*, V. 1 வஞ்சப் புலனைந்தின் வழியடைத்து அழுதே.
49. Ibid. *Achoppathikam*, V. 1 அத்தக் குணனக் கருனியவாறு யார் பெறு வார் அச்சோவே.
50. Aruṇanṭhi Śivachāriyār, *op. cit.*, Parapakkam, :V. 60 ஆசை யுற்றுழல் சூகரங்கள் அசுத்தமேனி அணைந்து தின்றே சுகித்தன வாயிருஞ்சுகம்.
51. Ibid. *Supakkam*, Second Sutra. 89. யோனி பேதம்.
52. Ibid. *Parappakkam*, V. 49 துன்பம் எய்திடுவானென் மற்றிது சொல்லி டாய் சொல்ல வல்லையேல்.
53. Ibid. *Supakkam*, Second Sutra, V. 27 அவனடிக்கு அன்பு செய்கை மான்பறம்.
54. Apparadigal, *op. cit.* *Tiruvathikai, Virattanam*, V. 1 கொடுமை பல செய்தன நானறியேன்.
55. Aruṇanṭhi Śivachāriyār, *op. cit.*, *Supakkam*, Second Sutra, V. 31. எங்கும் ஆனையே ஆனையே காண்.
56. Ibid. Eighth Sutra, V. 11.
57. Ibid. *Parapakkam*, V. 27.
58. Ibid. V. 47.

CHAPTER II

CAUSATION—ŚAIVA AND BUDDHIST

1. Aruṇānādi Śivāchāriyār, *Śivajñāna Siddhīyār*, Parapakkam, 2.1.8
காரண காரியத்தின் தொடர்ச்சியாய்க் காலமுன்றின் சோர்வற
தோன்றும் கெட்டு.
(*Kāraṇa Kāriyathin thotarchiyāik kāla Mūnriṇ sōrvara thōnrum kettu*)
2. கணத்தில் பங்கம் வரும் *Kanathil Pankam varum*.
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வானம் ஆன்மா மன்னு காலங்கடிக்கு மனமொடு வாக்கிறந்
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(*Vānam ānma mannu kālankattiku manamodu vakiranthittu innumore*)
4. *Abhidharmakesa* III. 25 cited in stcherbatsky. *The Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1, p. 135. (Also see S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 158-164 for the sautrantika stand, which is the nearest to the Śaiva versions of Buddhism).
5. Aruṇānāthi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit*, 2.1.2.
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8. *Ibid.*, 1.10. (11 valakku)—Right belief. (*ul valakku*) :consists in stating 'what is'. (*ulathu undenkai*). A hare's horn is a mere fancy. That is an example of false belief.
9. *Ibid.*, 2.13—*Epporulum anitham*—lit. all things are impermanent.
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11. S. N. Dasgupta, *op. cit*, vol. 1. p. 155. Inference too copies external reality as much as perception.
Alavai kadai (anu) manam ennu iraneluṭit—Valid means of knowledge consists of two—perception and inference.

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13. Arujnanthi Sivachariyar, *op. cit*, 2.1.5.
14. *Ab. K. Karika*, p. 76 f. cited in L. Devalle Peussin's '*Sautrantika*' in *Encyclopædia of religion and ethics*, vol. 11, p. 213.
15. *Kathavattu* XVIII, 9. cited in Peussin, *Ibid*.
16. Arujnanthi Sivachariyar, *op. cit*, 2.11.24.
17. There are several senses in which the term '*dharma*' is used. It is here used in the ontological sense. (see E. Conze, *BTI*. pp. 92.93)
18. E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, George Allen and Unwin Limited, London. 1962, p. 92.
19. The *Manimēkalai*, (30.199., p. 186) gives the following examples in illustration: *udampu* or body (which is a word to refer to a group of elements or *dhatu*s, *nir* or water (for a collection of many drops and *nādu* or country (for a collection of settlements).
20. The series of events as seed, the shoot and stalk, states the *Manimēkalai* are mistakenly referred to as the paddy-plant (*vitthu mulai thal enru-nikaleciyil avarrai nellenā valankuthal*). 30.200-201.
வித்து, முளை, தாள் என்றிந் நிகழ்ச்சியில் அவற்றை நெல்லென வழங்குதல்.
21. *Manimēkalai* 30.199.204.
22. Arujnanthi Sivachariyar, *op. cit*, 2.1.6.9.
23. Conze—*op. cit*, p. 34. conze states, 'the impermanent is automatically ill and should be dreaded.
24. Arujnanthi Sivachariyar, *op. cit*, 2.11.4. *Neruppaya thuyar pirappu*—lit. a suffering life, that is fire— நெருப்பாய துயர் திறப்பு.
25. *Ibid*. 2.11.30. Also see Ponnaiah, V.
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26. *Oruvanodu orutthi onru uraithidum ulakam ellam*—lit. the sum total of the world of described as (a) man (a) woman and one (or 'if'). ஒருவனோடு ஒருத்தி ஒன்று என்று உரைத்திடும் உலகம் எல்லாம்
27. *Vanthu, ninru, povathu*—lit. coming, staying and going.
28. *Sivjnāna Bōtham*, Sutra. 1.
29. Arujnanthi Sivachariyar, *op. cit*, 11.2. Supakkam. *ipputhathi ellam viithippadi thorri mayak kanalan*—(இப் புதாதி எல்லாம் விதிப்படி தோற்றி மாயக் காணலான்) lit. the entirety of elements etc. are according to the rule—i.e. perception—seen as arising and perishing.

CHAPTER II

CAUSATION—ŚAIVA AND BUDDHIST

1. Aruṇānādi Śivācāriyār, *Śivajñāna Siddhīyār*, Parapakkam, 2.1.8
காரண காரியத்தின் தொடர்ச்சியாய்க் காலமுன்றின் சோர்வற
தோன்றும் கெட்டு.
(*Kāraṇa Kāriyathin thotarchiyāik kāla Mūnriṇ sōrvara thōnrum kettu*)
2. கணத்தில் பங்கம் வரும் *Kanathil Pankam varum*.
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19. The *Manimākalai*, (30.199., p. 186) gives the following examples in illustration: *udampu* or body (which is a word to refer to a group of elements or *dhatu*), *nir* or water (for a collection of many drops and *nādu* or country (for a collection of settlements).
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27. *Vanthu, ninru, povathu*—lit. coming, staying and going.
28. *Sivjñāna Bōtham*, Sutra. 1.
29. Arujnanthi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, 11.2. *Supakkam. ipputhathi ellam vitthippadi thorri mayak kanalan*—(இப் புதாதி எல்லாம் விதிப்படி தோற்றி மாயக் காணலான்) lit. the entirety of elements etc. are according to the rule—i.e. perception—seen as arising and perishing.

30. *Śivajñāna Bōtham* Sivaññana Muni's *Hetu on surni. 1. thorramum trum ullathanpale kidatthalin*—lit. arising and end lying within the fold of the existent. தோற்றமும் ஈறும் உள்ள தன்பாலே கிடத்தலின்.
31. *Ibid.* Hetu on Surni 2. *illatharku thorraminmayln.* இல்லதற்கு தோற்றமின்மையின்.
32. *Maṇimēkali*, 30.7 and 16. *Piravippini Marutthuvan.* பிறவிப்பினி மருத்துவன்.
33. *Ibid.* 30.17.
34. Aruṇan̥thi Śivachāriyār, *op. cit.*, 1.11.
35. Ignatious Hirudayam. *Śivajñāna Bōtham* in *Saiva Siddhanta*, vol. I no. 2. April-June, 1966, p. 101.
36. Aruṇan̥thi Śivachāriyār, *op. cit.*, 11.14.
37. It is this discussion of the range of conditions that leads Stcherbatsky to refer to an infinity of causes. This (knowledge) he says, is only possible by an omniscient being. (*op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 129). (Perhaps the *Siddhiyār* is referring to such a conception of the Buddha when it states that it was the omniscient who authored the *pitakas*).

It is on this issue that Conze speculates about the possibility of tracing a man's death to some deadly conjunction of the heavens to which he was sensitive as the result of his birth-horoscope. (E. conze, *op. cit.*, p. 146). This is because he seeks to draw a distinction between ordinary practice that stresses on specific causes to the exclusion of general factors that Buddhism is interested in. This has to be linked with his attempt to present a case for the 'wisdom of the East' as against its western critics whom he castigates as those 'who' for mere tribal sluggishness, are convinced that 'western', i.e. Judaeo-Christian and scientific modes of thinking are the unfailing standards of all truth. (*Ibid.* Preface pp. 9-10.)

On the other hand Jayatilleke opts for a naturalistic theory. He sees in Buddhism the earliest formulation of a 'clear-cut theory of causation' in the History of Indian thought. He therefore adopts a position diametrically opposed to that of Conze when he takes R. E. Hume to task for remarking that (neither Buddha nor Buddhist writings had any interest in problems of.....scientific causation'. (E B T K p. 445) Jayatilleke seems to accept the very criteria as the standard of truth that Conze rejects with vehemence. Little wonder that neither author mentions the other. Perhaps it could be that Conze leans more on Mahayana and also because he betrays a contempt for the authority of the Pali scripture. On the otherhand the Pali sources constitute the main source material for Jayatilleke.

38. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, vol. 1. p. 119.
39. *Suttanipatha*. 11.25. cited in Jayatillake, K. N. *early Buddhist Theory of knowledge*, Allen and Unwin, 1963, p. 448.
40. *Tattva Sangraha Panjka*, p. 11.5 cited Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1. p. 119.
41. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, vol. 1. p. 119.
42. *Tattva sangraha Panjka*, p. 176.13 cited in Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, vol. 1. p. 121. fn 2.
43. *Tattva Sangraha*, 177.2, cited in Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, vol. 1. p. 121. fn 7.
44. Aruṇanṭhi Śivācāriyār, *op. cit.*, suppakam, 11.3. இயல்பு காண் தோற்றி மாய்கை என்றின் இயல்பினுக்குச் செயலின்று இயல்பு செய்தி செய்தியேல் இயல்பதின்னேம்.
It is significant to note that the term 'change' in Tamil denotes action (ceithi). When the nature of an object is referred to, 'nature' here implies something static and material that is devoid of any form of consciousness.
45. Aruṇanṭhi Śivācāriyār, *op. cit.*, Supakkam, 11.4.
46. Ibid. 11.4 தோற்றம் நாசம் தணக்கிலா நலங்கினர் நாதன் வேண்டும். *thorram nasam thanakku ila nalam kilar nathan vendum*—lit. a supreme being that is not subject to birth and destruction is necessary.
47. The *Siddhiyar* refers to it as 'ulakam ellam' (the world as a whole). This is corroborated in Meykendar's usage, for 'avai' in the first sutra means community—(The Śaivas believe that all animate objects have souls and at birth are provided with the due physical body. Hence the description in terms of gender).
48. Piet appears to see in this a leap from the parts to the whole. 'It infers from this directly perceived observation', says he, 'that what is true of all the parts must necessarily be true of the whole'. (LPSSP p. 167).
To paranjoti, the Siddhantin appears to commit 'the fallacy of composition'. (SS. p. 36).
49. Aruṇanṭhi Śivācāriyār, *op. cit.*, 11.1. Supakkam. *than muthal trumakti maruvidam anathi muttha citthuru marini ninru*—lit. he as the first and the end repeats the process remaining on eternally free and spirit-form.
50. Ibid. 11.2 *ipputhathi ellam vithippadi thorn mayak kanalan*—lit. those elements etc. are all perceived in the stipulated manner as coming to be and passing away. (Here they are trying to show that elements change, through the means of perception alone as held valid by the Materialists.)

51. Ibid. 11.9. This is illustrated by the analogy of the seed that sprouts in to a plant and perishes with the seasons (பயில் வித்து எல்லாம் காரிடம் அதானில் நாட்டும் அங்குரம் கழியும் வேனில்—*payil vittu kaliyum venie*—lit. the seed (and material objects) etc. sprout with the rains and are removed with the dry season).
52. Ibid. 11.6. உள்ள காரணத்தில் உண்டாம் காரியம். *Ulla karanathil undam kariyam.*
53. Ibid. 11.6. ஒரு கருத்தாவால் வெளிப்பட்டுத் தோன்றும். '*Oru karathaval velippadduth thonnum*'—lit. brought in to birth by a creator.
54. Ibid. 11.6. மன்னில் இல்லதாம் படம் கடாதி எழில் தரும். *Mannil illatham padam kadathi elil tharum*—lit. the cloth is not existent in the clay it gives rise to the pot.
55. Ignatious Hirudayam, *Salva Siddhanta*, Vol. 1. no. 1. Jan. 1966. p. 46.
56. Ibid.
57. *Sivajñāna Siddhiyar* Citturai.
58. Arujñanthi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit*, Supakkam, 11.17. *Purudan thanum athanukaranam perral arithalai*—lit. purusa knows only when he acquires the material organs.

CHAPTER III

K A R M A

1. Arujñandi Śivāchāriyār, *Sivajñāna Siddhiyār*, Supakkam, 2, 2.12. Sattanār, *Maṇimēkalai*, 17.51—refers to action based on one's inclinations.
2. Sattanār, *op. cit*, 3.76-77.
ceivinaṭ cintai inrenṇ yavathum eitha.
lit. that which is done if devoid of thought nothing would entail.
3. Ibid. 16. 87-88.
piranthavar cathalum tranthavar pirathalum urankalum villithalum ponrathu unmaiyn.
4. Arujñandhi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit*, 11.89.
entharu yonṭi ellam olitthu manidatthu uthitthal kandilṭi kadalaṭṭi kaiyal nṇthinan kariyankan.
lit.—to be born in a human form which is beyond the eightyfour million forms is comparable as a feat of swimming across the ocean.
Also Eliade—*M. Yoga Immortality and Freedom*, p. 189. (8400,000 *Mahakalpas*).

5. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, 11.88:
nilaiyatha kollivaddan karanku ena.
6. Ibid: 11.38.
nanavu marik kanavinai maruvumappol.
7. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* p. 673.
8. Bowker, J. *The Problem of suffering*, p. 249.
9. Maraimalai Adigal, *The Saiva Siddhanta as a Philosophy*, 2nd Ed. Kalagam, Madras 1966, p. 39-40.
10. Maṇikkavacagar, *Tiruvacagam*, Śivapurāṇam, 30-31.
Sella nintva ithavara sankamatthul ellappirupum piranthilaitthen emperuman
lit. within these (from grass to Gods) immobile and mobile forms of
life, in every species born, weary I've grown, great Lord.
11. Kliade. M. *op. cit.*, p. 189.
niyathi—fatality, destiny.
12. Sattanār, *op. cit.*, 27. 275-276.
immaiym immaippayanum ippirappe
poymal marumaiyundai vinsithuithal.
13. Ibid. 27. 283-287.
Nin thaithanthayanai anumanatteralallaku intha gnalatteru
envakai ariyai? meiyunarvu inri, melpporolunar variya;
aiyam allathu, thu sollapperai.
14. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār. *op. cit.*, Parapakkam, 2.11.1.
ullathavathu kandathenturai kondathennula katthunt, pillaiyai
valarkintra nalunaip pettra thayodu thanthaiyai kallame
purikalanar uyirunna introru kalaiyai mellaveyular
entru konu virumpumaru vilampide.

This appears to be an essentially Buddhist argument. In the *Sarva-*
darsanasamgraha-too, Madhavacharya allows the Buddhist to refute the
Materialist in terms of the validity of inference, thus indirectly acknowl-
edging its Buddhist source and also its validity for Advaita Vedānta.
(But this work belongs to a period that is later than the *Siddhiyār*).
15. Conze, E. *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 48.
16. Jayatilleke, K. N. *Early Buddhist Thought*. p. 460.
17. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, vol. 1. p. 130.
18. Sattanār, *op. cit.*, 25.58.
Mutra unarntha muthalvan. lit. the first one whose knowledge is complete.
Ibid. 12.78 *Perarivalan.* lit. one with immense knowledge.
Ibid. 9.9.11.

*Tholuthakaimathava, thuntпойul unarnthol Kayankaraiyil
ni uraitthathai ellam vayeyakuthal maykkara unarthen*

lit. Oh you maha tapas that deserves to be worshipped, or you who has realized the truths, I have now realized that all which you preached on the banks of gaya are true. (This included the prediction of an earthquake). an allowance of course must be made for Jayatillake's obsession prove Buddhism as scientific.

19. Rabula, Walpola, *what the Buddhataught*—Gordon Fraser, London, 1967, p. 32.
20. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1 p. 119.
Herein lies the true meaning of the Sautrantika stand that 'existence' is nothing but 'efficiency'. This 'efficiency' is brought closer to the notion of 'Creative cause'.
21. Sattanār, *op. cit.*, 16.35.
thiyum kollāth thivina—lit. an evil dead that cannot even be destroyed by fire.
22. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
23. Nyanatileka, *A Guide through Abhidummapitaka*, Colombo, 1957.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
25. Sattanār, *op. cit.*, 30. 59–63.
nalvinai thivina enru iruvakaiyal sollappadda karuvil, carthalam,
karuvilpadda poluthinul thorri vinaippayan vilaiyunkalai,
uyirkadien manāpperinapamum kavalaiyum kaddum.
26. *Ibid.* 30.82.
Urankuvor Unarvu.
27. Conze, E. *op. cit.*, p. 111.
28. *Ibid.* p. 108.
29. Conze, E. *Buddhist Meditation*, Allen & Unwin, 1956, p. 155.
30. It must be noted that the Buddhist understand 'Self' only in these terms. Conditions of debate and polemics lead to a superimposition of the meaning given in one system on to another—making much of the argumentation futile.
31. Sattanār, *op. cit.*, 30. 95–97.
akkaramappetriyin urupunar allam carpodu
kathikalil karanakariya urunkkalil thontral.
32. The Buddhist point to the virtues of (Buddhist) Dharma and the suffering arising from pursuing other paths opposed to the Dharma. All other doctrines are classified as false (*maram*) and therefore misleading its

adherents into suffering, while the Dharma (*aram*) points the way to transcend it. (*aram tharu salpum maram tharu thunpamum*) Sattanār, *op. cit.*, 21-20.

33. Nyanatileka, *op. cit.*, pp. 7 and 10.

34. Aruṇandi Śivāchariyār, *op. cit.*, 1.6.

Kutravidu arakamathi kunankalaik kuraiththalakum—lit. salvation from defilements involves the reduction of greed etc.

35. Sattanār, *op. cit.*, 6. 152.

Ulvinaivanthu ivan uyir uudu kalinthathu—lit. karma it is that consumed his life and exhausted itself.

Ibid., 6, 159-162.

aiyam undō—aruyir Ponai,

ceivinaivan marunkil centru pirappu eithuthal?

ankathu konarnthu nin aridar nikkuthal inku enakku

avathontru antru—lit. Have you any doubt that when a life goes that it attains a birth according to Karma? To revive it here and remove your sorrow if one that I cannot do.

36. *Ibid.* 6. 168.

Those teachings that say that a deep person can be restored to his life are false. *Tēvar tharuvar varamentru, orumurai man marai anthaṇar nannai uraikkum*—lit. the four noble vedas state that the deva could give (to restore life). *Avalap paditrunai ankathu* (Those are disgraceful teachings).

37. Meykandar, *Śivagnana Botham*, Sutra 1.

Thotriya thithiyil odunki malatthulatham—lit. origin, persistence and destruction lies with the malas.

38. Aruṇandi Śivāchariyār, *op. cit.*, supakkam 1.36.

Uyirukku maniniya putthi mutthi valankavum

arulanmunne thunniya malankalettām thudaippathum—lit. to the soul, gives insight and salvation, by grace erases the previously settled mala.

As in Buddhism, the emphasis is on the importance of human existence—vis-vis other planes of existence. But unlike Buddhism, it is not the mind so much as the heart is to be purified. Suffering is here treated as a mode of testing purified love.

39. *Ibid.* Parapakkam. 11.2;40.

The *Siddhiyar* interpretation of Advaita, which is in keeping with the recorded experiences about their relationship with God by the saints, is stated thus:

entrakamal, irandakamal ontrum irandum intrakamal—lit. neither one, nor two nor not neither one and neither two God's purpose in effecting the

evolutionary process is referred to as 'malaparipakam'—to make the *mala* called: *anava* ripe enough for removal. In the nature of an undesirable fungus in the system, he burns it with his divine eye (*malankalerelam nungun noldci*) and with his loving hand (*makkarunaik kaiyal*) raises one from the dreaded round of rebirths and places one in eternal mukti.

40. Aruṇandhi Śivachāriyar, *op. cit*, Parapakkam, 1.16.
41. Ibid. 1.11.20. The soul in its pure form has no propensity for knowledge unless it clings to some medium. It either clings to matter or the body and identifies itself with it i.e. to sensuous living or clings to God and identifies itself with God. It is helpless by itself. This is also the Śaiva conception of knowledge, which involves merger with the object known.
42. Ibid. Supakkam. 3.1.1.
43. Umapathi Śivacāriyar, *Sivaprakasam*, Kalagam, Madras. 1969, p. 112.
44. Aruṇandhi Śivachāriyar, *op. cit*, Supakkam, 2.1.9
Perilavu inpamodu pini mupuc cakkadennum
arum mun karuvud paddthu—lit. welfare and suffering, pleasure, disease, decay and death are the six that are impressed at conception.
45. *munpu ceitha kanman inkivatrithu.*
46. Aruṇandhi Śivachāriyar, *op. cit*, Supakkam, 2.11.12.
nancei vinai.
47. Ibid. 2.11.9.
(Sukkumamai) avvithi anupavaththal eridum.
48. Ibid. 2.11.12.
vanthidummuraimaiyode.
49. Ibid. 2.11 12.
alakilā arivan ānai—lit. the will of one whose knowledge has no bounds.
50. Ibid. Sutra 2.
51. Ibid. 2.11.31.
52. Ibid 2.11.32.
pinpu solvali nadappar thuyer nirayamuncerar—the injunctions and will never reach purgatory.
53. Ibid. 2.11.10.
vidappadum munnudampin vinai intha udal vilaikkum thodarcetyāl.
54. Ibid. 2.11.49.
vinatyāl utthippadi uru sukkumathe varun.
55. Ibid. 2.11. 27-29.

CHAPTER IV

IGNORANCE

1. Smart, Ninian. *Doctrines and arguments in Indian Philosophy*, p. 224.
(See also smart, *Philosophers and Religious truth* 6.9., p. 142).
2. Eliade, *Yoga Immortality and Freedom*, p. XVI.
3. Pali Text Society. Dictionary.
4. Aruṇāṇḍi Śivācāriyār, *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*, Supakkam. II 55.
5. Jayatilleke, K. N., 'Avijja', *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*.
6. Conze, E. *Buddhism*, p. 105. and Aruṇāṇḍi Śivācāriyār, *op. cit.*, 11.77.
7. Pope, G. U. *Tiruvacagam* fn. XXXVI-XXXVII (Note XV).
8. Sāttanār, *Maṇimēkalai*, 30.51.54.
Pethamai yenpathu yathu? yena vinavin othiya ivarrai unarāthu,
mayanki iyarpadu porulal kandaṭhu maranthu muyarkodu undu
yenak kettathu thelithal.
9. Jayatilleke, K. N., *op. cit.*
10. Nanāmoli., *The Path of Purification*.
(*Visuddhi Magga*) 1956. XVII. 52. Fn. p. 607.
11. Aruṇāṇḍi Śivācāriyār, *op. cit.*, Parapakkam, 1.12. (*pitthu eri*).
12. Ibid. 2.2.4.
nil pavak kulyil vilu nirmaiyakum.
13. Ibid. 2.1.10.
ul valakku uḷathu uḍdenkal.
14. Conze, E. *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 276.
Netti 27. Sabbh—dhamma—yathava—sāmpativedhalakkharā—avijja.
15. It might be interesting to note the precise definitions given to Buddhist *pramanas* by the santrantika logicians. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) as defined by Dharmakīrti is a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated by any names or relations (*Kalpāna*) and which is not erroneous (*kalpanapodhamabhrantam*). It thus means the correct presentation through the sense of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those features which are its and its alone. (The *Maṇimēkalai* refers to it as *suddunarvu*. 29.49.). This is its *svalakṣanam*. The validity of inference too depends on actually copying the facts of the external world. (see Das Gupta, S. N. *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. pp. 153-162) The above version of Buddhist *pramanas* along with the notion of momentariness gives the Sautrantika account of how wrong interpretation takes place at all.

16. Zimmer, Heinrich. *Philosophies of India*. p. 515.
17. Conze, E. *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 276.
anicce niccan ti, dukka sukhan ti,
anattaṇi atta ti, asubhe subhan ti.
18. Ibid. p. 40.
19. Discourse on Perfect view. M. 1.
20. Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*, XVII 43.
21. Pali Text Society, Dictionary.
22. Buddha ghosa, *op. cit.*, XVII. 51.
23. Perhaps what is implied is that they are not entitled to being claimed as knowledge. However, conze presents a contemporary example of possibilities (a) and (b) being juxtaposed. It is difficult to isolate exposition from abuse.
24. Conze, E. *Buddhist thought in India*, p. 42.
25. Sattanar, *op. cit.*, 6. 107-126; 20.40.69.
 It might appear that although there are prescribed meditations (the four 'stations of Brahma') for the cultivation of requisite social emotions that would regulate one's attitude to other people, no scope is allowed for personal relationships (particularly among the sexes) based on love and appreciation of the beautiful that could transcend lustful behaviour.
26. Eliade, Mircea, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
27. Buddha gosha, *op. cit.*, XVII. 57.
28. Ibid. XVII. 38.
29. Nyanatiloka, *Guide through the Abhidhammapitaka*, pp. 139-142.
30. Smart, Ninian, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
 By horizontal is meant those links in the chain that seek to give a causal account of the process of rebirth and thus are possessed of a temporal relationship. Ignorance and active tendencies (or karma formations) along with death and decay, existence process, attachment and craving belong to this mode of arrangement. The rest constitute an analysis of the conditions underlying the existence of craving in an individual (The *Maṇimākalā* clarifies them in terms of evil—attachment, craving and ignorance; actions—active tendencies and existence process; and the fruits—which consists of the rest. 30.169.174) S. V. 437.
31. This refers to what the Buddha taught as is revealed by the parable of the simsapa leaves.
32. Jayatilleke, K. N. *op. cit.*, on 'Avijja'.
33. Smart, Ninian. *op. cit.*, (D & IP), p. 38.
34. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*. p. 44 fn. 3,

35. Smart, Ninian—*op. cit.*, (D & IP), p. 42.

Referring to the analysis of the individual in terms of Psychophysical states and which serves as a model to be the object of contemplation, smart reminds us of the medical analogy where the facts are investigated with certain objectives in mind.

36. Eliade, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-7.

37. Buddaghosa, *Athasalini* p. 140.

38. Dasgupta, S. N. *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. 1. p. 110. (cit) Brah. IV., Chandogya, VIII. 7-12.

39. Ibid. p. 110.

40. Sattanar, *op. cit.*, 30.39-41.

Pannurarintrip pannap padathai, yanumintri, enathum intrip, pōnathumintri, vanthathumintri.

41. Ibid. 30. 43-44.

Vinaiyum payanum, pirappum vidum, inaiyana ellam thane yakiya.

42. Conze, E., *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 104 and fn. in p. 146.

This raises the difficulty of freedom of the will and the attendant issue of responsibility. Conze argues that a decision on it is unnecessary because (a) the number of causal conditions are unlimited and several unknown, and (b) in terms of what the 'I' can do against outside forces the whole problem is meaningless.

As against this Jayatilke (*Early Buddhist theory of knowledge*) p. 46 and stcherbatsky, (*Buddhist logic*, vol. 1. p. 131-134) argue for the existence of such a freedom.

43. This is comparable to the state of 'Jnanatpāh' found in Yoga.

44. Tirumular, *Tirumantiram*

*anādi Sivarupamākia ānma
thanathi malatthat thadaipaddu nintrathu
thanāthi malamum thadaiyaltra pōthē
anādi Sivarupa mākiyavāre—(lit.)*

The soul, that was the form of bliss without beginning, because of its beginningless association with impurity stands obstructed, when freed from the impurity, it regains its blissful form.

45. Meykanda Devar, *Sivajñāna Bōtham*, Sutra, 7.

46. Ibid. trans. Gordon Matthews.

*yavaiyum suniyam sattheṭṭhirathalin,
Ṣatthe yariyathu, asatthilathu ariyathu
iruthiran arivulathu irandala anma.*

47. *Satthithu ventrasatthuth thanariyatha satthale*
Sattharin thakala venda asatthithu satthi thentrov
Satthirul oliya lakkan thanmaiatham asatthaie
Satthudan nintru nikkun thanmaiya sathasatthami.
48. Meykanda Devar, *op. cit*, sutra 7. udaraka 3., and Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyar, *op. cit*, supakkam, VII.2.
49. Umāpathi Śivāchāriyār, *Sivaprakasam*, 57 commentary, p. 199.
50. 'Dehanyo' *vasvaro vyapi vibhinnah samalojadah*,
Snokarmaphalabhuk karta kincijjnah.
51. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit*, Supakkam, 111.1. *ceyirurum.*
52. *Pausakara Agama*, *cit*, in *stataratna samgraha—Śaiva Siddhānta*, Vol. 2. No. 1 & 2 p. 28.
53. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit*, Supakkam, VII. 4. *Kuripettra citthum-sattum*—The commentator refers to them as *sthula cit* and *sthula sat* as distinct from *sukṣma cit* and *sukṣma sat*.
54. *Ibid.* 111.1. fn. p. 195.
 J. M. Nallaswami Pillai equotes approvingly the saying of St. Paul: 'We all, with unveiled face, reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord are transformed in to the same image, from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the spirit.'
55. Ponnaiab, V., *Theory of knowledge in Śaiva Siddhānta*, p. 91.
56. *Kayittrai aravenak—kanum piranti kanninkan*
yatarrumoru kuttramilyali nikalamaiyin—lit.
 unless there be a defect in the eye, the perception of the rope as snake will not occur.
57. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit*, Alavaiyal 3.
Peyarcati kuname kanmam porulena ainthu
undal vikatpa unarvinukku—lit.
 determinate knowledge has name, class, quality, action and meaning.
58. *Ibid.* 2.82.
icca jananak kariyan kayam pettral maruvidum vyirkku,
59. Sivajñāna Munivar, *Śivajñāna Basyam*,
 p. 305. *muthalvanathu perunkarunaikku ilukkamakalanun.*
60. *Ibid.* p. 305.
ariyamaiyum arivumaktiya trandu
maruthalaikkunam oruporuduk kudamayanum.
61. Balasubramaniam, K. M., 'Special lectures on Śaiva Siddhānta', p. 74.
62. Sivajñāna Munivar, *op. cit*, p. 306.

CHAPTER V

SALVATION

1. But becoming truly free does not merely imply the negation of bondage and suffering. It is the positive experience of a break-through and the actual experience of ecstatic bliss. It is on the authority of those who had seen or experienced it (in the respective traditions) that it is known to be a blissful state.
2. This does not mean discarding the sense-organs. It merely refers to seeing things in depth, which amounts to seeing more and simultaneously discarding the temptation to surrender to the inclinations. The latter is born out of a serious struggle which religious life calls for. The outcome is going access to things as they are.
3. Dasgupta, S. N., *History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. 1. pp. 151-152. *Samyagjñānapurvika Sarvapurusarthasiddhi*.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
5. Stcherbatsky, Th., *The Central conception of Nirvana*, Lond. 1965, p. 24.
6. Ponnaiah, V., *Theory of Knowledge in Śaiva Siddhānta*, pp. 62-63.
7. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *Śivajñāna Siddiār, Supakkam. Alavallakkanam*, 4.
8. *Ibid.*, 13.
ānādhiye amalanāya ariyannul āgamanthan.
9. Ponnaiah, V.. *op. cit.*, p. 356.
10. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, (*avaiyadakam*)
maraiyinan ayanan mālān manatthinān vakkam
kuraivila alavinalun kuronathaki nintra iraiyanar—lit.
God who cannot be described by the agamas, Brahma, Visnu, the mind, words nor by defectless logic.
11. There are three forms of *jñāna* corresponding with the state of spiritual progress (1) *Pasajñāna*—knowledge of the *ātman* when in conjunction with the evolutes of *māyā*, (2) *pasujñāna*—knowledge of the *ātman* when aware of *anavam*, and (3) *patijñāna*—knowledge when the *ātman* is freed from its fetters attains to the character of *Śiva*.
12. Nyanamoli, Tr. *Vissuddi Magga*, Colombo, VIII, 2 and 7 fn. 72.
13. Sāttanār, *Maṭimēkalai*.
It refers to *nirvāṇa* as 'Ulvakai' or the method of being saved. 2.69.
It also uses the term 'thunpamidchi'—lit. release or cessation of suffering 30.133.

14. There seems to be however a tacit recognition that sense-based knowledge has a relative degree of truth (*samvṛti*) by the Buddhists, just as much as human life is viewed as a privilege (though of course earned by one's own actions alone). But its significance in the path to salvation is much less than ascribed to it in Śaiva Siddhānta. The Buddhists would seek to demolish it in their attempt to penetrate to the dharmas, while the Śaivas would view it as a deliberately designed stepping stone to reach higher stages,
15. Aruṇāndi Śivāchāriyar, *op. cit.*, Parapakkam, 11.12.14. states, *ariyamaī aramporulodinpavēdellām arainthu uyirkadku arivu ceyal alippathunūl*—lit. the scriptures written in the noble language enunciate the ideals of righteousness, prosperity, pleasure and salvation to provide knowledge to living beings.
16. Buddha goṣha, *Visuddi Magga*, XXI—106.10 and XXVII—30.
17. Pope, G. U. *Tiruvāṣaḡam*, 1900, University of Madras, p. 3. Instead he appeals to his Lord thus,—*ellappirappum piranthilaitten emperuman*—lit. in every species born, wear have grown, great Lord.
18. To the term 'bliss' Nyanamoli adds 'without suffering', as the meaning —note. 25. This is only a negative way of describing positive bliss.
19. As Christ says, 'Unless ye become as little children ye shall not enter the kingdom of God'.
20. Smart, N. *Reasons and Faiths*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964. p. 67.
21. Thayumanavar, *Sonna Sollathentru solven*—lit. how could I state the words that he uttered. cit in kalaipulavar Navāratnam, studies in *Hinduism*. Jaffna, 1963, p. 188.
22. This is comparable to the Sautrantika unit because it is here that an action becomes either karmically wholesome or unwholesome.
23. Aruṇāndi Śivāchāriyar, *op. cit.*, Supakkam, XI. 1. *mayamelam ninkī aran malaradikkil iruppan manatha Sivanupavammaruvikkondi*—lit. the fetters are removed and remains at the lotus feet of Hara enjoying for ever Sivanubhava. The Commentator adds that the soul's consciousness (*Sivānubhūti*) becomes identified with that of God (*Sivānubhūti*).
24. Meykandar, *Sivajñāna Bōtham*, Sutra ekanaki irai paṇi nīka.
25. cit. in kalaipulavar Navāratnam, *op. cit.*, pp. 188—189. *Sukamuttraccei theyenaip paṭṭirikkondandi*—lit. he made me blissful and clung me to him *Peṭṭirathaiyeiēntru selvansatṭrum pesathakariyam pesinan tholi*—lit. oh: comrade what could I say of that which I received. He spoke the words that cannot be spoken; *anthaccollal vilaiṇṭha sukattaiyēn solven*—lit. how could I say of the bliss caused by words. These are the words of Thayumanavar.

26. Stcherbatsky, Th, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.
27. Conze, E, *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 71.
28. The Dharmas it must be noted are of a restless nature, for ever coming to be and passing away. Penetration here involves the loss of the notion of a subject that sees and an object that is seen. The self as a distinct entity gets absorbed with the rest of the stream. On the Śaiva side, Hara too implies energy—here they refer to it as Supreme Energy in contrast with the soul whose energy is derivative. Here too penetration is involved and a loss of identity. Does this mean that the Sautrantika nirvāna is another form of Śaiva advaita? But unfortunately their doctrinal setting and techniques differ—*bhakti* as distinct from mindfulness alone.
29. *Mahāparinirvāna sūtra*, cit in Conze, E, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
anivā vata saṃskārā utpāda-vyaya-dharmiṇaḥ
utpadya hi nirudhyante teṣāṃ vyupaśamas sukhām.
30. Nallaswami Pillai, J. M. *Sivagñāna Bōtham* (Tr) p. 107. (notes).
31. Conze, E. *op. cit.*, p. 48.
32. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, *Parapakkam*, 11.2.4. *Neruppaya thuyar pirappu.*
33. Ibid. 11.1.30.
sorrow of bound existence consists of the five aggregates ending in the series). When they perish for good it results in the bliss of release.
34. Nanamoli, *op. cit.*, XVII. 52 fn. p. 607.
35. *Viparyaya*—perverted views.
36. Rhys Davids, T. W. on *Nirvāna*, *The Contemporary Review* XXIX, 1877 p. 253.
37. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, *Parapakkam*, 1.2.21.
To ascribe any value to it by accepting it as the only mode of existence to the total exclusion of a sacred mode of existence is referred to by the Śaivas, as the pleasures of a pig that wallows in a dung heap.
38. Smart, N. *World Religions: A Dialogue*, p. 41. What goes off as 'ordeal tolerance' because of faith in karma and rebirth is also reflective of an attitude of condescension true of most Indian religions engaged in polemics. The Śaivas too refer to their opponents as those who do not know the path of Salvation (*mutthinēri ariyatha mūrkar*).
39. Sāttanār, *op. cit.*, refers to this tendency as *kāmatthu iyatkal*—i.e., as lying in the nature of the life of craving.
40. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, *Parapakkam*, 12.1.5.
41. *Abhidharma kosa*, 11.54.57; iv 9; V. 12. *Sarvatraga hātu*.

42. Stcherbatsky, Th, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
43. Rhys Davids, T. W, *Pali Text Society. Dictionary*, p. 26 ab. Perhaps it is this emphasis in Buddhism that makes some conclude that it is 'purely and solely an ethical state to be reached in this birth by ethical practices, contemplation and insight'. It is therefore concluded that it is 'not transcendental'. This is not true if Buddhism is to be viewed in the broad tradition of Indian yogic mysticism.
44. Buddagosha, *op. cit.*, 1.1. XXI. 18.
45. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, *Parapakkam*, 11.1.31
*Paṭṭhidaṇḍa paṭṭhila vāḷkai eddaiyum pāṭhellām olitthidum
jñāna silam samādhiyin uruthiyāme.*
46. Ibid., 94, *aṭṭhithidum arākamathi
akattri nallarakkal pūritthu.*
47. Ibid., 94. *Ilitthidum pulankal pōkki
inpodu thunpam vāddi*
(clarity is a great deal obscured by the poetic nature of the language. In substance it does not differ very markedly from the conventional statement of the eight aspects of the path, and this is stated clearly in the commentary.)
48. *Milindapaṇha* Tr. by E. Conze, III. W, 8.
49. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, *Parapakkam*, 11.1.2.
āgamaṅkal sonna māthavan nāthanāvan.
50. Smart, N. *op. cit.*, p. 89.
51. Buddha Gosha, *op. cit.*, XVI. 65.
52. Stcherbatsky Th, *op. cit.*, p. 28 (cit. in).
53. Eliade, M. *Yoga Immortality and Freedom*, New York, 1958, p. 162.
54. *Samyutta Nikāya*, 11.106. Cit in Eliade, M. Ibid, p. 162.
55. Eliade, M. *op. cit.*, n. 1.2.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. 166.
58. Ibid., p. 100.
59. *Yoga Sūtras* III. 2. cit in Eliade, M. Ibid, p. 72.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p. 77.
62. Stcherbatsky Castigates La Vallée Poussin for dismissing Yoga as magic (*Nirvāṇa* p. 1. n. 2., p. 6. n. 2) and thus puts him at par with A. B. Keith. Perhaps such a misunderstanding would not have arisen if yoga were linked with the old legend of 'The Fountain of Youth' (See E. W.

Hopkins in JAOS Vol. 26, 1905) Yoga is 'comparable' with 'the magic principle of sacrificing the old to enable a new life to emerge.'

63. The *Siddhis* illustrate the existence of higher laws which are wholly natural but inaccessible to ordinary experience. But even this region of ontology revealed to yogic experience remains within the realm of conditioned phenomena and are therefore classified as temptations.

64. Eliade, M, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

65. Smart, N. *op. cit.*, p. 81.

It is a common feature of the religious mind to seek identifications, somewhat as elsewhere we like to classify.

66. Eliade, M. *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

67. Conze, E, *Buddhist Meditation*, p. 22.

68. *Majjima Nikaya* 11.17 cit in Eliade, M, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

Saiva initiation, which is in line with Vedic initiation, is in no way different from this.

69. In Saiva Siddhanta, the divine eye (as depicted in iconography) is located in Śiva's forehead.

70. Beings who have acquired such faculties are said to be governed by the aspiration for Dharma only to the exclusion of *arthā* and *kāma*. Their mode of birth is different from normal birth. (There is Buddhist legend that the Buddha was born off the mother's abdomen referred to Śaiva polemics). In parapsychological terms they are clairvoyance and clairaudience.

71. *Digha Nikāya* 11. 327 ff cit in Eliade, M, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

72. Eliade, M, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93 fn. 131.

73. Poussin, cit. in Eliade, M. *op. cit.*, p. 174.

74. Conze, E, *Buddhist Meditation*, p. 22.

75. Stcherbatsky, Th. *op. cit.*, p. 26.

76. Aruṇāndi Śivāchariyār, *op. cit.*, *Supakkam*, 8.27.

ajñānatthāl uṇvathnān, pantham
uyar meijñānatthān ānatthāl
athu povathu alaṇ kathirmun
irupāl ajñānam vidap pantham
arum mutthiyakum.

77. Than Grace is nothing greater; as in this world nothing is greater than that one's soul requires. com. There is nothing greater than divine grace. This may be illustrated by the fact that in the world the things each one needs and desires are to him the greatest.

(TVP. chap. IV. XXXI, *Tiruvacagam*, Note VI, G. U. Pope, Oxford, 1900).

78. In Umapathi's *Koyil Purānam*, Patanjali becomes a devotee of Śiva. It does not therefore imply a rejection of yoga. On the contrary it means that the Śaiva doctors had incorporated it along with theistic Saṅkhyā in to their system. But it is made preparatory to the descent of divine Grace.
79. The Śaivas too have a mystical (yogic) tradition of their own. The adepts were known as Siddhar, of whom Thirumoolar the author of the *Thirumantiram* was the earliest. (See *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*, *Supakam*, *Sutra* 7. and 2. *Studies in Hinduism* by K. Navaratnam p. 164).
80. *Si* for Śiva, *Va* for his energy, *ya* for soul, *ma* for impurity and *na* for the veiling energy (*tirotham*). Hence *sadasat*. The soul partakes in both the real (*sat*) and the unreal or perishing (*asat*).
(See *Śivajñāna Bōtham*, *Sutra* 6, Tr. by J. M. Nallasivam pillai, note p. 74).
81. The dance indicates the divine impulse and guidance given to the soul in this stage of bondage, and in the state of emancipation.
82. The dance of Śiva depicts the operation of this divine energy. It is referred to as the 'music of motion', where God manifests himself as the great energy or force of *Maha Chaitanyam*, when he wills that the whole universe of Psycho-physical phenomena should undergo evolution. The *Nūthineri Vilakkam* likens him to the heat latent in the firewood.
83. Aruṇandi Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, 11, 73-79.
84. Herein lies the difference between the Śiva and Buddhist approaches.
85. The Śaivas do not believe in God taking a human form for the human condition is by definition of a limited nature. It is the truly liberated, who as a *guru*, serves as the medium reflecting the divine.
86. Pope, G. U. *op. cit.*, p. 219.
With changing wills the senses five bewilder me: their Course Thou does close up,
Ambrosial fount; come, light superne, that every springing fill'st my soul, and give me grace to see thee as Thou art.....'
87. Aruṇand Śivāchāriyār, *op. cit.*, *Supakkam*, *Sutra* 8.1.1.
88. *Ibid.* 8.11.21.
89. It is one of communion and not identity with God.

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
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
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